The Press SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1938, Agreement at Munich

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22521, 1 October 1938, Page 16

The Press SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1938, Agreement at Munich

The Four-Power Conference at Munich has

reached, apparent!'., without much difficulty, an agreement on all except very minor details of the Sudeten German problem, so that for the

first time in a fortnight Europe is released from the imminent threat of war. Since the

agreement departs in no important respect from the Anglo-French scheme accepted in principle by the German and Czech Govern-

ments after the Berchtesgaden meeting between Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, since

it is in effect merely an elaboration of that

scheme, it will naturally be asked what new factor entered into the situation between the Godesberg impasse and the meeting at Munich to make a peaceful settlement possible. For the compromise reached is, to all outward appearances, just the sort of compromise which Mr Chamberlain suggested to Herr Hitler at Godesberg and which Herr Hitler declared to be unacceptable. Various explanations suggest themselves and have been suggested. In Rome it is confidently proclaimed that Signor Mussolini has saved the peace of Europe. In Washington it is believed that Mr Roosevelt (who was so embarrassed in the early stages of the crisis that he went to bed with a cold) carried the day with his homilies. Unconfirmed reports of unrest in Germany and Italy (which should be accepted with caution) invite the assumption that the dictatorships have not been successful in arousing any enthusiasm for war among their populations. It may be suspected, however, that something more substantial than a revulsion of feeling against war .or an unexpected revival of Herr Hitler’s moral sense has broken the deadlock. Fairly clearly, more was discussed and decided at Munich than the fate of the Sudeten Germans and the remnants of Czechoslovakia. Spain, colonies, and the Franco-Soviet pact are subjects which suggest themselves naturally; and it may be significant that the first two are mentioned speculatively in British wireless reports. Since Europe is back to power politics and very secret diplomacy it is, however, unlikely that anything definite will be known about the wider implications of the Munich meeting for some time to come.

Concerning the settlement of the Czech problem reached by the conference little need be said. The British and French Governments have claimed that their scheme for the cession of the Sudeten German areas is necessary for the preservation of the peace of Europe; they do not claim that it is just and they admit significantly that it requires “ sacrifices ” by the Czech Government. “It is vain,” says the “ Daily ■ Telegraph,” “to ignore the fact that “ throughout this crisis all the concessions have “ come from one side and all the exactions and “ provocations from the other.” The manner in which the settlement has been made is as Unpleasant as are some of -its terms. Much play, has been made with the phrase “ national “ self-determination.” But when the representatives of four Great Powers, by no title other than that conferred by their strength, re-draw the boundaries of a sovereign State and dictate its foreign policy without allowing its government to be heard, the phrase becomes the hollowest of mockeries. What has been done was necessary; but if the lessons of the crisis are to be of any value, it is imperative that the democratic peoples should face the fact that, in order to avert catastrophe, a nation and a principle have -been sacrificed. The political methods which on this occasion have saved the peace of Europe are not the political methods by which peace can be made just and permanent.