SIB IAN HAMILTON'S REPORT

Press, Volume L, Issue 14980, 29 May 1914, Page 4

SIB IAN HAMILTON'S REPORT

CRITICISM AXD PRAISE

Australian papers to baud by yesterday's mail contain lon£. extracts from Sir lav Hamilton's report on tho Australian Army. The following passages are taken from the ''T>aily Tole-

graph":—

TO COST TWICE AS MUCH. Tho report points at somo big problems to be iaced. On its first page comes tho statement that ' "Apart from new expenditure on the Navy, the Australian Army will ultimately cost just about twice as much as was originally anticipated." In Australia, Sir lan says, where one Minister accepts tho whole responsibility for defence, it should be easier than in the Old Country to readjust from time to timo tho balunce between naval and military expenditure in due and scientific proportion. But no amount of balancing will show a credit if the account has been overdrawn. Of a total defence expenditure estimate of £5,746,853 for the year 1913-14, the cost of the army is tet down at £3,315,435. And he remarks that even this '"'twico as much" has to bo used as a shield to keep off extra claims, whose objects are in themselves desirable. Only if the entire list of them were tabulated it "would stagger Australia, and show more clearly than pages of written argument the dangers for some timo to como of sanctioning expenditure under fresh heads unless a corresponding economy cau be booked in a parallel column." The adoption of the militia principle, the report says, should imply the abandonment of any idea of maintaining permanent troops, except in so far as it may be considered an indispensable adjunct to the militia. FOUR KUXCIPLES. Throughout his inspection. Sir lan has consistently kept four guiding principles in vi«w. Tho first is that an effective national militia must, in war, express the life of the nation in its widest sense. This implies that every man of military age, whether ho is a trainee or not, should know what he would bo expected to do if ever Australia was invaded.

The second principle is that, in a militia army, the system ohtaining in peace must, as nearly as possible, coincide with the sy&tem definitely accepted for war..

The third principle is that much of tho expenditure in peace, which is inevitable for a regular oversea army, can, in tho case of a militia, be avoided without unduly impairing was efficiency, provided always that national resources have been adequately organised.

And the fourth principle is that, evon übero the same theory applies to a gular and a militia system, it may be very much more vital to the one service than the other, and it involves tho taking of steps during peace to form in Australia a specialised business department whoso personnel shall, from tho outset, devote themselves to purely administrative work. ORGANISATION FOR WAR, Tho report goes on to explain that tho military training of "a nation's youth i 3 a totally different thine from tho organisation of the nation for war. Naturally and rightly enough, our attention lias so far been concentratod on the training.' But the time is almost ripo for consolidating all existing forces, national as well as. military, into a carefully planned instrument for ivar. . ,

''Tho urmy possessing no system for its uinintonance in tho field," Sir lan remarks, "is. like an elephant that has lost its trunk. It starves amid plenty." Not only should numerous depot cadras ■■with experienced officers and non-con»-rniesioned officers, be established at once on mobilisation, but njon already trained to arms to some extent should be forthcoming to fill them. Calculating <iepob requirements at 50 per cent, of the field array, about 2250 officers and 05,250 men." it is stated, would bo ■wanted for this purpose alone, over ami above the 29,000 officers and men required to complete the establishments of tho field nrmy. To meet this deficiency of ifcpproximately 100.000 men tlie only available ■would bo tonio 17.00(1 recruits. Under existing arrangements, says Sir lan, members of rifle clubs are relied on to supply all such deficiencies. As a temporary and provisional measure, this is the best that can be done.

At the moment there is no pos&jh),, substitute. But though Sir lan hasaoi a word to say against rifle clubs con sidered as an adjunct to the militia, he pomts out that it should not be regained as an integral part of tho militia, in the sense that its members as such, have a liability to service that is not ioca c ,_ bent ou the rest of the nation. ;Aclecfjate reserves should be formed, and it is pointed out that in Switzerland a man's service is normally divided Into thre© categories : —Twentieth to thirty, second year in tho elite, or active army; thirty-third to fortieth year itj the landwehr, or reserve of the active army: forty-first to iorty-eiphth year in the landsturm or territorial reseVre. Tb<» formation of a reserve, the report goes on, would replenish the ranks as they were thinned by war casualties and would greatly fncilitate tho process of national organisation. DECENTRALISATION*. The Australian system as it exists to-day is s0 pureiy a product of peace procedure, it is declared, that it could not hope to carry on beyond the first few weeks of war. Sir lan declares that: — . Tho centralisation in tho Defence department at Melbourne exceeds anything I have experienced during more than 40 years' service in India, in tho United Kingdom, and in every part of tho world where troops administered by the British War Office are stationed. That this centralisation is duo wholly to the existing system of financial control I am not pVepared to assert, but, unquestionably, it is on financial grounds that the present mass of petty questions, which in a well ordered business would be dealt with locally, are now referred from district to headquarters. Hence, an inevitable tendency to centralise in other branches of work. Hence, also, an increasing unwillingness on the part of officere to jict on their own responsibility. Hence, again, a real danger that, in. courso of time, the spirit of initiative throughout tho army may suffer. Hence, finally, the most fruitful cause of disaster in time of war—namely, the collapse of the.officqr trained for many years to .be frightened to death of a sixneuco when he is suddenly called urJon to decido a matter in which thousands of pounds may bo involved.

TIT*: ARMY TO-DAY. "The bast assets of tho Australian land forces at their present stage of development," says bir lan Hamilton, "are to be found in the soldier-like spirit, the intelligence, and the wiry, athletic frames of the bulk of the rank and file. Their limitations are those inherent in every militia, even that of Switzerland.' 7 Practical experience and habits of discipline are the products of years of continuous service, and until a militia has been some time in the field, it will always lack self-confidence when faced by professional soldiers. In a largo number, perhaps the majority, of Australian militia units, aJ.i ranks have dono their best by close etudy to preparo themselves to tako full advantage of their brief period of practice training in camp. But a great deal could bo dono to strengthen the practical side by levelling up tho higher criticism brought to bear upon camp training. A non-commissioned officer is rarely capable of giving higher tactical instruction. What is wanted is a hi.eMyeducated officer, whose views have been widened by travel, and working with, tho three arms combined.

The Duntroon graduate should, in due course, produce the very typo, especially i? no is encouraged to see something of the great outside military world. Such a man once appointed should be left free to devote himself mainly to the higher instruction of the militia officers and noncommissioned officers, who must themselves bo the instructors o? their meu.

DISCIPLINE. ' On this subject Sir lan is most encouraging. He says:— 1 freely confess tnat my recollectioi;s> of South Africa, coupled with tho assurances of numerous Austral- ( ian friends, had caused mo c 6 foci sceptical regarding tho quaK ity of the discipline I suould lind regulating the ranks of the' army. But, if I came here prepared to ban, 1 can only say now—T was ilie Australian soldier is very amenable to discipline. That a contrary should be so prevalent , is duo to tho following facts: — 1. There are not yet, competent commanders enough to go round. 2. ilanifestations of any feeling, but more especially, of feelings of respect, are discountenanced under tho unwritten Australian code of 'KHuhlCt. 3. The privates soldier.does not clearly ' understand fmt. w'»it nn officer is is one thing, and that what lie stands for is another, and, militarily speaking, tho significant thing.

The report emphasises, however, punctiliousness in- such mntters as >saluting—the men must remember that tho officer represents tho whole State.