W. T. YOUNG'S CASE.

Press, Volume L, Issue 14889, 31 January 1914, Page 6

W. T. YOUNG'S CASE.

APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT. (PBESS ASSOCIATION TFXEGKAM.) WELLINGTON, January 30. Tho hearing of tho appeal from the decision of Mr W. G. Riddell, S.M., in the case of William Thomas Young, president of the Federation of Labour, was taken in the Supreme Court to-day beforo his Honour the Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout). The charges heard by the Magistrate wero that Young (1) incited pei-sons to commit a breach of tho peace, and (2) incited persons to resist constables. The Magistrate, iv his judgment, given on December 4th, convicted defendant and sentenced him to threo months' im- ■ prisonment. Tho defendant was also ordered to enter into a bond of £250, and find two sureties of £250 each, that he would keep the peace foe twelve months. Upon an appeal being made by Mr T. M."*Wilforci, defendant, pending tho hearing of the appeal, was allon(£d out on bafi. ; The next day he was committed on a charge of having uttered seditious words, bail again being granted. At the hearing to-day, Mr T. M. Wilford, with him Mr, P. J. O'Regan, appeared in support of tho appeal, and Mr H., H. Cutler, Crown Solicitor, on behalf of the Crown. Opening for the appellant (who was not present), Mr Wilford stated that Young had been convicted under section 68 of the Police Offences Act, and the construction and wording of tho section were the basis of the appeal. It was contended that no offence had been committed by Young under that section v After reading the section carefully it wrjr. found that the offence with which the defendant was charged was that he incited a person to resist a eoristable in the execution.of his duty. \ There wero various offences under sec- : tion 68—the offences of resisting, wilfully .obstructing, inciting, or encouragI ing any person to resist a constable — I but ho desired to confine his argument ! to the actual charge "inciting a person j to resist a constable in the execution | of his duty." For tho Crown, it was contended that addressing a crowd to I tho effect that "if at any future time a. constable strikes one of you, | strike him back" was an offence under i the section, and it was upon the con- : struction placed upon tho«e words that the appeal was based. The words on which the # conviction was based wero contained in the following speech, made by Young on the 26th October, 1913, at a mass mooting in the Basin j Reserve of strikers and others: —"I want to cay that special constables are being called, for a number of them were marched to tho Newtown depot last night. I want to say this, that if the police force of this country are going to be utilised, I know the individual police don't want to be used for the purpose, but if the authorities of this country are .oing to use thorn to suppress tho working classes, I will undertake —we will undertake —to mass in this City of Wellington 10,000 or 16,000 armed men ready to protect themselves as armed men. If a police constable uses his baton to you, give him one back, and if ono won't do make a double header." In his judgment (counsel continued) the Maeistrate stated that on Thursday, 30th October, a serious riot took place in Wellington, in which three constables, while' in tbe execution of their duty, were assaulted, aud one constable was soveroly injured. Replying to his Honour, Mr Wilford stated that tho words were used before the riot mentioned.Mr Ostler said before the words were used thero had been riots. The strike was declared on the 22ncl October, and tho words wcro uttered on the 26th October. Mr Wilford added that tho Magistrate had held that i_ was not proved that defendant was directly connected with tho disturbance on 30th October. The point ho (counsel) wished to make was that it was not proved that when the defendant uttered tho words there were any constables present in the execution of their duty. Tho Chief Justice: That is a new point. Proceeding, Mr Wilford said the point that struck him was that the whole section dealt with persons actually resisting, assaulting, or obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty. If this wero sc\ then the words had no other meaning. The Chief Justice: That is another point. Mr Wilford further submitted that as the words "inciting" or "encouraging" were interpesed' in the same sentence, they must be controlled by the words "when a constable is in tho execution of his duty," therefore the words "in the execution of his duty" could not, have one meaning for controlling some of the verbs and another meaning for controlling others. The points he wished to make were:—(l) When the speech was made there -was no constable executing his duty; (2) the words were not spoken in respect of any particular constable or constables. The Crown had failed to show (1) that at the. tame the speech was made there was any constable or constables specially referred to; (2) that even if they had been referred to. there waa nothing to show that they were in the execution of their duty; (3) the words did not invite anyone to resist arrest; (4) that the act suggested would-be resistance, although it might be assault-, which was not tbe particular subject of the charge. The Chief Justice: How can you resist a man without an assault? Mr Wilford replied that he was con-

fining his arguments to th© fact that tho act provided for "inciting to resist" and "inciting to assault." and if tho coso was ono dealing with assault, then tho information should have been laid under the section dealing with assault. He submitted that inciting to assault in the event of some supposititious happening taking place could not be the 6ame as th© actual happening. Tho object of the particular section was to provide for the arrest of any man who during a row attempted to assault a policeman. Young had remarked, "If one of you is struck with a polico baton, hit him back," but ho did not incite any particular person. The case his friend relied on was Regina v. Most, which decided that whero a man advocated violence to reigning Kings, there was sufficient description, but it further decided that tho particular monarch referred to was tho reigning Sovereign of England. In his judgment in that case Lord Coleridge had clearly shown that there must bo definite people to whom tho words were addressed. Tlio judgment further considered that tho printed article referred to must be an incitement to murder ono or more of the reigning nionarchs of Europe. In Young's case, counsel went on, it was not an incitement to resist a constable, whatever he did, but an incitement to hit a constable if ho fi hits you with a baton." Counsel further added that, in construing clause 6S it was necessary for his Honour, before confirming the conviction, to _nd that Young told certain persons to resist constables while in tho execution of their duty, and not only that, but while they were doing that which they had to do. He concluded by citing legal opinion in support of ins arguments. Mr P. J. O'Regan, in addressing the Court, contended that section 68 of the Police Offences Act did not contemplate any hypothetical or contingent incitement, but that this incitement was contemporaneous with the offence against tho section. Hi. Honour: Your argument is that incitement must bo when there is an actual conflict between the police and the crowd themselves?

Mr O'Regan, continuing, said that during the forty years tho section had been in force, 'this was the first time an interpretation of the word "inciting" had ariesn. In 1873 tho Assaults on Constables Act had been brought into force, but prior to that there tvas no summary jurisdiction to deal' with these cases. Tho present Act was specially passed in order to give courts the power of summary jurisdiction to deal with offences of this kind. In 1884, for tho first time, power was conferred to arrest a person for inciting, but prior to that the position was that supposing a riot took place, any person who obstructed a constable cotild bo arrested without a warrant, but any person who incited a person to resist could not be arrested without a warrant. He submitted it was clear that section 68 altered tho law to remedy this obvious defect, so that tho person inciting could be arrested on the spot. A reading of the history of the statute allowed of that inference and no other. He would point out that if the conviction was correct, Young could have been arrested on the spot without warrant by a police officer. The Chief Justice remarked that this was the first time in the history of tho Dominion that any white person had been prosecuted for seditious utterances. Mr O'Regan remarked in view of the legislation just passed that Younc. if he delivered such a speech, would commit an offence. Thre© weeks had' elapsed between the uttering of the words and the timo of his arrest. Mr Ostler: The police were powerless to arrest him before. He was arrested as soon as order wa** restored. The Chief Justice: Perhaps the police were afraid to arrest him because of the 15,000 armed men. (Laughter.) After further argument his Honour reserved his decision.