THE "NELSON TOUCH."
TACTICS AT TRAFALGAR
LONG DISPUTE SETTLED
(FR il OCR OWN COREEsro^DBNT.) LONDON. October 24. On the eve of Trafalgar Day, tho Ad' miralty published the report of the Committee appointed in April, 1912, to examine and consider the evidence relating to the tactics employed by Nelson at Trafalgar. Tho members of the Committee wore Admiral Sir Cyprian
A. G. Bridge (chairman), Admiral Sir Reginald distance, Professor Charles H. Firth, and Mr W. G. Perrin. Many jK?oplc may !«• surprised to hoar that there is any question us to the tactics employed at Trafalgar, and that at this late date. though with timolj appearance, *uch a report should be called for. There has, however, been for years quity a strenuous argument upon tho bubject anion's the scholars who havo devoted themselves to Mich enquiries, and when the Admiralty War Staff got to work, a strong desire was expressed that this vexed question should be settled one© for all, or at least that all evidence should be lifted and considered.
-Nelson, m tho Victory, arrired off Cadiz on September 28th, 1805, and took command of the British .Fleet. \\ ncn the officers of the fleet went on board tho Victory to welcome tho return of thwr beloved Comniandcr-in-Chief, ho there and then expounded to them what ho called the "Nelson Joiicn." Tins was tho plan of attack which ho intended to pursue in the impending battle and which he is known to have discussed moid than once during his last stay in England. On October Ist ho wrote to Lady Hamilton: "When 1 came to explain to then) thn 'Nokson Touch' it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears, all approved. 'It was new—it was singular—it was simple! , and from Admirals downward it was repeated, 'It must succeed, if ever they will allow us u> get at them.' " With Collingwood this plan was exhaustively discussed almost from day to day; for Collingwood was a frequent guest on board tho A7 ; ctory, and he himself wrote on November 2nd, "In this affair ho did nothing without my counsel. Wo made our line of battle together, and concerted the mode of attack, which was pat in action in the most" admirable style. ,. On October JHh the plan was reduced to writing, in . a document the original of which, in Nelson's own autograph, is now in the British Museum. Copies of this document marked "Secret" were circuhited to tho commanding officers of the fleet; and on the sanie day Nelson wrote to Collingwood: "I send you my Plan of Attack, as far as a man may daro venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy ma,v be found in. But, my dear friend, *it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, . and to give full scope to yottr judgment for carrying them into effect. We can, my dear Coll., ha'-e no little jealousies." Such was the history of the plan of attack. Certain detailed instructions were given for the mode of attack; to ; be, delivered if the enemy should be seen to windward. But as he was actually seen to leeward and attacked in that position, these instructions never camo into operation. Special prescriptions were provided for "the intended attack from to windward," the instructions for the lee line being detailed and precise. "The divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy's centre." A simple diagram here drawn by Nelson shows that in this position the British leading divisions -we're to be parallel to tbo enemy's line. "The signal will-most probably tlien be made i for the leo lino to hear tip together, to [Ret all their* sails. . . an order to get ias quickly ac possible to the enemy's line, and to cut through, beginning from the 12 ship from the etwwy's rear." . ' / ■ '*
■ Nelson reserved his entire liberty of action in-the management of his ova line. : Oα this question the highest possible authority is that of. Collingwood. . He. yeas. Nelson's bosom friend. In this affair Nelson did nothing without his counsel. They concerted the modo of attack together. His was the pen which; Nelson haying been killed in the notion, was destined to give, tho first and most authoritative Account of the battle. He wrote it on the following days, and his despatch betrays no trace of even a suggestion that Nelson** intentions were not carried out ia all essential respects* On the contrary, ho affirms quite unmistakably, that 4hey were, and as ho waa thl man who carried them out, no oue could possibly know better than he did. In nis own view of the matter Collingwood waa fully .appraised of the plan, and he was. so intent on carrying it out by signals made to his awn division in accordance with the liberty of action conferred upon him by Nelson in the Mediterranean, that when ho saw the flags going up for tho immortal signal, "England expects that every man will do his duty," but. before its signification was reported to him, he exclaimed .;* with some impatience, "I wish Nelson would stop signalling. AVq all know what we hare to do.'* Wβ are confronted, however, with-the disquieting fact that the historians, nntil recent times,, have been of opinion that Nelson did not follow the plan, which he himself had laid down. There' are plans which show the British Fleet advancing in two lines "end on" to- the enemy, in such a way that the headmost ships would be overwhelmed by fire. We are made aware, too, that officers who took part in the battle had different ideas as to how it was fought. Captain Moorson, of the Revenge, writing a letter in December, 1805, said ho had seen several plans of the action, but none to answer to his ideas of it, and added, "A regular plan was laid down by Lord Nelson some time before the. action, but not acted npon." It was this latter view which 'has been held in the Service. <
Tl>e Committee are agreed that Nelson kent his ships in lino ahead as the most floxiblo formation, but here, too, the ships were not exactly in the wake of one another. His object was to threaten the enemy's van and conceal his purpose of attacking their centre. Ho had* said that they would not know •what he intended to do. Nelson first bcre a little, to nort and then to starboard, passing along the; enemy's line, and entering it astern of the Bucentaure. where the Victory was hotly enwith' results which are well known. In the Admiralty reDort there is no striking revelation. The general conclusion is that the battle, allowing for somo changes in the situation, was fousht as Nelson wished it to be fought. Tims we are not to reuard the great seaman as donnrttns from the principle he had bid down.
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Press, Volume XLIX, Issue 14839, 3 December 1913, Page 12
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1,148THE "NELSON TOUCH." Press, Volume XLIX, Issue 14839, 3 December 1913, Page 12
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