POLAND AND THE CRISIS

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22516, 26 September 1938, Page 10

POLAND AND THE CRISIS

Dispute Over Duchy of Tescheii? DISUNITY IN THE SLAV] .WORLD (SFICIAXXY HIBIVIM.S »0* TBM 7SX9ft> IBy "ARGUS."] The announcement that the Polish Government reserves ~\ full freedom of action in respect of Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia and that mass meetings in Poland are demanding the return of Teschen focuses attention on a new aspect of ; the present crisis. There is a possibility that these demands i spell the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the failure of the >- r attempt to bring abput a peaceful settlement of the dispute over \ « ' the Sudeten Germans.

The dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia points to a curious contradiction. The struggles waged in central and eastern Europe have, in the niain, been characterised as conflicts between the Slavic and Teutonic worlds. But the Poles, like the Czechs, are a Slavic people, and in the face of the common danger of German expansion could have been expected to support the Czechs. Recent events have shown not merely disunity in the Slav world but bitter enmities. Teschen The former Duchy of Teschen, which is in dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia, has long played an. important part in the relations between the two countries. The territory was once part of Austrian Silesia, pna has an area of about 500 square miles. At the end of the World War, as the Czechs and Poles could not agrep to which of the new States this. region should belong, it was provisionally decided that the territory should be cut in two. The boundary line did not last for long; the Poles, engaged at the time in a life-and-death struggle with the Russians, decreed elections in the entire region, whereupon their section of the territory was suddenly occupied bv Czech troops. If the Council of Ambassadors had not intervened, war would have brokep. out as a result of this coup. Protracted negotiations followed. The final decision favoured the Czechs for, contrary to the agreement of 1918, a large part of the territory they had occupied by force was given to them. The Poles have never forgotten this injury, for the population of the territory given to Czechoslovakia was predominantly Polish. Estimates of th» racial distribution of Teschen's population vary and provide a further cause for dispute. According to th« Czechs there are only 80,000 Poles; th<» Poles, on the contrary, claim that there are more than 200,000. Meanwhile, antagonism has become aggravated by Warsaw's belief that th« Czechs are unjust in their treatment of minorities.

accomplished by peaceful organisation and painstaking administration. Since 1918, the year which brought independence to the two peoples, they have grown further apart. Situated between modern Germany and Russia,, they have had to make the choice. In the beginning of 1934 the Poles made an agreement with Berlin, while the Czechs turned toward Moscow. . The Czechs made Geneva the cornerstone of their foreign policy; the Poles centred theirs on Warsaw, favouring direct negotiation on a bilateral basis. Seen against this background, the Teschen affair reveals its true seriot*ness for the future of Central Europe.

In spite of its small size Teschen possesses immense wealth and is an area of the very greatest economic importance. More than 95 per cent, of Czechoslovakia's coal supply is found in the Teschen region, which also supplies 70 per cent, of her steel production and 60 per cent.. of her iron. Czechoslevak and French investments in industrial equipment are enormous. Furthermore, from the Czechoslovak point of view, possession of the territory is indispensable, because it is traversed by the only railway connecting Prague with the eastern part of the republic. Poles and Czechs Behind the problem of Teschen stands a fundamental conflict in outlook between Poles and Czechs. Even in the old Austrian Empire, when they were subjected to similar repressions, they did not get on together. The Czechs were irritated at the understanding between Vienna and /the j Austrian Poles, for they saw in it the weakening ol their own schemes for national independence. On the other hand, the Poles failed to understand the attraction exercised over the Czechs by St. Petersburg, for in Polish eyes the principal enemy has always been Russia. It is indisputable that Vienna favoured the Poles, and did not regret the growth of differences between th» two Slav peoples. The psychological contrast between them was appient every time Slav questions that v>ere common to both arose. Polish society is aristocratic, and draws its ideals from a warlike past. It is a Polish conviction that national liberty and grandeur can only be won on the battlefield. The Poles are a visionary, romantic, and highly individualistic people. Czech society, on the other hand, is middle class, commercial, and characterised by a democratic uniformity. In the eyes of the Czechs evolution should be

Disontty in Poland

While present information is such as to suggest unanimity in the Polish demands on Czechoslovakia, it is doubtful whether this is in fact the case Out of the total Polish population of 35 000 000, some 20,000,000 are peasants, whose political influence has grown in recent years. Early this year at the National Congress held at Cracow, the peasant delegates were responsible for passing a resolution condemning the Government's foreign policy and declaring for whole-hearted friendship and co-operation with the democratic Powers, including Czechoslovakia. Only a month or two ago . the Opposition newspapers were writing m « toenffly tone and suggesting that the Poles living in Germany and Danzig would be only too happy to live under the conditions of the Polish minority m Czechoslovakia. There exist in Poland, mo?eover?besides the Left Wing, geoSaDhicaliy determined sections who gS with Prague. Such are thT eastern Poles, who resemble the CzechfS fear 'the Germans "The proVdemocratic sentiments of the masses have never been allowed- to •XJnce foreign situation caused little concern when Fiisuaskfwis *Tcharge, of affairs, for Ihey had complete confidence rn his judgment Bit their present Foreign Minister. Colonel Beck, .at least imtal very recently, never enjoyed this confidence.

Poland and Germany It is only natural that Poland should feel relief because the long-expected blow which, a rearmed Germany -was almost sure to deliver, threatens not her but Czechoslovakia Poland cannot but be interested in the defeat least of all, in the disappearance of Czechoslovakia. Qnce Hitler has finished with central Europe, geography points; inexorably in the direction of the Polish marches. Despite the German-Polish trade agreement of last July, General Goring*s newspapers have steadily attacked Poland's treatment of her German minorities, while a new campaign for frontier revision has been waged since„last May. ,„,■-- „ The importance of Poland is usually underestimated. .Although she is smaller than Russia she is much nearer the heart of Europe. Her army is one. of the largest in Europe, and she is well supplied with economic resources. But she also has conspicuous weaknesses. Not less than 25 per cent, of her population are non-Polish, including nearly 7,000,000 Russians and 4,000,000 Jewi Strongly Nationalist in policy, Polan*, probably treats her minorities worsr. than any other country in Europe. She has been on bad terms with all her neighbours without exception. She has quarrelled with Lithuania and Russia and there has been constant friction with Germany over Danzig and Silesia, while it has seemed doubtful whether any German Government would stomach the separation of East Prussia fromthe rest of Germany by the Polish corridor. In spite of her strength Poland cannot face the world.Poland's position is enigmatic. A land without natural frontiers' she is the natural battlefield of Eastern Europe. Situated between two power- - ful neighbours her policy has necessarily been opportunist. Poland has stood for armed neutrality. In event of - trouble she would prefer a policy ot watchful waiting, but it is doubtful whether the rush of events would allow this to be possible. Certainly the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, which is the natural consequence of her present demands, would only recoil on herself by strengthening a more powerful future enemy.