OUR LITERARY CORNER.

Press, Volume LIII, Issue 15989, 25 August 1917, Page 7

OUR LITERARY CORNER.

ORIGINAL AND SELECTED MATTER. NOTES ON BOOKS AND AUTHORS.

the last lap.

• ♦ I.—THE MAN" BEHIND THE FRONT, (From the "Morning Post."') (By courtesy of the Editor, Mr H. J. Gwynne.) Even the materialistic, brutal, and unimaginative German, the apostle of might, has realised long ago that victory can on * y k* s ac l" ovoc * t ' l ° s ? ir ' t of the people fighters in the field. AH their text-hooks could be quoted to demonstrate this. Bosides, it is obvious that tho national "will to win" is essential for the waging of a victorious war that even he has been bound to recognise it. and does not need tho preaching of text-books and military essayists to bring homo the importance of it. {5o it is that, in this third year of tho war, when everybody is beginning to feel the strain acutely, that nation only will win which is determined to win, and will lose if fatiguo and lassitudo undermine its courage. THE NEED FOR A SPURT.

Tho British race has never fought better than when it has its back to the wall, but it needs stimulating and enu couragement. Wo passed the • period of the war, in 1914-15. £10 indeed, all the Allies wero faced wiiki the possibility of tho worst hap- ' v jx/ning. Now wo havo tho Boeho beaten, and the nation should realise tho fact in order to givo support to tho armies in tho field. Wo aro in tho last lap of a long-distanco race. We arc all puffing a bit, but tho Gorman is puffing very hard indeed, and his strength and spirit aro not sustained by tho fact that ho knows that ho cannot win. Our political leaders, not having military knowledge, havo not yet realised that wo aro winning, so they cannot stimulate tho nation to the great final spurt which wo must soon begin to make. I hopo, in the course of these articles, to prove conclusively that tho Bocho i 6 being well beaten, and that tho path to comploto victory is not a long one. Thero is nothing so fatal to us as a nation as a stupid and blind optimism, but there is also no tiling so misleading and depressing as a malignant pessimism. The first stages of our victorious march began last year on tho Sommo. That groat- series of battlos drovo tho German back on to tho Hindenburg lino. And yet thero were people in England who eaid there was no Hindenburg line. Our enemy knew in October last that ho could not hang on, though it •was not till ©arly spring this year that * ho went back finally. So to-day, lio -'knows quite well that ho cannot stand any moro blows liko those of Arras and Hcssines. Ho is a groggy boxer leaning on'the ropes for support. It is our duty to sparo not an ounce of strength in order to give him tho knock-out blow.

THE. NEW WARFARE. We at hoiiio aro still inclined to look for. the'military results of the old times of mobile armies and open warfare. To outflank and out-manceuvro an enemy bo that he was hound to be smashed or run away is impossible to-day. But tho principles of strategy remain the same. They are simple. . Tho object of a commander is to concentrate superior forces at a decisive point and destroy tho enemy armies. In the old days this could bo accomplished as a result of two or three weeks' manoeuvring. It takes longer to-day. But wo are following the samo old principles, which never alter, although the execution is different. Wo at homo are apt to count results by miles or yards. This is utterly wrong. If we attack the enemy on a front of a thousand yards in a lino of trenches of 100 yards away and drive him but of thorn, have victory! 'When this is done on a larger scale of a , front of nine miles and a dopth of two we have achieved ft great victory, and if our losses are one-third of the enemy's (as they wero at MesBinos) we aro dealing him one of tho decisive blows of the war. r;To break through the enemy's line is now recognised on both sides as a most difficult and oven dangerous enterprise. We havo long ago given up trying to do so, but wo are trying to break the men who are . holding the line, and in that particular project-wo are having conspicuous and constant success. Tho . reasons which make it difficult to smash through 'tho enemy, scatter him right \ and left, and get behind his remaining lines not,, obvious, . perhaps, to those who have not studied the presont phase of warfare. Both lines are in. trenches, holding many positions stronger than Port Arthur. To drivo nicn out of these trenches requires an enormous artillery preparation, which breaks up tho country , in a "way which cannot be described. Suppose, for example, that the first assault —as, indeed, it has frequently happened— smashes up the enemy divisions in front of it and drives them headlong to the rear. It would seem a heavfcn-sent opportunity for pursuit, but it is nothing of the kind. The German is retreating, or, rather, running away, to a rear wpll supplied with good roads, light and heavy railways. He is going , back to his reserves of men and munitions; we are leaving ours behind. Be|X' fqre "we can take full advantage of our A success wo must build roads, nnq sometimes make bridges. All this requires timo, and when we are ready to push on we are face to face with a new, formidable position and new reserves of men and guns. „ . .This being so, the reader will no doubt ask himself what is tho uso of such attacks. Well, in the first place all our assaults have tho effect of lowering tho moral of the enemy. But thoy have another and more practical result. Take a pencil and a pair of compasses and draw a straight line. T jde it into ten equal parts. Each division represents five miles of front. Take the compasses and at any one of the five mile points draw a semi-circle, with a radius of five miles, on tho enemy's side of the line. This will represent the result of a big push. But if you will study this dent with an eye to artillery positions you will sco that .tne old line which tho Germans still

hold becomes liable to enfilade (or side-way) fire, as 'well as fire from the front.; In the result he has to give way and make tho gap in his Jinc bigger, and ultimately is obliged to withdraw altogether to a line far in the rear. This is -what happened at the Somme, as will be seen by Sir Douglas Haig's admirable despatch. An objection will at onco be made to this description that our gap (or salient) in tho enemy's line offers exactly the same advantage to him in this matter of frontal and enfilade fire. But here, conic in British airmen, British infantry—tho best in tho world— and, above all, British artillery predominance. The Boche can, and does, j make things in our salient uncomfortable for us, but we are not long before wo "get on top of him" and aro left more or less quiet to smash "up his remaining lines. j THIS YEAR'S RESULTS. j Let us look at. the state of affairs at the prcsont time. Last year the enemy iiad on the Western front 120 divisions. Of theso he put into and withdrew from tlio battJc line 07 from the Ist of July to the end of .November. . In tho month of July lib had used (and partially used up.) 34 divisions; in: August, 18. That is to..say, that last year in two months he had placed in the battle line, and drawn out mauled and reduccd, 52 divisions. _ This year, counting two months' offensive, French and British, from April 9th to June 9th, he has already used up and withdrawn 110 divisions out of 157. Now theso,are two facts -which nothing can controvert. There is no secret about them. They are well known to both sides. And"purely this can bo described as encouraging. « The Russian position has one great advantage. It is an uncertain one. This may have inconveniences for Russia's Allies, but it is also very embarrassing to tho Central Powers. No plan can be made on tho basis of Hussians "standing pat," nor yet on their making an offensive, with the result that the Bocho has not been able to tako any considerable amount of troops away from. tho Eastern front. What ho lias done is to exchange indifferent divisions on "tho Western front tor good divisions from the. Eastern. _He has also scut somo artillery from Russia The new formations, however, •which he iias been "busy preparing in tho winter are nearly, all on our and tho French" front. We may conclude from this, therefore, that, Hussia is immobilising a considerable German forco. "SMien she decides on an oftensive her task will fce comparatn el # . easy. BRITISH TACTICAL FROGRESb. The stages in the progress which the British armies in Franco have made can bo clearly defined, I'irst comes is cuve Ciiapelle, then Loos, then. the Somme, then tho Scarpe. and the Ancre, then Vimy and Arras, and lastly, Messines. Every ono of these wero lessons in the art of the particular kind of warfare wo arc now waging. Wo are a curious and incomprehensible race. . never make preparations; wo wait xoi disaster to be upon us. We sit down and say that everything will b© aU right in a few weeks, and then, ix> uec tho _ expression of a Canadian officer, : 'wlion our noses have been rubbed, in it" -we suddenly turn to and improvise most perfectly, moro perfectly, indeed, than many other nations who have ' been preparing for generations. It is wonderful, heartbreaking, and expensive, but somehow wo "get there. Go and ask German officers and oven prisoners what they think. They be-r/n-n gas; wo havo gone bettor, and our gas and anti-gas arrangements aro moro complete and more efficient than any that tho Boche possesses. Ho began with, a groat and powerful artillery; we beat him hollow. _ His oounterbattory work is miles behind ours. Wo beat him in tho air, we beat him in mines, wo boat him _ in_ all scientific appliances, wo boat him in his strongest point—organisation. His staff work is not now to bo compared to _ ours. There is not a. singlo position in his possession which we cannot take from him at loss cost than ho can dofend it. Ho is a beaten man. His moral is shaky, and only his discipline remains. He is fighting a hopeless fight, and he knows it, but our good people at home havo not yet realised it. Here, indeed, is a phenomenon -worthy of study. Tho nearer a man approaches tho firing lino the greater enthusiasm and confidence ho finds. Men who aro marching into tho line, as well as those ■who arc leaving it, display a spirit of such glorious courage and belief in victory that tho most determined pessimist becomes a changed man. As soon as I landed in England on iny return I found the opposite spirit. It was not exaptly depression. Perhaps "war weariness" is tho best term to use. But it was a marked contrast to tho breezy air of belief in an early victory which characterises 'the men at tho front. Pondering over this, -I came to tho conclusion that tho reason for this curious difference in spirit' between the Man Behind tho Front and the Front-Line Man lies in the fact that the fighter knows he has tho Booho down, while the people at homo havo their doubts. It will bo my task to try and prove to them that "given certain essentials, such as men and material (guns and ammunition), and, above all. tho determined "will to win" of the British race, victory is as certain as to-morrow's pun. G.