The Press FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1938. Chamberlain to Berchtesgaden

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22508, 16 September 1938, Page 10

The Press FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1938. Chamberlain to Berchtesgaden

Mr Neville Chamberlain’s visit to Berchtesgaden to discuss the international situation with Herr Hitler in an attempt to avert the disaster of war has been freely described as an event without precedent in modern . history. It is certainly true that never before, in a moment of acute crisis, have the heads of two States shortcircuited the ordinary means of communication between governments in an effort to find a settlement. But it is hardly correct to regard the episode as a new departure in diplomacy. In the period between the end of the Great War and the sanctions crisis, direct contacts between Foreign Ministers in place of contacts through • ambassadors were so frequent as to be normal. This was due partly to periodic meetings of Foreign Ministers at sessions of the League of Nations Council and Assembly and partly to the facilities for rapid travel afforded by tlie development of aviation. In Great Britain, the reaction against this technique of diplomacy began during the sanctions crisis when, as . a result of his frequent excursions abroad, Mr Anthony Eden to some extent lost contact with members of his own Government. Mr Baldwin is on record as saying, emphatically that never again as Prime Minister would he sanction the departure from the slower but surer methods of inter-governmental communication. Mr Chamberlain supported Mr Baldwin. in this- view, and his decision to go to Berchtesgaden is presumably due to a realisation that, with, the situation in' Czechoslovakia perilously close to a civil war, livery hour is valuable to those who are seeking to preserve peace. Whether his decision is a wise one it is impossible to say without a fuller knowledge of the facts than is now. available or can be available for many years to come. The risks are obvious- enough. The mere fact that such a desperate step has been taken must in itself increase the tension. And if the visit fails to have any useful result, it must leave the general situation worse than it was before. There is, too. the danger, which German press comment shows to be very real, that British prestige will suffer through the spectacle of a British Prime Minister making a personal appeal to Herr Hitle*. This will hot worry Englishmen, who will count loss of prestige a negligible . price to pay for even a chance of peace. But" the possibility exists that in a Germany habituated to truculence in politics- the gesture may ,be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Theije i* some consolation in the thought that reckless moves are foreign to Mr Chamberlain’s temperament and that therefore the visit may not be the unpremeditated and lastrninute expedient that it appears to be. The factor most likely to tell against the success of the visit. Unless preparations at the German end have been fairly thorough, is that, ironically enough, the democratic Prime Minister, dependent on his parliamentary majority, is far more a free agent in the present crisis than the dictator who in theory has complete and irresponsible power .over the German nation. Herr Hitler is imprisoned by a system and by a logic of evehts. He is more the mouthpiece of the National Socialist machine than its directive force. Moreover,-National Socialism has embarked, as alii dictatorships must embark on a programme of justification by successes in foreign policy. He and the, other National Socialist;ileaders. may- find it impossible, even if they are willing, to control the forces they have-loosed. j