The press MONDAY, MARCH 11, 1918. America and the War

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16157, 11 March 1918, Page 6

The press MONDAY, MARCH 11, 1918. America and the War

"When the \\*ar broke out, and for long ! after, it seemed to be quite certain that America would remain neutral i throughout tho conflict. Even when it began to appear inevitablo that tho j United States would declare war against Germany, there was no general expectation that the South and Central American Republics would all follow the example of their great neighbour. Xor have they dono so, but rccent cable messages indicate that in the future Germany may have to face tho antagonism of a really united America. Tho great barrier to nnity of sentiment and action has been tho obstinacy of Argentina in clinging to a neutrality which it would not be very incorrect to call pro-Gorman, but that barrier has practically beon surmounted, for the Argon-* tine' Government is arranging -with the United States Government for a conference of tho American Republics with a view to reaching a basis of union, and rt is reported also to have docided on active co-operation with the. Entente Powers in this war. If Argentina comes out-definitely against Germany, the position of Ohili, Peru, and Paraguav will bo determined, and we shall see an anti-German America on the ful? scale. Gorman influence lias beep veiy strong

in Argentina, and the President is understood to havo strong pro-German leanings. Kis policy of neutrality at all costs was attributed by his friends and supporters to a consoicntious belief that he could best serve Argentina's interest by giving her what would amount to a preferential position vis-a-vis the Central Empires, but there are others who regarded him as having for his main concern the promotion of Germany's interests and notiiing else. However that may be, German interests have been studied as far as possible without openly flouting the Allies, although the feeling of the mass of tho people has undoubtedly for a long timo favoured intervention on the side of the Entente. Since tho British Minister at Buenos Ayres declared thai it was logical l-o expect that the Allied Governments would favour L ruguay and lira7.it in commercial matters, and the United States Government issued a •• black list"' of Argentine firms, selfinterest naturally inclined the people of Argentina to abandon a neutrality that was more helpful to Germany than it was likely to be, in the long run, to their own Republic. But tho intoiventionist movement had not this purely gelfish basis. Intervention has been urged as a necessary step towards tho establishment of a real pan-American League—a dream of long before the war. Of tho general situation about the end of last year the Buenos Ayres correspondent of the New York "Post" wrote as follows :—

Thero is a general belief in official circles that is "managing" Uor.nuno-Argonuno negotiations, aud tuo tact time tne league of neutrals is sml rogarueu as petiole, with Argentina ab its lioau, gives colour to belief. German agents are manifestly lecding tins dangerous delusion by ail the means in their power. Chili, apparently, lias her suspicions, seeing that sue revises to commit herself to a n y ueiinito league of neutrals until sho is luiiy aware of what sucli commitment may involve, and that, apparently, is just what Argentina is unwilling to tell ner. It is common knowledge that Gorman oilers of money and material foi public works on a grand scale have Ixn-n h-.ado to Argentina, and tho publication of two cable despatches sent by Luxburg and handed to Uruguay at tne instance of tho Argentine Government shows that similar attempts wero made—and failed —on tho other sido of the Plate. Why these two cables out of the jnany despatches that havo still been kept back wero disclosod, one can. not say. The probability is that their delivery to Uruguay was designed to demonstrate tho truth of tho Spanish proverb, Ifin todas partes so cuocen habas (Means aro cooked everywhere), and perhaps to create a certain amount of distrust and ill-feeling. IJe that as it may, thero is no getting away from the fact that under existing circumstances, Argentina and Chili are both important bases for German energy in connexion with their hotly pressed campaign of underground intrigue, designed to protect and if nossiblo to expand their political and commercial influence in the Amcrieas.

It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of on American union against Germany. There is no region on oarth respecting which Germany has no designs or ambitions; her plans of World-domination touch every country. But perhaps nowhere did the Germans hopo they could build a powerful commercial foundation so largo and important as in South America, a vast continent of incalculable possibilities. It appears more than likely, now, that tho Germans must give up this ambitious hopo altogether.