War No Help

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22517, 27 September 1938, Page 10

War No Help

There has been much in the cable news during the last 24 hours to suggest that Great Britain and France are disposed to take a firmer line in resisting German demands on Czechoslovakia. The Czech Government's announcement that its general mobilisation order had been issued on the advice of the British and French Governments seemed to support this point of view; but the official British version of what occurred shows that the terms of- the announcement are misleading. All that the British Government . did was to inform the Czech Government that it could no longer accept the responsibility of advising against a mobilisation. Considering the increased tension throughout Europe, the change in the British attitude is understandable and is not necessarily the prelude to a stiffer resistance to Germany. Although the British and French Governments may feel confident that Herr Hitler will not ; use force while negotiations are in progress and he has an opportunity to secure what he wants without fighting, they cannot feel so certain that Poland and Hungary will j show a similar restraint. In both these countries, moreover, there is always the possibility that patriotic zeal will get put of hand and precipitate frontier skirmishes on a dangerous scale. In these circumstances, the Czech mobilisation need not be regarded as anything more than a measure necessary to create a more stable situation on Czechoslovakia's frontiers. As far as resistance to Germany's demands is concerned, the unpleasant truth must be faced that in the last fortnight events have moved against Czechoslovakia and her allies and have therefore diminished the chances of effective resistance by peaceful means. If resistance had been intended, the time for it was in August when the dispute concerned solely the status of the Sudeten Germans and both Poland and Hungary showed a strong disposition to keep out of the quarrel. The visit of the Regent and the Premier of Hungary to Germany during August was freely interpreted as meaning that Hungary had decided to throw in her lot with Germany in the impending crisis over Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, Admiral Horthy's statement after the visit that Hungary had assumed no new commitments was probably sincere and is certainly borne out by the Hungarian Government's attitude until a week ago. The situation changed completely when it became known that; under pressure from Great Britain and France, the Czech Government had yielded to the German demands. Germany having won such an easy victory, it was natural that both Poland and Hungary should feel that the time , was opportune to s take action on behalf of their own minorities in Czechoslovakia and that, from motives of self-preservation, they should find it desirable to align themselves with a-Power so obviously dominant in central and eastern Europe. A fortnight ago the overwhelming balance of probability was that Poland and Hungary would remain neutral, or do their best td remain neutral, in any war over Czechoslovakia; to-day it -is almost equally certain that they would become Germany's allies. The problem of bringing military assistance to Czechoslovakia was sufficiently difficult, even assuming that Germany was the only aggressor; now that Czechoslovakia has hostile States on all her borders except the narrow strip which separates her from Rumania, the task is an impossible one. A war cannot save the Czechs.