OUR LITERARY CORNER.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16144, 23 February 1918, Page 7

OUR LITERARY CORNER.

ORIGINAL AND SELECTED MATTER.

NOTES ON BOOKS AND AUTHORS.

IX SALONICA. -A.

4 NO LIMELIGHT BUT SOLID ACHIEVEMENT. (ntoii orr. srsciAL correspondent.) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SALONICA, December 27. Cambrai and Jerusalem —theso successes at the uttermost onds of the war area arc especially chcering ' to the British Salonica force, which remains in masterly inactivity midway between the stirring events of two continents. Yet the recent trend of opinion seems to show that even the Cinderella of armies may vet come into its own. In tlie first place, politicians—taking their interest at an external, not a personal estimate—have begun to ask pertinent" questions in the Imperial House of Commons. When are we going to have another despatch from Salonica? When is the force going to receive its due meed of recognition ? Arc decorations being distributed in proper proportion to the rewards for services on other fronts to the officers and men maintaining British prestige in the Balkans ? Secondly, books have been appearing— few, but incisive—dealing purely with our exploits in this field (e.g., "In Salonica With Our Army," by Harold Lake; Melrose), and lastly reviews and newspapers aro apparently becoming conscious of our existcnco. Even with "John Bull" indifferent, and Horatio Bottomley not willing to "watch Salonica," wc may yet be remembered, if only sound reviews like "New.Europe" continue to divert tho attention of the thinking world to some of the work that has been done since our birthday two years past. Tho article in "New Europe," written by H. A. Law, is an interesting expression of tho civilian's point of view. Starting from tho premiso that "origin- . ally designed to savo Serbia from being overrun, but despatched too late and in insufficient force to achieve that purpose," the expedition "has remained for two years a visible symbol of hesitant policy and uncertain strategy," he proceeds by a series of graded arguments, to insist on its political importance, and concludes as follows: —"The evacuation of Salonica, following upon that of Gallipoli, would be regarded by jur loyal friends in Serbia, Greece, and .Roumania as a cowardly betrayal." . . . "To .withdraw, from active participation in this region would bo to desert our friends, and to justify in the eyes of the worl^all the actions of the pro-Germans" . . . "I can understand a man who says that wc need every man, every gun, every aeroplane in France; I cannot understand thoso who would starve Salonica and yet send expeditions to the uttermost ends of tho earth." Seeing that the writer expresses himself as "incompetent to speak as to what may be achioved in a purely military spheito/' and as' 'litt?o qualified to 6peak on the purely military aspects of the business," ho is surprisingly frank in his disparagement of Palestine and Mesopotamia. But on tho political, cide, ho advances sound opinions as to the retention-of an army in Macedo:*.v and his counterarguments as to inactivity and lack of progress—which .be confesses has been imposed upon the Anglo-French force in the Balkans against its desire —may be met by some estimate of what actually has been, and is being, dono. PICK AND SHOVEL WORK. Soldiering on this "secondary" front, in this land of the Struma and the Vardar, has been a matter of uphill, pick and shovel work from start to finish, a continuous tackling of difficult and unexpected problems. The chief burden of Mr Lake's book, as indeed it would he of any book on the subject, is that v bf roads. Before tho coming of tho 'Allies, Macedonia was practically roadless. This information is not gathered fh>ra the Turkish survey maps, which /■'Wore criss-crossed with broad highways from the gulf of Orfano to tho Albanian border, but from the word of eye-wit--1 oesses who fought through the last Balkan war, and knew the immense difficulties of transport, oi; who—as members of the famous 10th Division—came back slowly and grudgingly fy6m, the Serbian hills. Village roads in England , used to he divided into county roayls, district council roads, and parish roads. THe surface of these diminished in smoothness and adaptability to heavy traffic as the authority diminished in importance and had, in consequence, less public money to 6pond. Beyond roads supported at the public expense, thore were bridle and foot-paths, and finally cart-tracks. In winter the latter were extremely sticky and slushy, but still passable. Two years ago every road in Macedonia, except, of course, the main streets of the largest towns — Salonica, Seres, Kavalla —was a carttrack, and worse than a cart track. In summer it was a mass of white dust, knee deep, in winter sheer holes and .treacherous muddy pools. Not even logging roads or prairio trails in the Great North-west were ever so dangerous and difficult. There were, . .indeed, absolutely no proper commnni- . cations, and the amount of time that > fcad necessarily to be spent on roadmaking, in a sun-parched, unhealthy wilderness, was inconceivable. But it was done, and done with a will and a thoroughness. There are roads (not ono Toad but many) to-day leading to the Struma and Doiran front, which have < carried tho heaviest typo of motor-lorry and motor tractor and gun-waggon, ! which 'havo transported up hill and down valley one way and the other at different times literally hundreds of , thousands of men, and hundreds and thousands of tons of supplies and ammunition, which retain to-day as good j a surface as any County Council road j Ml" the Homeland, or as, for instance, the road out of' Christchurch to HanBier Hot Springs, the comparison being : made because of a certain similarity in gAdient. And roads are not the only asset to < the credit of the army. Some months *20 the forces in the Struma Valley evacuated cortain malaria-stricken villages which they had before wre3tetf from the Turk, who at that time were aiding the Bulgar in that region. The

I enomy made much of the trove. It -was I vaunted as a necessary retirement. It i was indeed essential in this sense, that I it v. ys not regarded as or reasonable, dining the extreme heat of the [ Minnnor, to expose men to what is ; notoriouslv one of the most malarial j areas in the world, whereas on the hills beyond the air was cleanor and fresher | and infection far less likely. Tho action was entirely justified bv tho result It | would bo far: lea! to state that 1917 was entirely ire 2 of either malaria or dysentery, tho two sto-k diseases of the BalKan?. the intensive sanitary treat* mont ot camps and thoir immediate vicinity, an d this salutary removal out i i° c ] an gerous zone, has reduced the number of casos to a surprising degree, and most of thos9 who have £Ono int i ' dock" havo subjects of recurrenre, not cr now infection. And, beyond this, the very villages which wo (at our own will, mark you, and, not by ' force majeure") were retaken in the lata summer. Ihis, in itself, is an unanswerable argument to the re?lame as to our inactivity. On every occasion when w® have been active, we have made a step forward, small but dpfinite. And when we have mt been dt'incr something to catch the public eye pnu pjense the sensational mind, we have just been plugging away at the collar-work. SUPPLIES. Here, also, comes in the Army Service Corps. There has been an infinite amount talk about "Fred C'arno's army," but he is a sleepy soul in Macedonia who does not wake up every day and realise what tho A.S.C. means to tho very existence of tho forcc. The infantryman- who is always "on a stunt" sometimes forgets where his food and ammunition comes from, and how it gets there._ But if you are not eternally "getting busy," perhaps just holding tho line, or building up decent communications, you sometimes havo a moment to look round, and realise, and give credit where credit is duo. Let me quote a paragraph from the "Balkan News" in a roview of Mr Lake's book: "Supplies, supplies, and again supplies"— that is the koynoto of success for the modern army. As your transport, so will your victory be. Tho highest skill, the highest degree of valour, these will be useless unless, the manorial you require is instantly ready to your hand. Deprive your battery of sholls„ and you had better destroy tho guns before they N fall into the hands of the enemy. This is well-known, but it bears repetition." Or again, the words of a man in one of our M.T. Companies, crude, but direct:— There is not much fighting juat now. We're aware The reason for that ig not our own affair, Wo carry enough stuff to blow them to where They'd bo doing nothing. Would that the persona who eing eruch a song, We're here "doing nothing" I'll bet before long, Tkev'd bo gone "West," if they weren't hellish strong, ' "Doing nothing." Or, lastly, a note written by the author of a certain series of humorous articles which have met with much appreciation, as they were published from time to time in our own Army paper, though subject to interruption, owing to the writer's constant preoccupation in tho front line:--"Herowith No. o. I didn't send it last week, as we sallied forth on rather a dangerous enterprise, and, as I didn't know how many of us might not ' come back, I thought perhaps its appearance next day might he unseemly." (The letter, in truth, of a very perfect gentleman!) These are random extracts, but they are sufficient answer to tho quasi-comic creature who-caused passing merriment by the singing of "Go to Salonica for ia Holiday/' STICKING IT. So much, in short, for what has been done, though 1 have not attempted to measure the achievement with a statistical gauge. What counts infinitely more than figures can show, is the sheer grit, and pluck which has made men "do their bit" and "hang on." And we have got to go on "sticking it." So long as we havo no guarantee that Turkey will not repeat again her oft-reiterated tale of massacre and pillage and rapine, so long is a separate peace with Turkey ruled out. So long as Bulgaria and Serbia are at war, and Serbia is . our _ Ally, we can offer no concessions to her traditional enemy which would not seriously embarrass our like as a respecter'of contracts. There is even now a feeling abroad that we are willing to fight "jusqu'an dernier Serbe," and any increase in that feeling, based as it may be on false premises, would be an ineradicable blow to our reputation for decent diplomatic conduct. Even, indeed, if we offered Bulgaria a solatium for her desertion of the Central Powers, we could bring nothing in any wav comparable with what Germany—we" may assume has already promised. One glance at the map of Eastern Europe is sufficient to show the strategical position of Bulgaria as an intermediary between East and West. She" knows full well tho immense advantage of her friendship to Germany as long as she lies on the trade route between Constantinople and Berlin, and no offer in territory could entirely compensate for the loss of that advantage. Next to Bulgaria comes Roumania. There are few of us who will ever forget General Milne's inspiring message of congratulation to the British Salonica Force, when Roumania declared herself on our side. It was the first tangible result of our occupation, and in those far-off days it seemed so pregnant with future promise. Much that is unpleasant has Happened since August, 1916. The Dohrudja has been overrun. Transylvania is still in enemy hands, Bucharest is an Austro-German town, the Russian alliance has proved a broken reed, but tho Roumanian army still stand;} firm, waiting to join hands, repelline enemy attacks with the greatest skill, courage, and tenacity. Truly. Tulcea and Isaccea will stand as worthy companions to Serbian Kaimakchalam, when the history of tho war is finally written, though we knoT better what the Serbs have achieved, and sometimes forget that they may be a little weary of fighting, and waiting, and watching for tho fulfilment of all our -promises. ,

Little less important than the position of Roumania and Serbia is that of Greece. The Greeks are warweary. Their "golden fleece" is success in commercial places. Constantino was not a hero, hut bo was a f.-jr-seeing individual, who ganged the temper of his people. Tt paid him to gain a popularity "at the cannon's mouth" as a second "Bulgarslayer." It paid him, when the war was over, and Macedonia his. to keep the nation at Deace. because the nation wanted to. and could, make money.

Tet the Greeks have sent a large number of troops into_ the field. as many more are iu training, and by next spring the number may bo infinitely increased. To convert the r '"may be" into a "will" would be comparatively oasv, if only we strues hard and successfully. We are tempermanently shy of a gamble; sine© the Dardanelles even less inclined than before. But when the stakes £ro high, and in the Balkans they ere beyond compare, "nothing venture, nothing have.'*