STRATEGIC POSITION OF BRITISH EMPIRE

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23962, 1 June 1943, Page 4

STRATEGIC POSITION OF BRITISH EMPIRE

FUTURE OF AIR y POWER

Recently in dealing with some of the main points in Major Seversky’s book “Victory through Air Power, I em nhasised the fact that sea power cannow exist without air. power; mdeed we have learnt by fitter expen ence that, within range of shore-based aircraft air power is already the domi nant factor We know that up to quite recentlimes the British Navy alone «es ahlp to protect our sea and ocean tSde routes adequately all the world over but we must now lace the la that * long range bomber and torpedo aircra?t challenged our age-old naval command of the seas qeverskv predicts that the scope 01 sea powerVust become ever narrower because the striking radius of action of certain types of aeroplanes has already reached nearly 4000 miles and can easfly be increased. Now this means that these super-bombers can fly out to strike at enemy targets 4000 Julies away from their primary air base and then return non-stop to that same base. Bear in mind too that 4000 miles spans most of the Atlantic, and quite a large fraction of the Pacific Ocean. ~ . Thus, if the war lasts another two or three years, Seversky foresees that American heavy bombers based on Newfoundland will be able to conduct regular bombing offensives against Germany and return to their home bases non-stop. It would be simpler and much more economical, he claims, than the present method which involves the transport by sea of great quantities of oil, petrol, bombs, and supplies of all kinds to England, with the attendant tie-up of warships as escorts and the percentage of loss by sinkings. But Major Seversky goes further and foresees a radius of action of even 6000 miles obtainable within the next few years. He wants the American Government to cancel -its enormous annual expenditure on naval warships and build up great air fleets of these super long distance bombers and battle-aeroplanes. Such air fleets based on American soil and possessing a 6000 mile radius of action could bomb the key cities, ports, and industrial areas of any of the major nations in the world; such air power would, he reckons, give the United States a guarantee of peace and security for the post-war future. You will agree that this is a startling new picture, but for the moment let us accept these predictions of Seversky, and see what effect, in his view, this gigantic increase in the radius of action of air power will have on Great Britain and the British Empire, Role of Merchant Shipping To begin with, Seversky is . very pessimistic as to the practicability of depending upon merchant shipping for carrying raw materials, supplies, etc., over ocean routes in any future war: he considers surface vessels will become more and more difficult to protect against attacks by aircraft and submarines. He argues therefore that such self-contained continental areas as those of the United States or Soviet Russia with their direct land access to foodstuffs, fuel, oil, and bther basic materials will have a great advantage over areas such as the world-wide British Empire, which must import these things across thousands of hazardous sea miles. And so, if the British Empire intends to remain a Great Power in the world of to-morrow, it must maintain air supremacy over all its essential trade routes. This, suggests Seversky, calls for the building of large numbers of striking aircraft of trans-oceanic range and also a great merchant air service which would increasingly relieve our merchant shipping by transferring a considerable portion of our commerce to air liners. It is imperative also for Britain to develop a chain of primary air bases at various strategic points throughout the Empire. These primary bases, he tells us, must be self-sustain-ing in regard to air power, that is to say, they must not only house and maintain the necessary air force units but also possess sizeable aircraft industries, safe access to requisite raw materials and ample supplies of petrol and oil. In his conception therefore a primary air base may comprise a whole Dominion or a group of colonial territories. Seversky believes we shall rise to the new situation, but he blames us for holding on too long to what he calls our ingrained national seamindednessin stubborn disregard of the menace of air power. Now let us pause here and examine Seversky’s observations as closely as time will permit. In the main they are well founded and very stimulating, but they do contain certain exaggerations and flaws which must not pass unchallenged. “Self-supporting” Powers Roughly outlined, his first main claim is that a self-supporting continental Power such as the United States or Russia equipped with adequate trans-oceanic air fleets will possess great war-time advantages over an equally well-armed Britain, but one

[By GROUP CAPTAIN M. G. CHRISTIE in 8.8.C. Broadcast.]

who must draw the bulk of her plies from overseas. But is anv r* Power really self-supporting? Evens richly-endowed United States' imlS' ed nearly 450,000.000 pounds worth 0 *! goods from overseas in 1939 and tinues in the present war to be dependent on merchant shS? Again, a country can possess raw terials that are essential one year iS superfluous the next. Take the LT case of aeroplanes. We started 30 vlfl! ago making them of spruce and faW then we turned to fine steels- later » found that aluminium and magnet alloys were lighter and better- to d? some of our fastest aircraft are of a special variety of wood: and the near future who can say whethf we shall not employ entirely new na terials such as, for instance, the crT ducts of tree resins. In short, no conn try can ever claim to be ing; each will remain dependent Zb international overseas trade, some Vi course, in greater measure than others And now let us examine the nn»' pects of Seversky’s giant trans-oceani,' bombers and battleplanes, which T thinks, are destined to control’ tk! skies of the world. Will they be sm. to do so in reality? ’ Seversky overlooks one fact: hi* giant battleplanes will have to cttn enough petrol for a total.journey J say, 10,000 miles, for instance, W California to Japan and back. *5 American battleplane of 20,000 h.p.fljn take, roughly, 33 hours and use jaw* than 100 tons of petrol for the flight from California to Japan and back. This means, of course, that when this aeroplane gets to Japan it will still be carrying about 50 tons of petrol for its journey home. In contrast to thii Japanese short range battleplanes pat. rolling their own country will only need to carry enough petrol for abdut three hours flying—that is to say, about 10 tons. The defending Japanese aeroplane, therefore, will have in hand 1 margin of at least 40 tons. can utilise for equipping itself with still more powerful engines, with heavier protecting armour, or with 1 greater number of guns. For-theta reasons alone—and there are still others—l hold the view most definite* ly that the defender will always have a clear superiority over the long dli* tance attacker. Limitations of Giant Bombers I doubt whether giant bombers will prove effective over these great distances: their bomb loads must be relatively small, and these giants, oj course, offer a bulky target to heavily armed single-seat fighters, which would inevitably possess a much superior speed and manoeuvrability. Probably Seversky recommends them became America possesses insufficient territory round the globe for establishing a suit able chain of her own air bases: otherwise it is hard to perceive why he attaches so little value to intermediary and advanced airbases and insists upon world-wide operations being conducted solely by home-based aircraft. Contrary to Seversky’s views, I hold that no purely continental country possesses anything like the natural strategic advantages for air power that the British Empire does. Take a look at the map and see how its Dominions, colonies, and its hundreds of islands offer unique stepping stones to every corner of the globe. Let each of these make its contribution to our Empire air power by providing aerodromes with adequate ground equipment and reserve stocks of fuel and munitions. This, indeed, should be the foremost task of an Empire air planning board, We should then possess a world-wide system for the maintenance of our Empire air fleets and the great merchant air service we so badly need. Our bombers could fly at a moment’s notice from all parts of the Empire to within easy striking range of any thinkable enemy, and, thanks to the. stepping stones, they need carry ohly relatively small quantities of fuel, thus increasing their bomb-load capacity and .gun power. In case of war our merchant air service could rush supplies, spare parts, aero engines, and dismantled short-range fighter aeroplanes to any part of the Empire for speedy reassembly. It might, as. Seversky suggests, be found expedient for one or other Dominion to manufacture s certain quota of aircraft, particularly fighters, for local defence purposes. Do not please imagine that these ne measures would do away with seaborne traffic in war time: great quantities of raw materials and .supplies must still be brought in ships over tea routes, but with a world-wide networ of air power we should be able m protect our shipping adequately, ho 1 ! 1 against enemy aircraft and submarines, and at the same time strike at the enemy's trade routes, at least in. equ measure as he can attack ours These then are some of the strategic advantages which, I foresee, flung Empire will possess in the xcm ing Itir age. Clearly America, Rg the British Empire, and all otir AUira should collaborate and co-orgate their air power in the future by confer a permanent benefit on,m whole world.