SINGAPORE BASE.

Press, Volume LX, Issue 18231, 15 November 1924, Page 13

SINGAPORE BASE.

LATE ADMIRAL SCOTT'S VIEWS. In a letter written shortly before his death to Mr B. George Marks, of Sydney, Sir Percy Scott has some interesting things to say on the subject of Singapore. He places tho strength of the Japanese fleet (built and building) at 241 ships, based on the Inland Sea—the finest base in the world. Tho letter proceeds:— "For any chance- of success wo should havo to take out a fleet 50 per. cent, stronger than the Japanese, fleet —say, 360 ships of war—and, in addition, we should require mine-layers, mine-sweepers, ammunition ships, colliers, hospital ships, store ships, repair ships—the total armada of over 400 vessels, This fleet in lino ahead at our ordinary cruising distance apart would occupy 100 miles, and no port en route would take one-eighth of them, The 1 figures I mention were; quoted in Parliament last March, when the House was convinced that we could not send to the East a fleet Btrong enough to cope with the Japanese fleet, and the idea of building docks for battleships at Singapore was therefore abandoned.

"I am not opposed to the establishment of a base at Singapore. I am very much in favour of the project, but I am against building there docks for battleships. As for Japanese^opposition of the base, surely they would prefer us to'spend our money on bricks and mortar at Singapore than oa fast cruisers!

"It is wrong to say that the base has been abandoned. I agree with what Sir James Allen (New Zealand's High Commissioner) said to the London representative of 'The Sun'-—that 10,000-ton cruisers, not capital ships, were the greatest danger to tho Australasian trade routes; that Australians got nothing from the Washington Conference, because it made no stipulations regarding the construction of the smaller type's of war vessels. The hegemony of tho Pacific has passed to Japan because Britain is spending money on battleships instead of cruisers. ' . Best Means of Defence, "My opinions on the defence of Australia are as follows: — "(a) That Australia cannot provide and maintain a fleet sufficiently strong to cope with that of her potential enemy, Japan. "(b) That Great Britain cannot send out to the East a fleet sufficiently strong to cope with the Japanese fleet. ~ '. "(c) That Australia can protect herself against invasion or bombardment if she has sufficient aeroplanes, submarines, and destroyers. "(d) That she could not with her own cruisers protect »her seaborne commerce; she would require assistance from Great Britain. "(e) The U.S.A. are developing a strong cruiser and submarine base at Honolulu. "(f) Australia should provide a similar base, possibly at Port Darwin. "As regards the defence of Australia against an enemy fleet, we may take it that, if Australia, New Zealand, Hongkong, Singapore, and Pearl Harbour are adequately armed with modern weapons, any hostile fleet will keep as far away from • them as our fleet kept away from German ports during the late war. "If the foregoing fact is then it only remains to protect seaborne commerce.

"With properly armed bases capable of accommodating cruisers, torpedoboat destroyers, and submarines established at Singapore. Hongkong, Honolulu, and Port Darwin, and tho countries owning these bases co-op-erating together, peace might Jjc ensured for a very long period, but no time should be lost. Cruisers should be built and the bases protected. - "Australia nearly got trapped into spending a million of money on bricks and mortar at Singapore, instead o£ on the two cruißers sho ig now going to build.

"She had a narrow escape, and I hope she has learned to . beware of British politics." ■■-.. •