THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22520, 30 September 1938, Page 9

THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

*o rm» cditob or rat rmr.nt. Sir,—Brigadier-General A. W Andrew has announced that the democracies cannot help Czechoslovakia and that Russia is useless. From tni: simple ex cathedra pronouncement ho deduces that there will be no war. The Allies i n 1914 could not help berbia directly, and yet Serbia, after her armies had been driven out of the country, returned to se-' Jugoslavs creatde. ' The Belgians were driven out of Belgium, all but a small strip and yet they returned. The Czechoslovak army may be driven put of its country; but does this mean that the war will stop there? Your correspondent declares that * ranee is immobilised. This will probably be news to the French General Mah which has extended and manned its Maginot Line in order to secure c r?ater mobility for its forces. Probably the French are deficient in firstc!tss bombers; but Britain, on the other hand, is rather well supplied, in any case. Germany must employ «f e - forces to contain the French and Belgians, and if this does not involve a decrease in the numbers available tor Czechoslovakia, numbers mean nothing. In a world outburst will Hungary march? Well, the Jugoslavians and the Rumanians are in a position to influence the Hungarian effectiveness against Czechoslovakia. The German Army of 1914 was the product of 25 years of preparation; the German Army to-day is the product of three or four years. Is the country as united as it was in 1914? There is no means of telling this positively because the opposition to the Nazis has gone underground; but probably Hitler's readiness to delay even 24 hours has been influenced by some doubts about the home front. Admitted that the Russians may not be as strong as the democratic countries would hope, but is Russia stronger than she was in 1014? I think the evidence points to the fact that in organisation, in motor transport and m industrial backing for the army she is definitely stronger than in 1914. Britain is not fully armed; but her naval preponderance is greater than it was in 1914, her army is not less effective than it was in that year; her industrial organisation is more capable of taking up the war burden than in 1914; her food reserves are stronger: her air ;force is infinitely better. Germany must still stand a siege. Portugal? Her adherence means that in the event of war the liquidation of Franco and his Italian forces will be easier to effect, with a consequential facilitation of troop movements from overseas into Europe. And the United States?

The suggestion that the democracies cannot help Czechoslovakia to meet force is as short-sighted as The 1914 view that the war then would last only a few months. A war will not be short, and Hitler knows that time will be the ally of the democracies. He may also consider the lessons of China, the job of the conqueror is not easy, even with the initial odds in his favour.—Yours, etc., IN 1038. September 29, 1938.

TO TBI EDITOR OF THI PRESS. Sir, —While the decision to put into operation a four-power mediation machine to function for preserving world peace is most welcome, its inherent dangers cannot be discounted. Some of our most prominent statesmen have now no delusions that dictators can be won over to serve the very ends the destruction of which is the main .goal of all their endeavours. The significance that reinstated General von Fritsch withheld his armoured and motorised divisions from a surprise spearhead thrust into Czech territory may be that the present diplomatic move had premeditation. Political theory is now no longer the governing factor in negotiations, but the map of Europe; and geography has decreed, history teaches, and common exigency allows only a limited choice of action if the mastery of the Danubian basin as the key to European control is at stake. French influen.e on Poland, and the decision of Portugal (whose colonies play an important part in German strategy) affirming her pledge to Britain are welcome developments, but the activities ana influence of the first mortgagee of Spain are now of absorbing interest. Anglo-French diplomacy has. enormously increased Germany's task by convincing Russia that her best line of defence is not necessarily her own frontiers. Hitler also provoked the emergence of Soviet diplomacy from its seclusion, but now, his advisers may see' the value of purchasing its retirement in relation to Far East and African policy. The lesson of the collapse of Franco's offensive at Guadalajara Illustrates the difficulties of a modern "break-through" and furnishes interesting data in relation to the German attitude to the Anglo-French military guarantee of 1936-37. If, however, collective security can be jettisoned and the Soviet pacts deprived of all substance, the Third Reich.will have achieved a "break-down," for which Imperial Germany strove in vain. An eagle does not catch flies.— Yours, etc., MAIN SEQUENCE. September 29, 1938.