AIR BOMBING IN WAR

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22510, 19 September 1938, Page 8

AIR BOMBING IN WAR

Not a Decisive Factor

IN SPAIN

The prime factor of uncertainty in the world tb-day is the menace from the air. Nothing has bred fear and distrust, among the nations nor encouraged predatory ambitions so much; as this new means of sudden assault, not only upon fighting men, but upon their women and children far behind the lines.- It. is, therefore, of capital importance to measure, if that, be possible, the part which air power would play in a modern war. At the same time the obscurities of the questions make all judgments -little better than guesses. Lessons of the Spanish War 'lt may, however, be said _with some .assurance that the whole course of the war in -Spain, has seemed to- show the limitations rather than the strength of the air weapon. The extravagant claims of a certain school of air experts have not been fulfilled. Take, first, the case of warships. We were assured some time ago that navies were obsolete and that great battleships, costing seven or eight million pounds, would be easily' destroyed bv aeroplanes costing only a few thousands. I asked in the House of Commons 18 months ago why it was that no Spanish warships of either side had been; sunk by aircraft. The Spanish fleets are not well equipped with anti-aircraft artillery. Their vessels have nospecial armour against overhead! attack. - Yet we se: them cruising about; ;the coast, often in full view from .the. shore, apparently as free from danger as if aeroplanes had never been .invented. Thus, two years have passed. All the time, each side in the Spanish war has • possessed hundreds’, - of aeroplanes- of comparatively modern types, manned not only by a few ardent Spaniards, but in’ the main by pilots from Italy, Germany, and Russia. Very often -it would only take a quarter of an hour’s <Aying from; the shore aerodrome to reach, these ships. Not only have they not been destroyed but apparently it is not thought worth while even to try. The sinking of the National cruiser. Canarias ..would be .-a tremendous stroke, for the' Spanish Republicans. Why are they not able, to do it? Similarly; the Republican destroyers would appear an easy target .for the airmen of Italy and Germany, but nothing happens. British Navy’s Precautions At the time of the Abyssinian tension in the Mediterranean we were warned by tales 'of hbw easy it would be for Mussolini’s air force to blow •the British! fleet out of the water. Since then an enorpaous work of antif aircraft defehcw, • both—active and passive, has . been done .upohl'the ships of the the - original danger was"fnuchi exag-* gerated. -Whatever it was-three* years ago, it is certainly much less to-day; when the British ships haVe received such immense and formidable protection. . ' -

I, therefore, continue to adhere to, the ■ Opinion, I Have frequently expressed that aircraft will-notJse a mortal danger to properly-equipped modernl war fleets, whether at sea or lying in harbour under the protection of their own very powerful anti-air-craft batteries-reinforced by those on shore. '

attack on .’undefended merchant ships is l more: threatening, but evenin this' sphere" where 'the brave- air- 1 men- run no risk and can *come down as low as they like. with, impunity and even stop;.to machine?gun 'the escaping crews, it, is said that in 500.attacks, only 10 ships have been actually sunk. The arming of all merchant ships with anti-aircraft artillery and the institution of. convoys under, properly-equipped escorting vessels shouldreduce this , new" danger to, manageable dimensions..

It would- seem to follow, therefore, that all the implications of sea-power based upon the possession of a superior line of battleships still retain their validity. If this be true, and it is the view both of the-British and American naval authorities, the command of the seas would. appear to rest unchallenged with either of the navies of Britain or the United States. This, added to the undoubted obsolescene of the submarine as a decisive war-weapon, should- give a feeling of confidence and security; so far as the seas and oceans are : concerned, to ‘.the Western Powers.

LESSONS; FROM THE'FIGHTING

The value of air power in sea and v arfare is discussed in this article by Mr Winston Churchill. From Hie lessons of the war in Spain and from the recent improvements in antiaircraft defences Mr Churchill concludes that aeroplanes ju-e “an additional complication rather than a decisive weapon. [By WINSTON CHURCHILL, P.C.. MJ*.]

On land, the operations of the' 1 Spanish armies do not seem to have" ‘f. been decisively affected by the air- 4 weapon. The Republicans, being at a great inferiority in the air, have had, " to endure, often without any means - ; of retaliation, very heavy disproportionate air attack. This inequality has I not quelled their spirit; on the con-. : trary, all accounts declare that thev are righting more stubbornly than at s the. beginning of the war. The Ebro Battle : . f ■ But the "most striking example of V the limitations of the air by the Spu- - ish war arises from the operations across the Ebro. Here, for five weeks".-' 50,000 Republican troops have hem .- fighting continuously bn the south hank , of that river, supplied from day to >. ; day by; a number of bridges, all of- * - which are plainly visible, from "ttej--air and which are not defended byj ' any very large nmrier of anti-aircraft U - guns. Why, we must ask, have these - bridges not been destroyed by air- f , bombing? Certainly, if this had beeh'> . accomplished, the defeat and destruc-' , ' tion of the Republican army would have followed. There was, therefore,- T the highest incentive to General Franco and his German and Italian pilots to break down these bridges;-;/:; He certainly possessed several him- . dred aircraft of modern types which ; could operate from aerodromes close I, at hand, returning perhaps every half- ’■ hour to fetch a new consignment of,-,:-bombs. In this case, they have tried, - but we must still ask, why have they; not succeeded? Inability to aim accur- w ately, and - the unwillingness of alien J:J pilots "to come down low, even in. the.' face of feeble fire, appear to be the only explanations. ■ , We now come to the effects of "air ~ bombing and machine • gunning on , troops in trenches. ' The moral effect. is. no-doubt, very great, especially. - when the air attack is so one-sided." ' But everything goes to‘.show that" an..’, air attack oh trench-lines and fortified*; points is far. less effective than bom- . . bardment -by: artillery. Indeed, have, heard it- said by soldiers -o* er-.V , periencethat .the concentrated hog-' bardment of two or three batteries of ’.. field cannon would, be far worse -to bear’than that of TOO aeroplanes! Cer- ■; tainly, in the. against the Basque country, it-was not the aeroplanes, hut the powerful foreign hat- ‘-; teries which cleared, the way for-Gen-eral Franco’s advance.

Not a Decisive Weapon It .wouldseem, therefore, that far as the fighting troops are eoa--,' earned, aircraft are an..additional cam- r plication rather than d . decisive weapon. It is ‘believed that these opinions are' shared by the-leading soldiers, of.'.? France and Germany. -If they, right, the main basis conditions under which'armie*' figbfwiU. like' those'of ' navies, not be found to have undergone any revolutionary change. Bat,' of course, the Spanish straggle-may he , peculiar, and the conditions there no true guide. i - There remains the air attack upon, - I the civil population, upon the rsc—, \ todies producing- munitions' and : npa^* l the- economic" springs of the country. * ; Here : again, .we -should make a' .great- - mistake to apply the Spanish,'leawn,, I for instance, to ‘the British’case; ex- , j cept under . very great does not appear, however, that in ! spamj very, little accurate bombing has been achieved of particular small targets, j? especially when these had any kind'of -j defence. ■ . ; ’ ' - -'riyj As 'to the psychological . fects upon the civil populations oTr Madrid. Barcelona; and Valencia,' these>>. ’ have been exactly the opposite of if, what the foreign air bombers expected. So Inr from producing panic apd,'a- -. Wish to surrender, they have aroused a spirit of furious and unyielding re*; si stance among all classes. They, haw-; - united’ whole -communities, othenfi* deeply sundered, 1 in -a commonC hatred ( of such base: and barbarous methods. ItI, therefore, remain convinced that?; where the strength of the air forces js?s. equal, the’ side which- consumes energy upon slaughter of the civhj --- population is likely to encounter suifegprising disappointments, and that jthfeg':. attack of military objectives and troopt&. ! in the fighting zones should rematog/J the sole aim of airmen. ... .. All these considerations imght - p???V vitiated by very much larger numbers iff of' aircraft operating ‘ against', mueb/f-r larger targets. ' , .;■•. - ■S’Sjfa I must therefore add, to aitoid understanding, that none-of the crao-fjV; elusions which I have tried to draw;.,;from the Spanish civil. war in the . slightest degree diminishes the need: l'. for Great Britain, with’her special dan—*',: gers. and" vulnerabilities, to acquire at the earliest possible moment an air force at least eaual to that of any Power within striking distance of- her , shores.- ;

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