SINGAPORE BASE.

Press, Volume LXI, Issue 18362, 21 April 1925, Page 14

SINGAPORE BASE.

GOVERNMENT PLANS.

FLOATING DOCK TO BE SENT OUT.

(FAOII OCB , OWN' COBBBSFOITDENT.)

LONDON,. March 10

When the Germans handed over their fleet at the beginning of the_ war their forfeitures included two floating dock>. One cf these has already been cut in half and lengthened. Presumably the same will be done to the .other. In any case, it has been decided that one of these docks shall be taken to Singapore and the other to Malta. Lord Curzon, in a debate in the House oi Lords, mentioned that the whole question was being raretulJv examined b\ the Committee of Imperial Defence. Ihev had come to the ruiU'lusicn that, for the purpose of a floating, t;ie site of tiie old .Strait was tlie only possible site. The expenditure it was proposed to ask Parliament to assent to was: l'J-o-iiti, £204,000; 1826-2 1, £•300.000; 1U27-2&, £-'77,000.

Discussion on the Singapore question arose through Viscount Wnnboriic (Liberal) calling attention to the Government's intention with regard to the proposed naval base, and moniiji that papers Ixs laid on t>lie table. It was, lie said, not too hue for the Government to reconsider the project with a view to its modification, if not total abandonment, having regard to the prospect of a further international conference on the question of armaments which, if it bora fruit, would favourably affect the situation with which this naval ba*e was designed to cope. If trouble arose, did anyone suppose that it could be localised in the Pacific or anywhere else'' Such a base would take probably ten years to construct, and it might easily happen that when it was finished the progre-s achieved in aeiial .and submarine craft would have adversely affected the_ primacy of the battleship as the unit of There wan far less objection to a floating .base, which cot'Jd t>e removed at any time and which could possibly be of some commercial value. Was the case of vital and urgent necessity? The Admiraltv, he presumed, would reply in the affirmative, but if all the spend in a: departments received all they asked for the country would soon be- on the verge of bankruptcy. The late Government, m abandoning the scheme, had received support from South .Africa, Australia, and New_ Zealand. The proposal was inconsistent with our general aspirations and might cast 'sowj doubt on the sincerity of onr desire for peace. It had already ■Given rise to anxiety and offence in Japan. If that was so, it was only too likely to provoke that kind of response whifh led a.lways to the disastrous race for armaments. The Japanese Admiralty had been very reluctant to follow the lead of Great Britain, France, and the United States in building new cruisers of 10,000 tons.

No Menace to Japan. Earl Balfour said lie thought that no one of their Lordships could speak with such authority as he on the subject of what Japanese feeling was when the Washington arrangement was come to. Kverybodv knew that_ Singapore was deliberately left outsidp the agreement which prevented the augmentation of naval forces in the Pacific because tlie British Empire felt that its use as a naval base might be necessary for the Empire. He was on the most cordial and intimate terms with the Japanese Delegation at Washington. He had been in freauent correspondence with some of them ever since, and no hint had ever reached him personally that they regarded with any jealousy the work, which'"pn the face of it was defensive—(cheers) —: and on the face of it could not be a menace to Japan. He did not think any other nation would have le/t Singapore unfortified aud unused as a naval base so long as we had.

"The whole case as I see' it can be summed up in a nutshell. We arc responsible for an Empire which is not only laTger and fr.r more scattered than any Empire which has yet existed. The important fractions of the British Empire—l am talking of the great selfgoverning fractions of the Empire— : - India, Australia, New Zealand, and so forth—all know that the • defence of the Empire rests on tho British Fleet and with the British • Fleet alone. If the British Fleet is to remain, ap it must remain, in the Atlantic and in tho seas adjacent to the Home country the only way in which our Fleet san be made effective, should the necessity arise, in the vast area of the Pacific or in the Indian Ocean is by having a base somewhere in these seas, and if you ask the question 'Where?' the answer can only be at Singapore."

Contrary to National Policy. Lord Halriane gently and obscurelyreproved this youthful confidence that the genuine pacificism of Britain would bo accepted at her own valuation. The project was'not, he admitted, inconsistent with tho Washington Agreement, but.it was contrary to the national policy of doing nothing even remotely provocative. The lawyer appeared in liis alternative and contradictory contention that, just because we had nothing to fear from Japan, Australia and New Zealand were completely secure;- but it was the cxMinistcr for \Var who asked where the 30,000 men who would be necessary to protect the base were to come from, and how they would bo housed. Lord Curzon said the Singapore base was a necessary and desirable link in a great chain of Imperial communications. Our position in the Far East was not comparable with that of other European Powers. It was said that the possession of a baso at Singapore would bo regarded by those other Powers as giving this country a position of unfair advantage.' Wo had always enjpyed a position of advantage. Our possessions in that part of tho world and the obligations we had inherited from our predecessors surely carried with them the obligation of protection and defence. If there was a war in the Far East and we had not tho base at Singapore, the whole of our possessions would go, our trade routes would be destroyed, and the Dominions would bo exposed.

Gift from Hong Kong. Turning to the views of 1 lie Dominions and T>epcndencies concerned, he declared that the best evidence was the offer by Hong-Kong of £250,000, gratefully accepted, the gift by the Straits Settlements of the land at a cost of £146,000, and the decision of Australia and Ne\V Zealand to lay the matter before their Parliaments, although, upon the abandonment of the project by the Labour Government, they had taken on shipbuilding commitments for a total'of £3;500,000. In reply to a question in the House of Commons, Mr L. S. Amery explained that the gift of £250,000 from HongKong represented the profits made by the Colony out of the local scheme of shipping control during the war. The gift had been most gratefully accepted by his Majesty's Government. The generous offer of the Straits Settlement to provide the necessary lands still held good. The site had been acquired at a cost of £146,000, and would be handed over as required. Mr Ammon (Camberwell N.) asked whether the offers from Australia and New Zealand held good. Mr Amery said he would reply if the question were put on the order paper.