NOTES AND COMMENTS.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16168, 23 March 1918, Page 9

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

* GERMANY MOVES. At last the. curtain has been rai>ed on what may prove tho last act of tho tragedy of the war. The long-export-ed Gorman otTensive iu the West, appears to have begun with a "terrific . bombardment along most or the British tront,'' and an attack at Lagnicourt, lying to Ltie west, of Cambrai, iu front 01 ikmrlon Wood, wnuh tlie Bntisa had 10 evaluate when the Uiui'liiaus made their counter-attack ultor tuo lauioiib "cattle ot Uil< tanks, last Novernoer. 'lliero is no" luaieation jei wuciucr the enemy intend to attack at aay uiuer point oa i;.e Ilul<, or \> jcuier uo Kiu wai ol assaUii 111 ti:e t_ailloral is lUe.illt to U1& tract the Allies luiviii.uii j .tm suaie spot, iuciiu'i' norm ur suuiii, wiieiv au atteaipl to I,'ivak is to be ltiaae. l>uueudori hus conceaiod iiis pians well,* and we have as yet oeen given 110 moa as to w notlier lie liopes to bix-uU tmoiiga to Calais or l'aris. Iu tho turmiv case iu» could count on spmo uaval assistance, Out tiie bombardment or .Dunkirk, winch ended so badly lor somo lour or live uennan destroyers, was probably ouiy one 01 the "tip-and-11111' ranis whicn constitute the only naval activity, apart lroni tlie tubmarine campaign, 01 which Geniiany is capable. 111 all likelihood it had uo connexion with tho eommencoment of the oll'ensive. The ro-gruupiug of the German commands into lour armies indicates the possibility oi' four simultaneous attacks at diiferent points, a plan to which tho reported pooling by tho Allies of all their reserves may oppose au ctl'ective resistance. An indication was given the other day that a German attack might bo made in the historic battlefield of the Mouse Valley, which has been the scene, especially at Vordun, of so much lighting iu the ; present war. Mux it k all speculation. If this is in reality the heginning of the great offensive, we shall know a good deal more of the German plans i*i a few days - . In the meantime, as we said tho other day, there is no reason for nervousness or depression. Anxious we may well bn, for if our victory is sufficiently dccisivo it may break the back of Germany's resistance. Tho Allies have done all, I we believe, that is humanlv possible to ensure success, and wo have 110 fear of the result. If this is the Armageddon of the war, wo shall not fail. MR GERARD'S VIEWS. Not long ago Mr James W. Gerard, the famous American ex-Ambassador to Derlin, gave a Now York paper 1 is views on the situation, particularly as it concerned Germany. He asserted that a revolution in Germany was unthinkable as long as the German armies held the Allies back from German ,oil or staved off somo immense defeat 011 invuded soil—some reallv gigantic reverse that would surely presage disaster. "The modern Germans are not." ho saiJ, "of the stuff of which revolutionists are easily made. They might turn in adversity—my belief is thai tliev will—hut never" in success, or while they believe, as most of thein do whole-heartedly, that their sacrifices keep their fatherland from being shattered by greedy, envious enemies. We might just as well concentrate on the one sure way of curing Germane of her disease, which is to beat her upon the fields of battle. Mr Gerard remarked that it was irritating to hear tho persistent chatter about- "starving Germany." "Ger-' many has never been anywhere near starving. She. took time bv the forelock and systemised the food distribution problem as she systemised everything. It is perfectly true that rations were cut down so far as the stay-at-homes were concerned, so that the army could liavo plenty of the best: hut no man who knows what is going on can keep up the parrotlike chatter about Germany starving unless he is an utter fool or worse." It nil depends upon what one would describe as "starving." Unless scores of other popole have lied, the German nation would regard the food restrictions which they have to suffer as an extremely good imitation of starvation. He added that Germany was ;ict bankrupt yet by any means. Regarding her military strength, he made the amazing statement that she had „ine million effectives—a number which largely exceeds that granted to i.er by expert military writers— and adek-d that the German military machine was nowhere near collapse.

"STRONGER THAN EVER." Here are same extracts from Mr Gerard's further remarks:—. ''The sober truth is that we are tackling an enemy who is perhans evea stronger to-day than she as when she launched her thunderbolt at an amazed civilisation. The machine is fctill running smoothly. - It is still well oiled." "There is no use talking about the war ending in 1918. One can only guess, but my guess is that that there will be three or lour years more at least of struggle and sacrifice and devotion before the peace terms can be laid down by democracy." "The thing always to keep in mind is that we. are starting in to fight a nation little if any impaired in ws military strength, "that still manages to find the food it needs, that is still backed by its public opinion, and that still believes it has a chance of victory and of world domination." "They cannot win because God is against them, as Hugo said of Naojleon at "Waterloo, hut they will not bo beaten by talk. They have got t» > e crushed by the armies of the free nations. " We have quoted these statements not because we wholly agree with till of thorn—wo do not believe, for instance, that Germany to-day is stronger than ever—but bccause * they are the views of a man who up to twelve months ano had cxccntionniiy good opportunities for knowing Germany and the German authorities, civil and military, and because, :.lso tlioy are a good corrective to that habit of under-estimating the enc.iiy which. as we have seen, is not, as we use-1 to believe, exclusively a Britisli fault.

THE BOMBING OF MANNHEIM. The ton of bombs which, as reported by the Under-Secretary for War, weiv dropped on Mannheim on March 18th. "with good effect," were by 110 means tile first that gave the Mannheimsrs an experience of a bombing raid. Mannheim, indeed, has better reason than almost ::nv other German city to rogrt t tlm adoption of air reprisals by Great Britain. It was one of the first objectives in our now aerial offensive, and the raid that was made upon it by British airmen at the end of ii.-rvniber had right, t-o tho claim. made for it that it was a landmark iit the history of the aerial operations of the war. ".Seen iron) the air." wrote 'lie aviation contributor of the "Observer." '•Mannheim looks like a huge chessboard. its straight streets intersecting ar right angles. and over a hundred perfectly square sections. It was over this important German city rlir.t onr airmen suddenly appeared -11 broaii daylight, dropping a large r.nmlior of bombs with considerable material and a great deal of moral effect. Not a big raid as regards weight of explosives dropped, it was particularly we!!-directed and ably executed. . ". Th;shrewd and irritating attack muy rlispo.se the public to credit tho futiiorities with, the possession of average intelligence, although a certain number fit impatient people appeared to lie disappointed that Mannheim was not Berlin, or even Cologne or Essen. Yet there may wt-li have been sound

reasomfejjiicli importanv'at' tho inonldnt thai^.—> them. It is n big manufacturing contro with important docks, .canals, aud railways, and a railway bridge across the Rhine. Thus, "it "ia linked with the town of Ludwigshavon, which ras boon repeatedly ho in bod by thp French. At present a centre of war domical industries, it does in ordinary tiines big trade in petroleum, grain, tobacco.'! OX THE .) UMI\ If we knew all the facts we should probably .find that this one raid Hid more to upset the German nerve tr.au almcst anv other single operation the war. ' It added to'the worries ot the nation, not merely a practicallv new form of attack but also a dreaatui uncertainty, which would have a ) ,u greater moral effect than any German air raid could have upon England Raids on London nowadays^have htt.o effect in disturbing the city's or the ration's nerves On the other hand tho towns strung along the lthine—a dozen or more of thcnr —had never known an air raid, probably did not believe that one would ever be made on thenii and must have been most horribly surprised when bombs were rained «-n Mannheim in broad daylight. Itmight be the turn of any one or then: next. Nor can the military authorities have 1 ell entirely comfortable about it. At ten or twelve <j\ these towns the Rhine is spanned by a bridge which, as the ''Observer" writor remarked, is indispensable to tho German organisation. ''StoD tho traftie they convey, or cut the gathered threads of transport at points for a week or over, and the safety of tho enemy would be seriously compromised. 1'• wculd be our retort to the submarine campaign." " /> In spirit and in conduct, the attack 011 Mannheim, he concluded, surpassed German attacks on London. "Our airmen did their work by day, and flow at Mich a low altitude that particular objects in the city could ho selected lor their aim. When the Hun flies over Ixindon now he comes at night, and flies ■ so high that ho can make 110 reasonable attempt to select spocial targets."

THE JANUARY RAID. Tho l>ecemhcr raid referred _to above induced the City Fathers of Mannheim to communicate with the German Government, demanding greater protection from air raids or the abandonment- of attacks 011 fortified towns,'in order to prevent reprisals. To this no answer was received. Tho Government, in any case, could not admit that German airmen ever bombed unprotected towns. London, in tho phraseology of German communiques, is always "the fortress of London," and was so styled long before it possessed the full equipment of 1 anti-aircraft guns which, by German reasoning, may make it a fortress. Places like Ramsgato, Margate, Broadstairs, Yarmouth, and other South and East Coast towns, are described in German reports of their air raids in terms which make them quite unrecognisable by their residents, and which are not remotely accuratc. So, as Gorman raids on these and other "fortified" towns continued, Mannheim was visited again by our airmen nt the end of January, on this occasion at night. Their bombs seem to have had a most disturbing effect upon the townsfolk. Several who arrived in hot flight at Basle declared that it was a night of terror. One bomb fell directly on some barracks. Panicstricken people, in spite of policc instructions. rushed into tho streets half clothod. When the airmen, whose stay over the town lasted barely ten minutes, •departed. a n angry crowd, shouting: "Down with the war! Give us peace!" gathered in the principal streets. The local newspapers were forbidden to publish accounts of the raid. Since then there has been moro than one. raid on Mannhbira, as well as other towns on tho Rhine —notably one on Coblenz last week- —and thoy will no doubt be continued until the Hun _ has Vieeii taught to soe the folly of liis ways.

JAPAN IN SIBERIA. g ' President Wilson still apparently stands in the way of a general agree- -fJ. inout among the Allied that Japan j should be allowed to deal with .the situation in Eastern Siberia created by the Russian peace with Germany. Tho President, we aro told, will _ assent . later to Japanese intervention, if publie opinion insists, as tho position .is growing more serious. Waiting thus .. on public opinion, there-is a • danger that if Japan's action depends on nis B sanction, tho President may wait too j| long. But it Eeoms possible that the fl question may be settled without, his fl assent being given, for the fighting at "■ Blagovestehenlr, in which Japanese have B been engaged with the Bolsheviks, may ■ precipitate matters, especially in view of tho statement that many thousands of J German prisoners are roaming about • 1 Eastern Siberia, trying to secure arms. S-j Tho presonce- of Japanese and. British -1 I warships at Vladivostock may, as j stated, assure the safety of tho , J city's foreign population, but it is conceivable that if these mat man prisoners 'got tho arms they fl| want, and attacked tho city, tho war- H ships might not be able to prevent 'JS them seizing the stores and munitions intended for the Allios that aro lying ■{H there. According to common belief, which' -•SjCj is supported by a recent writer, thero must bo enormous quantities of munitions at Vladivostock, and in depots along the Siborian' railway. "Almost since the war opened Japan has been busy keeping tho armios in Rusda fed with weapons and military 6torcs. The two military arsenals at Tokio and Osaka were originally reserved as a Government monopoly. During tho 1904-5 war 15,000 hands "V were employed by these factories, but ..I profiting by experience tho plants of 4 J tho works wero expanded, and a£ the SB timo the, great war broko out 80,000 ' hands were engaged. Russia ai>- > § proached Jnnan for munitions, and immediately 1260 factories, large and *0 small, with 100,000 operatives, took S up tho work." In 1916-16, forty-fi Japanese -factories wero supplviiflj iH Russia with cartridges alone. In- throe*** *9 ynfirp Jnnnn sent to Russia about il-" £91.000,000 worth of munitions and military supplios. Fow much of this !s still lyinc at Vladivostock has not , boon stated, but none can have left i tho Bolsheviks secured control of +h" Gover">nent some months 1 ago. If it loft Vladivostock r>rc«ont conditions it mipht in time * the Germans, or. Nt Insist, supply tV Germnn prisoners with tho. matonnl *- *i.o V to become a menace in the