The Press THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1935. The British White Paper

Press, Volume LXXI, Issue 21416, 7 March 1935, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1935. The British White Paper

The British White Paper on the defence estimates will leave peaceloving men and women in all parts of the world puzzled and uneasy. The proposed increase in defence expenditure is not unexpected and still leaves Great Britain's armaments bill relatively smaller than that of some other powers. What makes the White Paper so unhappily inept is its language and the circumstances surrounding its issue. Within a few days Sir John Simon is, or was, due in Berlin on a visit which might have brought Germany back to the League of Nations and enabled the Disarmament Conference to resume its work with a fair chance of success. As both " The " Times " and the " Morning Post " pointed out, Great Britain was, by reason of her prestige and her detachment, peculiarly fitted for the task of reconciling Germany and Russia and securing the acceptance by Germany of a formula giving practical effect to the principle of " equality of status." Moreover, both France and Italy had agreed to leave the presentation of their side of the case to Sir John Simon; and the results of a preliminary exchange of notes between the British and German Governments had been most encouraging. It seemed clear that, with the Saar question settled, Germany was willing and even eager to abandon her isolated position. At one stroke the opportunity has been jeopardised and the British Government seems to have lost its faith in the possibilities of mediation. The White Paper is politely sceptical of the value of recent conciliatory utterances by members of the German Government; it refers significantly to the need for maintaining " the integrity of certain " territories* across the channel and it mentions with regret increases in the armaments of certain nations, not including France. Whether Herr Hitler has a cold or not, a visit by Sir John Simon to Berlin is not likely to be much use now. The reasons behind the issue of the White Paper at such an inopportune moment and in such inopportune form can only be guessed at. It may be —such things have happened before—that one half of the Cabinet acted without the [ full cognisance of the other half. Or it may be, and this is more probable, that the British Government has preferred the temporary security of an overwhelmingly powerful alliance to the less substantial prospect of peace through general disarmament and an increase in the prestige and authority of the League of Nations. Unfortunately, it is an unvarying rule of the game called "the balance of •' power" that overwhelmingly powerful alliances are unstable. To-day Germany has arrayed against her France, Italy, Russia, and, presumably, Great Britain. But what will the situation, be a year hence? The agreement between France and Italy is a flimsy affair, liable to be disrupted at any moment by a handful of tribesmen in Northern Africa or the indiscretions of the Croat nationalists. Nor will there be any illusions in France over the value of the alliance with Russia or the motives behind it. It is, of course, too early to despair. As the "News-Chronicle" says, the British Government may yet discover that it has seriously misunderstood the intensity of British public opinion on the issues of peace and war. It is not the proposed increases in defence expenditure that will arouse opposition but the feeling that Sir John Simon's mission has been rendered useless and Great Britain's support lent to the barren chauvinism of the French Foreign Office. The strengthening of Imperial defence is one matter and the attempt to intimidate Germany quite another. The use of the term " National "Government" in the White Paper has excited comment. The National Government may yet discover that it was never less representative of the nation than when it committed itself to the proposals and statements the White Paper contains.