NOTES AND COMMENTS.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16159, 13 March 1918, Page 8

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

WHERE WILL GERMANY STRIKE i In referring, yesterday, to the position in Salonica, \vc quoted one or two opinions in favour of the belief that Germanj', in co-operation with Bulgaria, may, in view of the change in her relations with. Russia and lioumania, undertake an offensive against the Allied force in Macedonia, which would have at least a* good chance of success. The possibility of such an attack and of Genna'n offensives against Italy and the British forces in Palestino'and Mesopotamia, is very interestfcgly discussed in an article written a month or two r.go by Mr Frank Simonds, one of the best American war writers ana critics. Tho question of the day, he said, was "Where will Germany strike?"* "Will she strike in Asia Minor to regain Bagdad and Jerusalem, restore her dream of a Berlin-Byzan-tium-Bagdad railway, and regain her old sally-port against British Egypt and the Suez Canal which a Turkish Palestine supplied? Will she attack the heterogeneous force now defending Salonica and offering the sole European obstacle to the completion of Mittle Europa, walling off this vast Teutonic creation from tne /Egoan and from the natural outlet of the Central Empire at the south?''

WEST OR EAST? For various reasons Mr Simonds, at the time he wrote, bolieved a great German offensive in the West was unlikely. Largely, apparently, he based this belief on the German assertion that such an attack was to be made. The Germans, he pointed out, had heralded their plans "with brass bands and. a blare of trumpets,'' a proceeding quite out of keeping with their policy in the past. It has struck others than Mr Simonds that all Germany's preparations, about which there has been less than the usual secrecy, may be but a vast scheme of "camouflage" designed to mask her real intentions, aud though this theory might bo thought to be demolished by such an attack as that of the last wock-end —which might be the beginning of the big movement—it might, oil the other hand, bo designed to add a touch of reality to her apparent programme and further convince the Allies of tho necessity of strengthening their forces in tho West. That, ■we admit, would be carrying the "camouflage" theory rather far, but it cannot be dismissed as quite untenable. A AVestern offensive will come, in Mr Simonds's opinion, only if the German situation—economic, not military—"is •so desperate that the Germans feel that they must risk everything on one more bid for a quick decision," and the West is the only front on which "such a decision is to be had. A victory in Italy, or at Salonica or Bagdad, would still leave Britain, France, and America to bo dealt with. But if Germany feels that she can hold out—a condition much more possible now that she can draw on the "Ukraine and Roumania—sho will try to break her opponents nerves and impress the world by successes in minor fields, each indecisive in itself, but with a cumulative effect that might bo of considerable servico to her.

SALONICA AND BAGDAD. It is said that the majority of the military critics among tho Allies hold the opinion that if Germany wants to take Salonica she could do it—at a price. "She has," wrote Mr Simonds, "the interior lines of communication. An attack upon Salonica would put the Allied transport system to a very great strain; it would compel a further shift of French and British troops to the Near' East, certain to be opposed bitterly in both nations, and it would thus weaken the Western front, which remains the decisive front. The Germans could also rely upon Bulgarian troops for the main effort. For Bui-

garia Salonica is the prize that has been sought ever since Bulgaria began to have great aspirations. Germany would supply the guns, tho generalship, a few chosen troops. Certain Austrian units might bo .added."' The effect of such an attack would be to compel the Allies to decide whether they should alter their plans and send more men and guns to Macedonia, or whether they should remain in full strength on the West front and let Salonica go. In the latter case, "Greece might fall, and the German domination of the Balkans would be complete, the Kaiser would re-establish his brother-in-law on the throne of Greece and confront the world with the accomplished fact."

The defection of Russia and Roumania from the side of the Allies undoubtedly renders more difficult tie position of the British expedition in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Germany claims to have secured, by the peace treaties she lias made with Russia, a direct free routo to Persia and Afghanistan, and this must imply equal facility in reaching Mesopotamia. An 'offensive against Bagdad and Jerusalem would, in Mr Simons's opinion, be chicily the work of Turkish troops, German led, reinforced by a few German divisions, and munitioned and gunned by the Germans. It would cost the Germans little in life and a failure would have no disastrous effects at home. '•'lf it succeeded, the British would have to face the problem of either making new sacrifices in the West and withdrawing new divisions, or of accepting the loss of Mesopotamia and giving aH their attention to the defence of Egypt. Egypt and India would, in a sense, be imperilled, and both have a value in the British mind wholly unappreciated by any other nation save the German."

AND ITALY. 'V ar experts at -fcionio, tne cable tells us, are cii&cussing the possiuiuties ot an Italian campaign, ana CoioneJ. Kcpingtou has as»erloci that tho Allies in itiuy "do not hold a lino which a soiuier would have selected," as it permits ot enveloping operations by the Austnans from The north. Their occupancy ot the line ot tho I'iave was apparently forccd upon the Ailieci troops; u was tne best anu easiest oil wiiicn to resist the advancc on Venice, and it may be that they had no men to spare to strengthen their positions in tne mountains. Besides, as Colonel Repington says, tho possibility of an attack through. Switzerland must always be remembered. Neither Germany n6r Austria would conceivably have any compunctions about breaking faith with iSwitzeriand if either thought tiiero was material gain to be derived from doing so.

Mr iSimonds foresaw the danger to which Colonel Repmgcon draws attention. He expected an Austro-Ger-man offensive in Northern Italy in the spring, or earlier.

'The Central Powers have" advanced in the mountains now to the point where they possess most of the necessary ground, and the Italian position seems to me untenable. The. Italians will naturally hold it as long as possible, to gain time to prepare the . line of the Adige, t/ut tho line of the Piave, in the judgment of military men, is no longer permanently tenable, in the face of recent Austro-German gains on the Asiago Plateau." His further assertion that this meant the loss of Venice must, of course, bo qualified. It is not certain that the offensive would succeed —Italy put up a splendid resistance against tho first drive, when the enemy seemed to havo her beaten, and she has since then been reinforced by British and French troops. But any fresh offensive in force against Italy might lead to fresh appeals for help from the Allies, and whether at oould safely bo given would be an awkward question. In the remarks by Mr Simonds that we have quoted he does not in :n:v sense try to predict what Germany will do. He only points to tho possibilities, which are obvious to any intelligent observer. They make our position more difficult, and add to our responsibilities, but in no may will they affect the final result of the war. And whether Germany can make use of any or all of the openings which circumstances have given her. depends on lu w lonrr the German people will bear the intolerable conditions under which they are living.