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IN PALESTINE.

BRITISH ADVANCE TWO MILES.

GERMAN THREAT AGAINST PETROGRAD.

LLOYD GEORGE AND THE ALLIED WAR COUNCIL.

4th YEAR—2OSth DAY

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

MR LLOYD GEORGE

EXPLAINS

STORY OF VERSAILLES

CONFERENCE

(By Cuble.—Press Association. —Copyright.) (Australian and N.Z. Cable Association.) LONDON, November 19.

Air "Lloyd George, speaking in the House of Commons on tho recent Army changes, said that the retention of Sir "William Robertson as Chief of Staff was latterly incompatible with the Allies' common policy, which was based on the assumption that tho Allies had suffered in the past through lack of concerted, co-ordinated efforts. The Prime Minister said: —

The Government j egrets that Sir William Robertson's position is no longer compatible with the policy decided upon nt Versailles, but, if that policy is right, no personalities—however valuable, important, or distinguished—should etaud in the way of its execution. (Clieors.) If tho policy is wrong, no personalities and no Governments ought to stand in the way of its being instantly defeated. There is absolutely no difference between our policy and the policy of Franco, Italy, and the United States in this respect. That policy was based on tho assumption that the Allies had hitherto suffered through a lack of co-ordinatod effort, and our purposo and policy lias been to get concentration and unity of effort. It is only necessary to look at 1917 to find exactly the same set of circumstances, inevitably diminishing the power and concentration which would otherwise have been possible. In order to counteract the efforts of the Germans and the Russian collapse, it was agreed at Versailles that thero must be a central authority to exercise discretion over the war policy, that that authority must bo intor-Allied, and that it must have executive power. Tho only difference of opinion was over the question how that authority should be constituted, but agreement on this point was also reached. Mr Lloyd George proceeded, to mention several proposals which were considered and rejected. One was that tho central authority should be composed of the Chiofs-of-Staffs, but this idea was found to be unworkable. It was felt that the members of the new body must know not only tho condition of their own armies on their own fronts, but all the conditions on all the fronts and of all tbe armies. Versailles was now the repository for such information, which was co-ordinated by very able staffs. No single War Office possessed such information.

The Prime Minister proceeded to give cogent reasons why the Chiefs-of-Staffs in the various capitals could not properly exercise the functions aimed at. The Supreme Council had unanimously rejected this proposal. The Delegations then_ separated, and considered the mattor independently, with the most remarkable result that next morning earfh Delegation submitted exactly the same propcsal—namely, the proposal which now held tho field.

Mr Lloyd George said lie would have liked to have read to the House a document in which tho American Delegation oogentlv nut the case for the proposal which had finally been carried, but ho could not, because it was mixed up with tho plan of operations. The Americans presented the caso with irresistible power and logic. The proposal was altered here and there, during several hours' discussion, in which there was not ij single dissentient so far as the plan was concerned. Sir Douglas Hai 2 called attention to a weak point or two, and the delegates undertook to remedy them, but these were not points affecting the root proposal. Upon returning here, he reported to Cabinet that ho thought the plan unworkable and dangerous. Subsequently the Army Council made certain criticisms from a constitutional viewpoint. He considered these carefully with Lord Derby (Minister of War), who, throughout, had put Sir William Robertson's case before Cabinet.

Tlie Prime Minister emphasised his anxiety that these arrangements should be worked whole-heartedly by all tho British and French military authorities, and especially that Sir Douglas Haig should bo satisfied ; therefore, bebore any agreement was made, ho talkod tne matter over with Sir Douglas H al S. who said he would work under the new arrangement—which was that the British Permanent Military Adviser on tho Council of Versailles should become a member of the Army Council, and should constantly eommunicato with the Chief-of-St-aff, and should be absolutely free in the advice ho gave. Tho Chief-of-Staff would have tho samo powers as hi.s predecessors, and Sir William Robertson would remain the supreme military advisor t-o tho British Government. Ho would accompany Ministers to meetings of the Supreme War Council, as adviser, and have the rifrnt to visit France and consult th» military representatives. Our representative at Versailles must have the most perfcct freedom to discuss and recommend plans. If the Commander-in-a P! lrove > or 'f there was difference of opinion among tho various representatives, then the Government; . Thero was no derogation of his authority bv tlie Government The Chief-of-Stiiff would be the chief adviser to the Government in the ovent of any such difference of opinion. It only after the Government had decided to offer Sir William Robertson the position of representative at Versailles that lie (Mr Lloyd George* realised that Sir William Robertson objcctoil military crounds, to tho system which the Versailles Council had decided unanimously to adopt. Sir William Robertson suggested that the representative at Versailles should he made a deputy of tho Chief-of-Staff, but the Government rejected this because the suggested position would be impossible for any man, and would make the British representative in- j ferior to other members of tho Council.

A voice: What about General Foch ?

The Prime ?.iinister pointed out that General Foch was within 25 minutes of Versailles, and could be consulted in the

event of an emergency. lie reiterated t-hnt the Government most deeply regretted that it was obliged to proceed without Sir William Robertson. It was a choice between, carrying ont the policy unanimously formulated by the military advisors of the Allies and retaining the services of this most distinguished and very valued public servant. Sir Willimn Robertson was paid the fullest consideration, but, in view of the magnitude of the policy, tho Government •was bound to stand bv its arrangement with the Allies. Tho I'rimc Minister dwelt on the natural difficulties of securing the military unity of the Allies. Some thought that the new arrangement would so euro political unity, hut would imperil tho unity of tho armies. The Government proposed to invito suggestions from tho highest military authorities as regards tho best means of removing any anxiety that the new scheme might impair the efficiency of our Army The Government would adopt any such suggestion to improve the now scheme. National feeling, historical tradition, and suspicion militated against every alliance, while there were also difficulties due to professional conservatism. Ho pleaded for mutual trust and confidence, which wero tho very soul of victory, and *(ddod :— "Wo discussed and re-discussed this plan, in order that our -whole concentrated strength should be mobilised to resist and break tho most terrible foe civilisation has over been confronted with. We were faced with terrible realities. The enemy had rejected most moderate terms, 'which the whole of civilisation had accopted as reasonable. Why did he reject them? Because ho was clearly convinced that tho Russian collapse would giro him power to achieve military victory, and impose Prussianism forcibly 011 Europe. I bog the House to turn down all controversy and close its ranks. (Loud cheers.) If the House disapproves of the Versailles policy, let it put in a Government which will refuse to accept that policy: but it must 1)0 another Government. (Cheers.) Tho Government is entitled to know, and know to-night, whether th'o House and nation wish to proceed with the policy deliberately settled with tho view of organising our forces. Wo must advance on the foe. I havo endeavoured to discharge tho terrible functions of my position to the. utmost of my capacity of my strength. (Cheers.) If the House to-night repudiates that policy for which I. am responsible, and on which I believo the safety of the country depends, I shall quit office with but ono regret—that I havo not had greater strength and greater ability to place at tho disposal of my native land in tho gravest hour of her history. (Loud and prolonged cheers.)" ' RRITTSH PRESS COMMENT. LONDON, February 20. Tlie Parliamentary correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" says:—"The symptoms of a crisis have vanished. The Unionist War Committee met privately and endorsed the Government's policy, and heartily concurred in Mr Austen Chamberlain's declaration that the Government must sever connexion with Press influence, and itsolf govern. Strong representations to this effect havo been made to Mr Lloyd Georgo privately by , his most ardent Unionist supporters. Mr Chamberlain said that half of Mr Lloyd George's troubles arose from the fact that tho Government was associated with certain newspaper proprietors, thereby surrounding itself with suspicion and distrust." The "Morning Post" says:—"We do not believe that the public yet realises the position of tho Army. This is not surprising, because any newspaper attempting to explain it would bo treated as vicious; but mav not tho public look to the Houso of Commons for the truth? AVe have swapped horses in the biggest crisis of the war, when the stream is doepeet and the night darkest." WAR MINISTER OFFERS TO RESIGN. LONDON, February 20. House of Lords, Lord Derby (Minister of War) stronglv supported the Versailles Council, which had already achieved excellent results. Ho had done his utmost to induce Sir William Robertson to accept the Versailles scheme. Lord Derby added that he had tendered his own resignation, but Mr Lloyd Georgo asked him to remain. j MR PUNCH'S WARNING. LONDON, February 20. "Punch," in a cartoon, represents Mr Punch as saying to John Bull:— "Don't worry about Russia. What wo have got to worry about is this cursed backstairs intrigue in Press and Parliament."

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19180222.2.54

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16143, 22 February 1918, Page 7

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,644

IN PALESTINE. Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16143, 22 February 1918, Page 7

IN PALESTINE. Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16143, 22 February 1918, Page 7

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