LORD CECIL.

Press, Volume LXIII, Issue 19161, 18 November 1927, Page 11

LORD CECIL.

REASONS FOR RESIGNATION A FRANK STATEMENT. * (BT CABLE—PRESS ASSOCIATION—COPYRIGHT.) (AUSTRALIAN AND K.Z. AND SUN CABLE.) (Received November 17th, 7.30 p.m.) LONDON", November 16. In the House of Lords, as the outcome of a reference to questions of foreign policy by Lord Parmoor, Lord Cecil made a personal explanation regarding his resignation from Cabinet. 1 He said it was the culmination of a series of events, such as the Labour Government's rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, followed by the Conservatives' rejection of the 1924 Geneva Protocol. He went to the Naval Conference conscious that his instructions would cause serious difficulties. Exactly what he anticipated occurred. He was repeatedly put in the position of defending situations seemingly wholly indefensible, thereby creating the impression that Britain was lukewarm on the subject of disarmament. Lord Cecil narrated several instances of what he described as Departmental obstruction. Indeed, representatives of the Admiralty scarcely concealed their indifference, if not hostility, to the whole proceedings; He did not infer that was the attitude of the whole Cabinet, but nevertheless ho was unable to convince Cabinet of the importance of taking a stronger line with their technical advisers. Owing to the harmfulness of many incidents, he asked for a free hand to decide minor matters. This was declined. He trusted Cabinet had now seen the result of too great deference to expert advice, and would give Lord Cushendun (formerly Mr Ronald' McNeil) greater support than it felt able to accord him (Lord Cecil). Cecil). Lord Cecil said that when he returned from Geneva he was exhausted and discouraged, and felt that though the Conference was not a complete failure, the advance was not commensurate with the objective. Above all, he felt the fundamental difference between his and Cabinet's views on the importance of an international effort to disarm. He referred to Mr Churchill's declaration after the breakdown, when he said, "England is unable now to, and I hope never will, in future embody in a solemn international agreement words binding us to the principle of a mathematical parity of naval strength." Lord Cecil continued that though he did not agree, he was certain Mr Churchill was convinced that his warning was essential for the safety of England. He was equally sure that if Mr Churchill persisted, he would bang, bolt, and bar the door against any hope of agreement with America on naval disarmament. There was no doubt that the moment Mr Churchill realised that the delegates had agreed on parity, even though they received express telegraphic sanction to do so, he began to. press on his colleagues in Cabinet the necessity of avoiding what he regarded as a disastrous concession. The culmination of many telegrams was the recall 1 of Lord Cecil, who traced at length the subsequent negotiations, and added that the Government had taken a course which he believed had caused the failure of vital negotiations. If he had remained in office he would have had to take responsibility for that as well as to defend it. That was impossible. Earl Balfour regretted that Lord Cecil thought it necessary to level serious charges at his late colleagues. He did not see how the course of events at Geneva had justified the extreme course adopted by Lord Cecil, who, it appeared to Earl Balfour, had allowed inevitable differences to accumulate to a point at which temper gave way. He did not believe two great pacific countries would fail to reach a friendly agreement on the point at issue. Britain did not object to America building as many small craft as she thought necessary, but we had duties to perform to the Empire and to the people of the Homeland.

"Let us say to America, 'Do not ask us to diminish small craft beyond the point we deem necessary for our safety,'"-he said. "Surely that line of policy is not so inherently unreasonable that America will even refuse to listen."

Earl Balfour said he regarded the Geneva Conference as interrupted, not ended. Compared with the great issues, the differences that had arisen were small and petty.