The Press. MONDAY, JUNE 1, 1914. Russia and Germany.

Press, Volume L, Issue 14982, 1 June 1914, Page 6

The Press. MONDAY, JUNE 1, 1914. Russia and Germany.

: In view of the recent admission of the German Foreign Minister that there is " an undercurrent of r. strained feeling .*'between Russia and Germany," and -of tho angry Press campaign in March last, adverted to a few weeks ago in our leading columns, very special interest attache, to an article of Mr _. JEUis Barker oil "Ilk Relations be--"tween Russia and Germany," which "appeared in tho April "Fortnightly Re- - .** view." Mr Barker is no alarmist. He - does not for a moment anticipate any immediate prospect of war between the two great rival Powers. He even sees ' in their joint responsibility for the partition of Poland, and for tho repression of Polish nationality, a ground of mutual interest. But he realises that a fresh crisis in the Balkans, a collision between Germany and Frarjco, or one between Russia and AustroHungary, might at any moment render war inevitable. He therefore devotes his article to a careful compan- - eon of tho. respective resources and probable future development of tho two countries, and to a consideration of the lino of action it would be advisable for "Germany to follow in the event of such a war. Of recent years the valne of Russian foreign trade, a trade principally in . foodstuffs and raw materials, has enor-,-inousl.v increased, and the increase has been faithfully reflected in a steadily .expanding revenue. It was pointed out last year that for the fourth time in ■succession there was no deficit to be met, and that in five years the ordinary -revenue- had increased by of which Jess than £8,009,000 was duo to fresh taxation. Imperial revenue exceeded Imperial expenditure, though • between 1907 and 1913 the army expenditure had risen from £43,800,000 to £62,700.000, and the navy expenditure from £9,500,000 to £21,900,000. These facts are very striking, and when one remembers 1 that Russian population increases three and •-half times as rapidly as German, Awhile Germany, with her 2C5.74Q square

miles of territory has 310 inhabitants to the squaro mile, and Russia, with her 8,379,044 square miles, as yet has only 20, they become moro striking still. For, even assuming, on Mr Barker's hypothesis, that only one-half of Russia is susceptible of close settlement, and that this half is capable of supporting only half as many people per square mile as Germany is, tnc population must ultimately touch the colossal figure of 670,000,000. Even now it stands at 170,000.000., and renders the proposed increase of tho peace establishment of the army to upwards of 1.700.000 readily practicable! Obviously such figures most be bitter reading for Germany, whose population is rapidly approaching, if it has not already reached, the point whore further expansion without increase of territory becomes impossible. For the present, however, they are heavily discounted by the in- j dustrial efficiency of Germany, and her admirably complete system of internal i

communication, as compared with tho backwardness of Russia in these respects. But Russia is beginning to set her house in order. Hor reverses at the hands of Japau have for the time turned hor attention from adventures in tho Far East, and it is on tho cards that tho course of the next few years

may see her European territory thoroughly reorganised and developed, and her Polish and Finnish problems finding solution.

Mr Barker is not among those disciples of Air Norman Angell who belicvo that a flusso-Gormaii war must necessarily spoil disaster to both countries. On the contrary,, he points out that Ttusbia would benefit greatly by securing the eastern provinces of Germany, and the harbours of Konigsberg and Diiiit-ig, while Germany would stand to gain even more by seizing the Baltic Provinces of liussia. For Courland, Livonia, Esthonia, which as the local names, and the large German element in the population, far in excess of the Russian, remind us, were originally civilised by German influence, would give her not merely a welcome outlet for surplus population, and larger home markets, but by insuring her control cf tho Baltic Sea would afford a fine strategic base for operation*.- against St. Petersburg. Such an occupation would advance the German frontier to within 80 miles of the Russian Capital, and would at the same time add to the ease of its defence, since the many small lakes of these provinces render them unsuitable for the employment of largo masses of troops, and in lakes Pciptis and Pakon there would .be a water barrier against the Russian some 90 miles in width.

But apart from such' wide conjectures as these, the lino of the Baltic is the natural lino of advance for a German attack on Russia. Assuming the neutrality of Great Britain, or tbo seizure !of the three narrow, gateways to tho i Baltic by Germany, her army of invasion would make the sea its base of supply, and the final .assault on the capital would be supported by the fleet. It would be the story of Sebastopol over again, with St. Petersburg in the title role. Such an attack, pressed home, would turn the Russian flank effectively, and render nugatory her preparations for launching 13, army corps over the German frontier within five weeks of the outbreak of war. Moreover Finland, with 98 per cent, of its 3,000,000 people Lutheran in religion, and racially, intellectually, and socially inimical to Russia, would be a powerful factor in tho situation so created. If Napoleon had started on his disastrous Russian campaign earlier in the yoar. and if he had held command of the sea, ho must have dictated terms to Russia from Moscow. On tho same conditions, Germany may yet dictate terms from St. Petersburg as she once dictated them from Paris. It would be a . very rash reader of history who- should venture to affirm that such contingencies will never come to pass, and the controversy in March, however it arose, is evidence of a nervous tension which m3y yet reach the breaking-point.