MR CHAMBERLAIN SPEAKS

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22520, 30 September 1938, Page 13

MR CHAMBERLAIN SPEAKS

I CLIMAX TO GLOOMY RECITAL I UNPRECEDENTED SCENE I IN PARLIAMENT I (urrw omcu* topww- 1 I /Received September 29, 9.40 a.m.) I RUGBY, September 28. I Mr Chamberlain's announcement § to the House of Commons, that, as I the result of a new appeal for peace | which he had addressed last night I to Herr Hitler, the German Chancellor had invited him to a meeting, came at the close of a long statement After a scene of extraordinary enthunasn the House adjourned until Monday, on Mr Chamberlain's sugfMtion, to which the two Opposition loaders brought 'their support in •tart speeches, the spirit of which *>• recognised in renewed outbursts of-enthusiasm. The announcement «f to-morrow's meeting, and the dramatic new hopes of peace it rains, came in the passages.of the Mm* Minister's speech in which a loaf recital of events in recent ■oaths was brought 'to a .joint ■tare, as a last effort to preserve Piste, he sent the Foreign Office adtfaar (Sir Horace Wilson) to Berlin as Monday with a personal message to Herr Hitler, for delivery before •» speech at the Sports Palace. Mr Chamberlain reviewed at fefth the chain of events following *t Czech-Sudeten breach and. dealt visits to Berchtesgaden and fioiesberg. He said hj. had no doubt tfcit his visit to Herr Hitler prevailed an invasion of CzechoApproval of France fMr Chamberlain said the French i hau entirely approved this •Native. His letter had pointed out J*Herr Hitler that the reception of •a. German memorandum by the jaachoslovak Government, and pub--1 opinion throughout the world, had flMttuied the expectations he had JlWssed at the last meeting at Pgubcrg. |*he new proposal he made was fat with a view to arriving at a Wament by negotiation - ihere gold be an immediate discussion s**een German and Czechoslovak 5« F : British representatives. Herr Pair, howevei, expressed the view 1* he could not depart from the Igedure of the Godesberg memoSf uni - Jp Monday night, after reading 2* Hitler's speech, in which Hitler grassed his disbelief in the inSgons of the Czechoslovak Govto carry out the promises, Pamberlain offered on behalfBritish Government to guarthose promises, and next g Sir Horace Wilson again err Hitler.

Herr Hitler's view, however, remained unchanged. Therefore, on .Mr Chamberlain's instructions Sir Horace Wilson repeated to Herr Hitler in precise terms that France would fulfil its-obligations to Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack upon the latter, and that should France become engaged in hostilities with Germany, the British Government would feel obliged tossupport her. . *

"Now, 'he story 1 have told the House brings us up to last night, Mr Chamberlain went on. ' About half-past twelve, I received from Herr Hitler a reply to my letter, sent by Sir Horace Wilson. A careful perusal of that indicates certain limitations which were not included in the memorandum, and it also gives certain additional assurances. There is, for example, a definite statement that troops will not be moved beyond the red line. They are only to preserve order. . The plebiscite is to be carried out with no outside influence, and Herr Hitler will abide by the result. Finally, he will join in an international guarantee of the remainder,,of Czechoslovakia, once the minorities' questions are settled.

"Reassuring Statements"

"These are all reassuring statements, as far as they go. I have nc hesitation in saying, after the personal contact I established with him. that Herr Hitler means what he says. The reflection which was uppermost in my mind when I read his lette. to me was that once more the differences and obscurities had been narrowed still further to a point when it was inconceivable that they could not be settled by negotiation. So strongly did I feel it, that I felt impelled to send once more a last appeal to the Chancellor. "I sent him thfe following personal message: 'After reading your letter, I feel certain that you can get all the essentials without war. and witnout delay. I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements for the transfer with you and representatives of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy, if you so desire. I feel convinced that we could reach an agreement in a week. However much you doubt the Prague Governments intention, you cannot doubt the power of the British and French Governments to see that the promises are carried out fairly, forthwith. As you know, I have stated publicly we are prepared to see they shall be carried out. I cannot Relieve you will take the responsibility of starting a world war, which may end civilisation, for the sake, of a few days* delay in settling this longstanding problem.' "At the same time I sent the following personal message to Signor Mussolini: 'I have to-day addressed alast appeal to Herr Hitler to abstain from the use of force to settle the Sudeten problem, which I teei sure can be settled by a short discussion which would give the essential territory and protection for the Sudetens and Czechs. I have offered to go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with . German and Czech representatives, and, « we Chancellor so desires, with repre-j sentatives of Italy and France. _ I trust vour Excellency will inform the German Chancellor that you are willing to be represented, and will urge him to agree to my proposal, winch will keep all our peoples out

of war.'"

Action by Mussolini In reply to his message to Signor Mussolini, Mr Chamberlain said he was informed that instructions had been Tent to the Italian Ambassador to see the German Foreign

Minister (Herr von Ribbenfrop) and say that while Italy would fulfil completely its pledges to stand by Germany, Signor Mussolini hoped, in of the great importance of the British Government's request, that Kerr Hitler would see his way to postpone the action the Chancellor had told Sir Horace Wilson would be taken at 2 p.m. to-day.

Signor Mussolini asked for at least 24 hours' postponement to enable him to re-examine the situation and find a peaceful settlement. Herr Hitler responded, and agreed to postpone mobilisation for 24 hours. (Loud cheers.) "Whatever our past views about Signor Mussolini I believe everyone will welcome his gesture." said Mr Chamberlain.

"I have already guaranteed that the Czech promise will be carried out, and T feel confident that full agreement could be reached in a week."

Mr Chamberlain then came to the most dramatic moment in his speech!—" This is not all. I have something further to say to the House. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him at Munich to-morrow. He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted the invitation, and I have no doubt that M. Daladier will also accept. I need not say what my answer will be." When the cheering allowed him 10 resume. Mr Chamberlain continued: "All of us are patriots, and there can be no membei of this' House who did not feel his heart leap when he heard the crisis had been once more postponed, and we are given one more opportunity to try what reason, goodwill and discussion can do to settle a problem which is already within sight of settlement."

Adjrturnment Suggested

Speaking with increasing emotion, which almost prevented him from continuing, Mr Chamberlain concluded —"I cannot say any more, except I know the House will be ready to release me now to go and see what I can make of this last effort. Perhaps you think it well that in view of this new development you should adopt my suggestion to adjourn for a few days, -when perhaps we can meet in happier circumstances."

The dramatic conclusion of the speech was preceded by a detailed description of Mr Chamberlain's first meeting with Hitler. Referring to negotiations towards the end of August, Mr Chamberlain said that 'events then occurred which increased the seriousness of the situation. As a result, the British Ambassador (Sir Nevile Henderson) was recalled to London for consultation and a meeting of Ministers held.

On August 13 (the next day), Sir Nevile returned to Berlin and gave the State Secretary at the German Foreign Office a strong personal warning regarding the probable attitude of the British Government—already defined as Mr Chamberlain had reminded the House in his speech of March 24—in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, particularly if France were compelled to intervene.

Two days later, continued Mr Chamberlain. Sir Nevile repeated his warning to the German Foreign Minister. Mr Chamberlain explained that the British Government desired to impress the seriousness of the situation upon the German Government without the risk of further aggravation of the situation by any formal representations which might have been interpreted by the German Government as a public rebuff

as had been the case in regard i to representations made on May 21. At the same time, with the Nuremberg conference in prospect, the British Minister at Prague saw the President of Czechoslovakia (Dr. Benes) and impressed on him the vital necessity of further concessions. The Berchtesgaden Talks Dealing with the Nuremberg speech and the immediate deterioration which followed it, Mr Chamberlain came in turn to the first meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. "At this conversation, which lasted three hours, I very soon became aware that the situation was much more acute and urgent than I realised," said Mr Chamberlain. In courteous, but perfectly definite terms, Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudeten Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich. If they could not achieve this by their own efforts, he said, Germany would assist them and he declared categorically that rather ' than wait, he would be prepared to risk a world war. '

"So strongly did I get the impression that the Chancellor was contemplating invasion of Czechoslovakia that I asked him why he allowed me to travel all that way since it was evidently wasting my time. He said if I could give him there and then an assurance that the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination, he was quite ready to discuss ways and means of carrying it out. "I was, of course, in no position to give there and then such an assurance," added the Prime Minister, "but I undertook to return at once to consult my colleagues if he would refrain from active hostilities until I had had time to obtain their reply. That assurance he gave, provided, he said, nothing happened in Czechoslovakia of such a nature as to force his hand, and that assurance remained binding ever since. "I have no doubt, now looking back, that my visit alone prevented the invasion for which everything had been prepared, and it is clear to me that with German troops in the positions they then occupied nothing that anybody could do would prevent that invasion unless the right of self-determination was granted, and that quickly, to the Sudeten Germans, and that was the sole hope of a peaceful solution." Joint Advice to Prague

Mr Chamberlain then described his return to London to consult the Cabinet, which received the views of Lord Runciman and held discussions with French Ministers and gave advice which the French and British Governments tendered at Prague and which was accepted unconditionally on September 21. He added that Sir Basil Newton was instructed to inform Czechoslovakia next day that Britain was profoundly conscious of the immense sacrifice which Czechoslovakia had agreed to and the immense public interest that Government had shown.

The Prime Minister then described his second meeting with Herr Hitler at Godesberg. "I thought I had only to discuss quietly with him," he said, "the various proposals already submitted. I was shocked when, at the beginning of these conversations, he said these proposals were not acceptable, and I learned that there were other proposals which I had not contemplated at all. I felt I had to consider what I had to do. "Consequently I withdrew with my mind full of foreboding as to the success of my mission." After his exchange of letters for the purpose of clarifying the position, Mr Chamberlain visited the Chancellor to say good-bye, and remained for more than three hours with him. He received the memorandum of Herr Hitler's final proposals and the map for transmission to Prague. "For the first time, in the memorandum I found the new proposals," Mr Chamberlain said, "and I spoke very frankly. I dwelt with all the emphasis at my command upon the risks which would be incurred by insisting on such terms. I declared that the language and the manner of the document, which I described as an ultimatum rather than a memorandum, would profoundly shock public opinion in neutral countries, arid I bitterly reproached the Chancellor on his failure to respond in any way to the efforts which I had made to secure peace. In spite of these frank words the conversation was carried on on more friendly terms than that which Dreceded it. "Last Territorial Ambition" "I think I should add that before saying farewell to Herr Hitler I had a few words with him in private, which I do not think are without importance. In the first place, he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berchtesgaden, namely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe, and that he had no wish to have in the Reich people of other races than Germans.

"In the second place, he said again very earnestly that he wanted to be friends with England, and if only this Sudeten question could be got out of the wav he would gladly resume conversations." The memorandum was communicated to Czechoslovakia and decisively rejected. The French Ministers came to London. Finally Mr Chamberlain revealed that in the conversations between the French and British Ministers the latter formed the British that if Czechoslovakia were attacked France would fulfil her treatv obligations. "In reply, we said that if, as a result of these obligations, the French forces became actively engaged, we shnuld be Dledged to support them."

This announcement was received with cheers, and led on to the description of the Prime Minister's final bid for oeace which resulted in the invitation for the Four-Power talks at Munich.

The Leader of the Opposition (Mr C. R. Attlee) said he was certain that everyone in the House would welcome the statement. He was sure every ' member was desirous of neglecting no chance of preserving peace, without sacrificing the principle. He would wish to give the Prime Minister every opportunity of following this new move. (Labour cheers.)

The House adjourned at 3.10 p.m. Members crowded round Mr Chamberlain, shaking hands and congratulating him.

Never a Similar Scene

A Press Association message says that never in the history of the House of Commons has there been a similar scene. In tired, gloomy tones, Mr Chamberlain was reaching the end of his speech when a messenger was seen calling the Foreign Secretary (Lord Halifax) from the Peers' Gallery, where he was alongside Lord Baldwin and the Duke of Kent. A few minutes later a messenger, struggled through the crowded bar of the House and handed a document to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Simon), who quickly glanced at it and passed it i to-Mr Chamberlain, who was then ' .(

outlining his last desperate approach to Signor Mussolini. Mr Chamberlain halted a moment, drew himself up to his full height, and in ringing tones read Herr Hitler's agreement to the conference. The feeling of the House burst like a volcano from members on all sides. The Diplomatic Corps, distinguished visitors, and peers leaped up on their seats, shouting, cheering, and crying. As the cheering subsided Mr Chamberlain's voice was again heard. He was controlling himself with difficulty. It was obvious that the strain of the past weeks had taken sudden hold with the coming of a sense of relief. The muscles of his face were twitching, and in scarcely audible tones he said: "No member of the House did not feel his heart leap that the crisis was once more postponed. I hope the House is prepared to release me now to go and see what I can make of this last effort." I A solitary "aye" expressed the House's agreement.