OUR LITERARY CORNER.

Press, Volume LIII, Issue 15869, 7 April 1917, Page 7

OUR LITERARY CORNER.

TRENCH WARFARE.

ITS EVOLUTION AND VALUE.

Copyright spcciallv secured by "The Press.")

(By General Berthaut of the French Army;)

It ha 3 always been a subject of much discussion among the nlost competent tacticians —and particularly so since the war of 1870—what use (if any) could be made of fortification on the field of battle. If no agreement was reached it was because this, like many other things, has its good and its bad points, and it was hard to determine on which side, the balance inclined; and indeed the reasons advanced on both sides appeared. to have much tho same weight, until the present war supplied its practical tests. The supporters of fortified lines extemporised in tho field had som© justification in urging that, in view of the power of modern weapons, tho greater raDge of rifle firo and the consequent flatness of the trajectory and tho increased effectiveness of shells charged with explosives of ever-growing violence it has become impossible for troops, even in open formation, to move under the enemy's firo; it has even become impossible to stay still without cover. Tho first cover to ho taken is any ditch, however shallow, any rise of ground, however slight, . tree trunks, and stretches of wall. If none of theso is available, which may very well ho the case, tho infantry soldier can do nothing but lie down flat, so as to present, the smallest possible target, and he (in gain a little further protection by placing in front of him tho pack ho has been carrying; but the protection thus afforded is of no great value. If ie has to remain whore he is through tho advance being impeded, lie can seeuro rather more effective protection, at least against bullets, and to some extent against shell splinters, by removing some of the earth, that is to say by digging a narrow shallow ditch, which with the eiirth cast in front, affords shelter to a crouching man. This is called a shelter trcnch, the first and timplcst element of field fortification, which has often to be carried out in sonditions of groat .danger, under the rery fire of the enemy. It necessitates tho use of suitable tools; and hence, for many years past, the foot-soldiers of all nations have been furnished with portable tools, above all with entrenching spades, which the- Austrian army was 4o first to adopt, eoon after tho war of {866. These short-handled tools, which ean be used by a man in a crouching or even a recumbent position, and which he carries himself, are suitable only for the making of shelter trenches.; the first rtage is a holo dug by each individual, \ud then the holes aro connected up. "ftho-works havo to ho strengthened, is to be made deeper, and stronger, if a more pernahentsch'aracter is to/be'given- to'the

Wonchj' thero •is need, for more .tools/, transport-. (S'in 'waggODs'and on pack-horses. It also roqnijes]'the assistance of engineers {©;plan;tfio Tvprk and carry out the most diffioult'pirts themselves. to-the spiades there are .■ >ihef glands!" of,tools, : particularly for >r miti^^lown 'trees ,and utilising their ' for protection; against artillery, I- .o.V/;laj r mg th'etair cross-wise, or, as obto a hostile advancc, by turning V 'tEmr..Branches towards 1 tho enemy 1 For || ;• 'troops are provided <pwith varioustypes of portablo saws, jointed; saw used- in the !|v. French arinyi or the sword bayonet with saw at the back used in the German '"army, which has been rather top readily regarded as an instrument of torture v indicating barbarous cruelty. K®ieso-- developments have been " V brought about by the supporters of , fifild fortification, in the face of strong ; ,:i' adverse criticism, criticism which was : . Doi without foundation and deserved _ fory scrious consideration. The most mportant objection raised was this: If Infantry troops advancing to the attacli • ire allotpod to halt and to lie down, it is , ;eiy'diifficnlt to make them rise and | h move forward as long as tho fire of the . - onemy - remains unabated. ; The only to effect this, is to-push another body of troops beyond them, -which carries them forward with it. If there is a trench, ifc becomes even more difficult* to induce the troops occupying it t-o come out and rush at tho enemy. '!j: shall see a little later that experience in the present war affords an ans- . wer to this objection, for there have been splendid examples of the opposite happening. . ' Still following the same lines of i thought, the opponents of field forti- , ication ii tho days before this war, V , Qr S®d further that troops sheltered in - * inches, by not continuing tho ad- _ vance, ceased to play an active part, which alone produces results. They pass to a stato of passive defence which has a depressing effect on tho moral- of the soldier. Troops in trenches are impressed i the superiority of the onemy who "tacks at his own time and place. •, c y have lost tho initiative, and with "" confidence in themselves and their \ .J?"*® 18 * They are always weaker than fit th© point of attack, because he secretly concentrates his means * of attack at the point which he has selected, and where ho can thus make 6U "> °f possessing superior forces. supporters of field fortification, granting the truth of this, roJ plied that it ig no leas certain that tho must necessarily be made in ,ooen, and that tho advancing — are exposed to serious losses "jhilo crossing the interval under tho „ of the defence, while tho defending arc sheltered and suffer hardly • *n? loss. Moreover, there may bo .accessary defences in front of the which do not interfere with (the defenders' fire, but keep th© atkeking troops exposed to it; such de- . arc the pit with a stake inside {"wolf-pit"), the caltrop (made of four spikes), the chevaux-de-frise (spiked ■lars), tho abattis (of tree trunks), and JTiro entanglements, often mad© of >arbedwire. / -Jt will be seen that there were good

ORIGINAL AND SELECTED MATTER.

NOTES ON BOOKS AND AUTHORS

reasons for holding these opposite views. Those who held them were, as a rule, mere influenced by their temperament than by logical considerations. To officers of a daring and adventurous spirit only offensive action could appeal; those who planned more deliberately preferred to start with the defensive,. under the protection of field fortification, with the subsequent assumption of the offensive, by making counter-attacks, when the assailant's effort wa 9 broken. National temperaments also served to determine which method was preferred. During the siege of Paris, in 1870, the French Army always attacked in the open, for instance, at Le Uourget, at Champigny and at Buzenval. The German Army, lesg daring in spirit, did not attack, but confined itself to bombarding Paris and occupying all around it defensive positions that were very strongly fortified and protected, against which the attacks of the Paris army were shattered. When I desired to visit the battle field after the siege, and to record on a map all the defensive works and the German batteries before anything had been changed. I had the greatest difficulty in making my way among the dense zones of felled trees and across the wire entanglements in front of the trenches. In spite of all this many officers remained convinced that field fortificatioß* was .dangerous and dreferred open fighting. From 1884 to .1889 I was tho chief of a • military mission in Japan. I helped to teach the Japanese how to conduct a war, by directing their manoeuvres and lecturing to their officers on tactics and strategy. I always found 'that they almost unanimously felt absolute contempt for fortification. The Japaneso is not merely brayo, he is intrepid to tho verge of foolhardiness. Even at manoeuvres his self-esteem makes it hard for him to accept the part of defender. He considers it below his dignity to do anything but attack, and will advance to the assault, in face of the most formidable obstacles however unfavourable the conditions, and with supreme contempt of danger. That is how ho behaved at Port Arthur,- against the Chinese. It is a matter of principle with him, or at any rate it was; for the principle could no longor be maintained after the experience of the war in Manchuria. Tlie early battles in Manchuria were delivered in the open, by the Russians as well as by the Japaneso. But when Mukden was reached, the lesson had been learnt, and there was an evolution in tactics. The Japanese and Russian armies then found themselves face to face for some time without a change of ground. Both armies had recognised the necessity of protecting themselves with uninterrupted lines of entrenchments, in two or more rows. The eptire length of the entrenchments on both sides amounted to more than 6i*xty miles. For a-distance of about forty miles, leaving out of account the protecting bends on the- wings, the two fronts were practically parallel, at a distance which, according to tho nature of the ground, varied from about a mile and a quarter to a few hundred yards. The strength of each army was about 400,000 men; and these were all under cover. In front of the trenches were obstacles particularly .wire en- ■ tanglementa. Until the beginning of the actual battle of Mukden, fought by masses in close formation, which had been concentrated behind the lines, -the two adversaries never ceased to bombard and attack each other's trenches where they were closest, now at one -point, now at another, with biayonet fighting, and even the use of hand j gren-des. Now is this not only exactly what is happening at the preseht day? Did we not receive, ten years ago, a certain indication. of what modern warfare would be like? A study of the Mancliurian war showed clearly what we must expect and what wo must do. But it required study,'and few officers paid anv attention to it; yet every war is based on the experience gained in tho last war. Our first battles in Belgium and m Franco were fought in tho open. In the first place events moved so rapidly that it could not well be otherwise, »nd neither of tho adversaries had yet recognised to his cost that it.was necessary to adopt any other course. When, howeyer, -W6. took th© pffetisiv© on tho Marne, and the Germans saw themselves compelled, to fall back and in danger of being driven beyond the frontier, they hastened to prepare lines of entrenchments behind their front, and they proceeded to occupy these in order to stay their retreat, and check our victorious advance. Our troops; worn out by the protracted straggle, and by incessant marching and fighting, aid also having come to tho end of their ammunition, were compelled to slacken their "pace 'and to take some rest; . As beforo Mukden, this sufficed to chango the character of the warfare, i The Germans entrenched themselves, and in -order to retain the ground in 1 front of them, we were obliged to do i the same. At Mukden the front extended for sixty miles, in' accordance with the strength of the armies. With us the front extends from th-o North Sea to Switzerland, again in accordance with the strength of the opposing Are we to conclude from this that our troop 3 have lost their capacity for taking the. offensive, or that attacks have no longer any prospect of success? The victory gained by the English j Army and ourg on the Artois front, our brilliant offensive in the Champagne supply a negative answer to this question. Then are we to say that field fortification is no longer of any use? That also would he a mistake. In this respect the material conditions aro the same for both adversaries; and ? that being sos the individual superiority of tho individual soldier once more asserts itself, and this is a matter of national character. On the whole, tho individual capacity of the soldiers of the Allies is indisputably superior to that of tho German soldiers, and evidence of this is forthcoming every day. We are gaming ground from tho Germans, while they never gain any from us. If both sides wero fighting in the open, _ their defeats, the extent of which is limited owing to field fortification, would be far more seriotis. . We have, however, to bear m mind some further considerations. What — in spite of* trenches, shelters, sunken batteries, wire entanglements and other obstacles of all kinds—makes offensive action possible, is the * preparation of attacks by means of intense artillery firo. which Tenders the hostile positions accessible, at least for a tunc. Such preparation has always been necessary in past wars, it has always been the recognised thing, and there is no treatise on tactics in which it does not appear essential. But this preparation has not always Been the same. Such as it is to-day it is far beyond anvthing that could have been conceived formerly, owing to the use of quick-firing guns, employed for the first time in this war. to the progress that has been made in the manufacture of projectiles,. and to the much greater forco of modern explosives. Itwould be impossible to make an assault upon well devised field work 3, that is, works properly adapted to the lie of the ground, works that are solidly constructed, well defended, and intact. It is only by a surprise attack that troops succeed in penetrating certain sections of the first line trenches, when thoir own trenches are fairly close to

them. But an attack in force ot« *— extended front, and calculated to penetrate farther, demands a formidable preparation which destroys the accessory defences, breaks up the "wire entanglements, demolishes the batteries, and levels the trenches. It is accordingly indispensable that the artillery should bo superior to that of the adversary, if such a result is to bo achieved. At the outset it was the Germans who had this superiority, cspeciall in heavy artillery, and in shells of great size and weight. The superiority is ours now, thanks to the efforts of our governments and of public and private munition works, in England and in France. The full effect of this lias not yet made itself felt: it js becoming daily more apparent, and we must not neglect to keep on increasing our output, for we must carry vt to the point when the enemy is crushed. Ig the war has taken this turn on the Western front 6inco our victory on the Marne, how is it that there has not been the same development on the other front in Russia? There are two main reasons for this. The first is that for a whole year the Russians never, had at their disposal the material supplies of guns and munitions that would have plaoed them on an equality with the Germans. The almost entire absence of munitions coincided in _ a strange way (the real reasons for which will be known some day) with the German offensive on the Dunajec and Biala front, when the Russians were masters of tho Carpathians. The crushing of their right flank by the enemy's artillery was the prime cause of the retreat to their present positions. The other reason is that in spit© of the lessoDs of • the war in Manchuria, which the Russian army should have been the first to turn to account, this army has paid far too little attention to field fortification. No doubt, developments were often too rapid to allow of any serious attempt at it; but this cannot be urged as regards the Dunajec and Biala front, which should have been fortified so as to render it unassailable] and this should have been done with all the more care as the resources in artillery were known to be inferior to those of the enemy. Why waß this front not put in as sound a state of defence as it should have been? That again is a question to which an answer will be forthcoming in due course. It is apparent, then, that, what has happened on the "Russian front, 60 far from invalidating our conclusions as to the value of field fortification, actually confirms them. If use had been made of the resources provided by field works for enhancing the power of resistance on the part of a defensive front, such as that of the Runajec and the Biala, the present situation would probably bo very difficult from what it is, even in spite of a temporary inferiority or artillery and shells. The Germans, who know well what they .are about, are at this moment occupied in the very work of consolidating their means of resistance in Russia, in view of the coming Russian offensive, by fortifying their present lines or other lines behind their front better suited for the purpose, with, the same care as that displayed in fortfying their" fronts on the Western scene of operations. When the Russians develop their offensive they will meet with enormous difficulties which they will be able to surmount only at the cost of great sacrifices, and with the aid of very powerful heavy artillery that is superior to the enemy's at the point of attack. . In conclusion I must add a few wards as to the system employed in the construction of field works. Mention is often made, in a general way, of the "first line" and the "second line, 5 ' and the general reader' may imagine that there is just one trench running along the front and constituting the "first line," and,- at & certain distance behind it, a seoond trench to be -used if the first has been rendered untenable.

That, however, does not represent the actual facts, and a little thought will show that the reality cannot, be quite such a simple affair. In the. first place, between the first and the second line, there must necessarily be trenches running from one to the other, communicating passages which make it possible for the troops to circulate under cover and for reinforcements, food and munitions to be brought right np to the first line. Further, it is evident that the sites selected for batteries have to fulfil other conditions than tKose to be occupied by infantry, and that consequently they must have their separate positions which also require to be linked up by means of communicating passages. The same applies to stores of ammunition, of materials, etc. It follows that the ground which lies between the two "lines" must be partly occupied by works of various kinds, and i s consequently divided into sections. Moreover if the enemy, by a sufficiently powerful effort succeeds in piercing the first line at one point, this must not bo allowed to result in the loss of the whole line. ' The check must be localised as much as possible, vnJ the way to do this is again to divide the space into sections. Then each of the eections > can be defended even when those adjoining have been taken; each i B surrounded by accessory defences, especially wir© entanglements, and the enemy who bai penetrated at one point has succeeded in breaking only one mesh of the net, while all the other meshes remain intact. These sections are, of coursc. arranged and their shape and sizo aro determined in accordance with the natural obstacles and the general lie of the ground.

T must content myself with "Ehis explanation. a s J- do not wish to become too technical in my language. What I have said gives a good general idea why and bow our successes are achieved, and also shows "what limits the. extent of these successes.