NOTES AND COMMENTS.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16165, 20 March 1918, Page 8

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

UNRESTRICTED U-BOAT WARFARE. Admiral von Tirpitz is nothing if not consistent. Tho author of the policy of unrestricted submarining, he is still asserting that "if it is continued unflinchingly" it vjill/compel Britain to make peace and will ensure Germany s permanent possession of a -naval base on the Belgian coast. The slibm;y?inc danger is certainly serious enough for Great Britain, but it has never come within the limits of probability that it would ever compel us to p(>tc«*, and if Mr Joscphus Daniels, the. American Secretary of the Navy, is rigtit in his statement that tho world shipping construction now exceed 1 - the sinkings, the crisis mu.-t bo regarded as having been passed, and von Tirpitz's con'idtnce to be even more ba.v'r.-..-) than it It is a s*id blow to German hopes. For more 'hail two y?ars the country was !«»l to believe that tho submarine weapon would, if properly used, bring England to Iio:- knee's in six months. Some interesting secret history regarding this matter was lately brought to lignt by the Amsterdam paper "Handelsblad," which published a series of documents obtained secretly from German archives, showing the steps which led to the adoption by Germany of her unrestricted fcubmnrine campaign about a year ago. Towards the close /of 191 fi, the German Admiralty prepared a memorandum to show that'unrestricted U-boat warfare would compel Great Britain to suo for peace within six months. The wording of-this memorandum indicates that the Admiralty hlready had decided to adopt this intensified warfare, but desired to convince the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, and tho Foreign Office of the certainty of the good results on economic and general grounds, rather titan merely on military grounds. Accordingly the memorandum based its arguments on statistics of food prices, freight and insurance rates in Great iSritain. pointed out tho effect which oven the restricted submarine war had shown on pricas of tho essential commodities, on the balance of trade, and on the moral of the English people, and deduce?) from this that, with ynrestrinted submarine warfare, England could hold out. for only a short period against these factors. CONVINCING THE CHANCELLOR, This memorandum was first submitted to Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, and then to Dr. Karl Helfferich, Vice-Chanccllor. Tho latter rejected it on the ground that it was impossible f*> set a limit on England's staying power, and the absence of authentic estimates of her stocks on hand, and 'also because he feared the action which would result in declare tion of war from neutrals, especially tho United States. Presumably, although we are not told so, the Chancellor concur red. The authors of the memorandum then sent a reply in which they pointed out thd gravity of the interna] situation in Germany, and contended that a desperate remedy was necessary. They reinforced their argument by calling in nine experts representing German finance, commerce, mining, and agriculture. These men were invited to replv to three questions: First, -what would be the effect on England of an unrestricted submarine war? Second, what would be tho cffect on Germany's relations with the United States and other neutrals, and, third, to what'extent did the in--ternal situation of Germany demand tho use of this drastic weapon

THE EXPERTS' VIEWS. All the experts agreed on the first point, that England would havo to sue for peace in six months at most, one or two ; -cing-that a ruthless U-boat war wou.u accomplish tho purpose in threo months. The differed as to tho prospect of war with tho United States as a result of tho proposed policy, but nonc_ of them advised that on that aceoiHTfc it should not bo undertaken. I "Bitter feeling in the United States after tho war is not worth considering," said one of them, p'becausc, if Germany succeeds, she can dictate terms to assure favoured treatment for herself. If, on the other hand, Germany throws away this opportunity, the passive approval of tho United States will be of smaH practical value." On the third question all the experts agreed that the internal .situation demanded a drastic remedy, each describing the' condition of the country as threatening disaster. It was on the strength of this array of expert opinion, backed. by the arguments of the Admiralty, that the policy of unrestricted submarining was adopted. It is a policy which has covered Germany with infamy, and which will be long remembered against her. It has certainly inflicted huge losses on Britain and her Allies, and on neutral nations, but it has never come within measurable distance of achieving its purpose.

-A DUTCH.CLAJM. The who are just now apparently feeling rfcther sore over the combined action of Britain and America in regard to Dutch shipping in Allied seem *ft\havo somewhat peculiar views abouY neutrality. It is not long since they were vigorously defending their action in supplying Germany with sand and gravel, though it was proved by geological experts that some of the "pill-boxes" on the Flanders front were made of concrete conjposed of materials .that <jould only feve come from Holland. And some time ago the Dutch Gorernment put in a, claim against tJ*e British Government' and thereay brought down upon themselves a reply in Mr -Balfour's most polished and scathing style of diplomatic corresDondence. It appears that two Dutch ships,-the Elve and Bernisse, which ' wera Vbyaging from abroad to Rotterdam without at a British port, were bejng sent in to Kirkwall tor examination, they met a German The latter opened fire on them without anr warning or summons to stop, and without trying to ascertain their nationality. The crew an I the British officers and sailors on board took to the boats; torpedoes were then discharged at the two vessels, and the Elve sank. The Bernisse was saved bv some British trawlers and towed to l£irkwall. where she was beached. In October the Dutch Government claimed damages for the loss of the ships, on the ground that this was due to their detention by tho British naval forces, and to their being compelled to enter the danger zone. The essential portion or Mr Bai-

four's reply deserves quoting in full. | After reciting the facts, he continual: ''In these circumstances, his Majestj s Government would have expected to hoar that a strong protest had oeen ; addressed bv the .Netherlands Government to the German Government against the obviously illegal and inhumane action of their submarines, and that a claim had been made against that Government in respect of the oss caused by such action. They might also, perhaps, have hoped to receive some acknowledgment of the servicesrendered by the British Navy in sating the Bernisse from destruction, especially in view of the fact that no claim for salvage has been made, itis not stated whether any claim has been addressed to the German Government, but I assumo that it has not. because, if it had been, the position would be that an attempt being made to get the claim paid twice over. The situation, therefore, is that, in the opinion of the Netherlands Government, his Majesty's Government aro to be held responsible, because, while they were performing the perfectly legitimate act- of sending a neutral vessel into port for examination, an act was committed by their enemies for which no justification whatever is possible; and the German Government are apparently to bo held blameless." Mr Balfour added that the owners of the ships had not availed themselves of the facilities which the British Government offered, whereby neutral vessels, under certain reasonable conditions, could be examined at ports cutside the danger zone. He said emphatically that his Government declined to accept any liability in tho matter. "I am constrained to say," he concluded, "that the action of a neutral nation, which apparently accepts, without protest, the proceedings of German submarines in such a case as this, and confines its efforts to presenting claims for the loss caused by such action to his Majesty's Government, is, in their opinion,_ inconsistent with the obligations of neutrality. Indeed, it is not easy to characterise such action hv a professedly friendly Power, with due legard to the customary amenities of diplomatic correspondence."