The Czech Mobilisation

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22516, 26 September 1938, Page 10

The Czech Mobilisation

The Czech Government's order for a general mobilisation is a direct and perhaps inevitable consequence of the complicating effect on the European crisis of the demands made by Poland and Hungary in respect of their minorities in Czechoslovakia. As long as the dispute remained a dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia over.the status of the Sudeten Germans, and as long as the Czech Government accepted, however unwillingly, • the AngloFrench peace scheme, Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler had the situation reasonably under control. The outcome of the Godesberg discussions, while these conditions were fulfilled, would be the outcome of the crisis as a whole; and the balance of probability favoured a. peaceful outcome. But, in spite of much that has been said to the contrary, it is clear that, as far as the British Government is concerned, the scope of the Godesberg discussions extends no further than the Sudeten German question. The claims of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia have not been discussed by Mr Chamberlain at Godesberg and cannot be discussed for the sufficient reason that he has not yet been able to consult with the French and ..Czech Governments on the new situation which they create. In the circumstances the Czech Government feels, and is entitled to feel, that continued refusal to mobilise leaves Czechoslovakia in a state of weakness which is in itself a source of danger. Hitherto, it has yielded to the urgent advice of the British and French Governments not to mobilise because it has believed that as long as there is direct negotiation between these governments and the German Government, there is no real danger of a sudden invasion. But the grounds for this belief have become at least dubious. If Herr Hitler is playing for higher stakes than the. cession of the Sudeten German areas, he may well be. pleased enough if Poland or Hungary saves him the need for an act of aggression. Nor can it be forgotten that, in the period immediately following the peace settlement, military coups played a large part in the determination of boundaries in eastern and central Europe. Poland may well feel that the present situation is admirably adapted for the use. .of tactics which succeeded handsomely 20 years ago;.