The Press. Wednesday, july 17, 1918. The German Offensive.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16266, 17 July 1918, Page 6

The Press. Wednesday, july 17, 1918. The German Offensive.

The expected German offensive has commenced, and it is no surprise that it shoiild turn out to be a resumption of the May-June drive between Rheims and Soissons. The main attack is along the Chateau Thierry-Rheims line, and the front of attack extended apparently to about twenty kilometres east of Rheims. At the end of that nine-day ' battle for Paris," as it was called in France, the Germans were held in a svedge, of which Chateau Thierry was the point, and this bite into the Allies' ground, over fifty-five kilometres deep, was made in five days. The present attack penetrated five -kilometres, on the first day, and is apparently encountering a firmer resistance than met the earlier drives, while east of Rheims the enemy appears to have been completely checked. Until we have fuller details, however, we may consider here to-day only the general situation in the light of what we learned from the May-June offensive. The Allied Command has learned —and this is the main fact —that within limits the mere occupation of territory is not of vital importance. It is, however, of vital importance to economise' men, so far as that can be dono without imperilling the whole position, and this policy of economical resistance was carried out thoroughly in the last German offensive. The enomy, on the other hand, cannot play a waiting game, and is obliged to hurl his masses forward regardless of cost, in the hope of paralysing our armies and of ultimately reaching Paris. He expects that if Paris falls he will be able to force France to make peace, and ho knows that ho cannot wait until the American forces finally turn the scale against him. His advances have been made possible by the Allies' policy of holding the front lines comparatively lightly, and keeping their strength in their reserves. In March the Germans attacked with forty divisions against fourteen and in May with twenty against seven. It is most unlikely that the Chateau Thierry-Rheims front was lightly held on this occasion, however, but still the sovereign rule' for the Allied Command is that ground can be more profitably given up than men. After the last German drive M. Clemenceau said in the Chamber of Deputies, "The Americans are arriving; "we are staking the game upon the "help of the Americans." The chairman of the War and Armament Committee, M. Benazet, used similar language: "If we resist, and everything " authorises us to hope so, we shall "have time to await the arrival of the ''troops on whiah the civilised naiiam

" are basing great hopes." Some American observers took these statements as a clue to Allied policy since the (northern) spring of 1917—a policy of deliberate waiting for the Americans, which would assist the husbanding of French man-power. If the Allied forces, and especially the French Army, were wasted in offensive operations, America's numbers might avail little in the end. Hence the creation of a general reserve under Foch to "keep " goal," or, in other words, to maintain a safe defensive position which would ultimately turn into an offensive. An American correspondent who is understood to reflect the opinion in military circles in Washington takes this view:

"Those in authority," he wrote last month, "who view the prospect of the future coolly and without illusions, acknowledge to themselves that there may be elements of weakness in the Central Powers which are not known to the Allies. They acknowledge, too, that under pressure the sending of Americans to France may still be speeded up, and that thus the balance may be restored sooner than now seems probable, and that 1919 may be something better for the Allies than a year of waiting and deadlock. These are the incalculable elements. Tho calculable elements lead to the conclusion that June, J"ly> August ? September, and October of this year will he repetitions of April and Mnv, withnhe Allies fighting desperately to hold off the superior mieht of Germany, and that November, December, January, and February will be months of rest, during which America will have an opportunity at least to make the defence of the Allies irresistible, and that thereafter the advantage will slowly swing to the Allies, so as to make victory possible in 1920." One thing at least is certain, namely, that however be may sacrifice his men the enemy will achieve nothing that will "bring him an inch nearer to victory. The increasing strength of the Allies, and his own increasing difficulties at home, are reasons why he must eyert his whole force to obtain some decisive result now, but there is no decisive result which he can obtain against the valour and tenacity of the brave men under Foch and Haig and Pershing.