DOCUMENTS OF THE CRISIS

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22521, 1 October 1938, Page 18

DOCUMENTS OF THE CRISIS

Publication in New Zealand

INTERESTING SIDELIGHTS ON RECENT EVENTS

[Specially Written for “The Press” by ARGUS.]

Yesterday the New Zealand Government published as an official paper the texts of the more important letters and documents relating to the development of the European crisis in the last fortnight. The paper includes a report by Lord Runciman on the Sudeten German problem, letters which passed between Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, the text of the Anglo-French plan, and certain observations by the Czech Minister in London.

It Is interesting to note that the exact nature of the famous Note of September 23, which resulted in the postponement of the Godesbcrg conversations. Is not known. In the official publication the text is not complete, the first paragraph being omitted.

In view of the publication yesterday of cabled excerpts from Lord Rur.ciman's letter to the British Prime Minister. Mr Neville Chamberlain, it has become more important than ever to appreciate exactly what Lord Runciman did write. The inference in the cabled report was that the Sudeten Germans could not be blamed for the present crisis. That this is entirely misleading .and not Lord Runciman’s real opinion is revealed by a reading of the complete text.

The Sudeten Negotiations Lord Runciman opens his letter by referring to the final plan issued by the Czech Government, which, he says, in the opinion of the more responsible Sudeten leaders, embodied almost all the requirements of the eight pohits made at Karlsbad by Herr Hinlein This offer, it will be remembered. was refused. “Little doubt remains in my mind that the very fact they were so favourable,” Lord Runciman writes, “operated against their chance with the more extreme elements of the Sudeten German Party.” After further concessions had been granted by the Czech Government, negotiations were resumed, and again broke down. “Again,” he says, “I am convinced that this (the reopening of negotiations) did not suit the policy of the Sudeten extremists, and that the incidents were provoked and instigated on September 11. and with greater effect after Herr Hitler’s speech on September 12. “With the rejection of the Czechoslovak Government’s offer on September 13 and with the breaking off of negotiations by Herr Henlein my functions as a mediator were in fact at an end. Directly and indirectly the connexion between the chief of the Sudeten leaders and the Government of the Reich had become the dominant fac'.ir in the situation; the dispute was no longer an internal one. It was not part ,of ray function to attempt mediation between Czechoslovakia and Germany. “Responsibility for the final break must, in my opinion, rest on Herr Henlein and Herr Frank, and upon those of their supporters inside and outside the country who were urging then* to extreme and unconstitutional action.”

Godesberg Letters

Ldrd Runciman then concedes that the Sudeten Germans have cause for their grievances. These were outlined i.i yesterday’s He continues: “If some cession is inevitable, as I believe it to be, it is as well that it shcfuld be done promptly and"without procrastination.”

International Implications On the political side of the problem, which concerns the integrity and security of Czechoslovakia, especially in relation to her immediate neighbours. he says;-‘T believe that here the problem is one of removing a centre of intense political friction from the middle of Europe. Just as it is essential for the International position of Switzerland that her policy should be entirely neutral, so an analogous policy is necessary for Czechoslovakia —not only for her own future existence. but for the peace of Europe.” To achieve this, he made two .principal recommendations:— “(1) That the Czechoslovak Government should so remodel her foreign relations as to give assurance to her neighbours that’ she will in no circumstances attack them or enter into any aggressive’ action against them arising from obligations to other States.

“(2) That the principal Powers acting in the .interests of the peace of Europe should give to Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against her.” On September 19, the British and French Governments drew, up their proposals - for the solution of the

Czechoslovak problem. Beyond what is already known, these confirm that the transfer of territory would “probably” have to include areas with more than 50 per cent, of Gorman inhabitants. As a contribution to the pacification of Europe, it was stated, the United Kingdom would be prepared to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. One of the principal conditions of this guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee in place of the existing treaties, “which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character.”

At this point, it is not out of place to draw attention to the real’ significance of this suggestion for the substitution of a general guarantee for “existing treaties which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character.” It means that Czechoslovakia shall be asked to renounce her present treaties of mutual assistance, in case of unprovoked aggression, with France, Russia, and with the countries of the Little Entente. It is, therefore, of considerable importance to remember that Soviet Russia is not represented at the Munich Conference. Any discussions on the future of Europe must in Some way concern this country. Her reaction to any change in Czechoslovakia’s status must be allowed for.

The White Paper then prints the letters that were exchanged between Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler at Godesberg. Extracts revealing the fundamental points at issue were printed yesterday. There is little or nothing that can be added to them. For Mr Chamberlain the sticking points were the immediate entry of German troops, and the fact that, although agreement had been reached in principle, the Chancellor would not concede this point. “In the event of German troops moving into the areas, as you consider necessary, no doubt the Czechoslovak Government would have no option but to order their forces to resist, and this would mean the destruction of the basis upon which you and I a week ago agreed to work together, namely, an orderly settlement of this question rather than a, settlement by force.” Mr Chamberlain wrote. On the other hand, Herr Hitler expressed his determination to end the matter swiftly. “England and France have never made an endeavour to alter this situation. This situation is unbearable and will now be terminated by me.” It only remains to draw attention to the wide divergence in point of view that exists between Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler. Mr Chamberlain writes: “I do not think you realised the impossibility of my agreeing to put forward any plan unless I have reason to suppose it will be considered by public opinion in my country, in France, and indeed in the world generally, as carrying out the principles already agreed upon in an orderly fashion, free from the threat of force. I am sure an attempt to occupy forthwith by German troops the areas which will becorfta. part of the Reich at once in principle and very shortly afterwards by formal delimitation would be condemned as an unnecessary display of force.” Herr Hitler writes on September 23, referring particularly to Sudeten areas: "There is here no international Power or agreement which would have the right to take precedence over German right. My knowledge of Czech practice in such matters over a period of long years compels me to assume the insincerity of the, Czech assurances so long as they are not implemented by practical proof.” And on September 26 “The Prague Government has no right to doubt that the German military measures would stop within these limits” (the new boundary submitted in the Godesberg memorandum). Any doubts as to whether Hitler considered that the problem was one to be solved in terms of German national honour are set at rest in his communication of September 23. He writes: “I can only emphasise to your Excellency that these Sudeten Germans are not going back to the German Reich in virtue of the gracious or benevolent sympathy of the nations, but on the grounds of their own will based on the right of the self-determination of nations, and of the irrevocable decision of the German Reich to give effect to this will. It is. however, for a nation an unworthy demand to have such a recognition made dependent on conditions which are not provided for ‘in treaties nor are practical in view of the shortness of time.”