Bay of Plenty Beacon Published Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 1947 FUTURE OF J-FORCE

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 11, Issue 67, 15 August 1947, Page 4

Bay of Plenty Beacon Published Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 1947 FUTURE OF J-FORCE

A MATTER on which some clarification would be welcome is the future of New Zealand’s representation among the occupying forces in Japan. In general terms, the occupation of Japan has not developed as it was originally expected to. It has become heavily loaded with American authority. The predominant part played by the Americans in the Pacific war, followed by the selection (perhaps inevitable) of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the occupation forces, foreshadowed the likelihood that American authority would be uppermost in Japan’s immediate post-war administration. But the tendency has developed beyond all expectations, and the occupation of Japan is now described from London as “an American show.” What, then, is the position of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, and particularly of the New Zealand units which are a part of that force? The fact that a reduction in the strength of 8.C.0.F. was under consideration was announced last week. Mr Herbert Morrison, on behalf of the British Government, stated that the Imperial authorities, in consultation with other nations, was considering the size and effectiveness of the occupation forces, with a view to ascertaining the possibility of its reduction. Unfortunately, Mr Morrison’s statement did not make it clear whether the contemplated reduction is to apply only to United Kingdom units in 8.C.0.F., or w~hether it may also involve New Zealand, Australian and Indian units as well. The existing agreement between the Empire countries concerned provides that all policy and administrative matters relating to the force are the joint concern of all the interested Governments. The New Zealand Minister of Defence, Mr Jones, so far has insufficient information to be able to shed any real light on the developments forecast by Mr Morrison. No time should be lost by the New Zealand authorities, however, in ascertaining the exact position. There are numerous reasons why the position of J-Force should be re-defined. In the first place, General MacArthur’s administration (after a doubtful start) has now attained such success- that Mr Morrison was able to stress the “degree of stability achieved.” As a consequence, the occupation of Japan has become so predominantly American that the existence of the whole British Commonwealth force is now chiefly a matter of token significance. Secondly, on a basis of proportion. New Zealand’s contribution to the Commonwealth force is much greater than that of any other part of the Empire. Accordingly, if a general scaling-down of Empire responsibilities in Japan has now become possible, this Dominion is certainly entitled to a substantial chare in the' relief. On the other hand, the British Government deem it expedient to retain a token force of substantial strength—not really in spite of the predominance of American authority, but rather because of it. It is probably felt in Whitehall that British interests and prestige could hardly afford a complete eclipse. In that event, Britain would be justified in asking both New Zealand and Australia to undertake a substantial share of the Imperial burden, not only because they have agreed to carry a greater weight of responsibility than in the past, but also because the occupation of Japan (in particular) affects the New Zealand and Australian zone of security. But whatever, the underlying motives of the course now apparently contemplated, any changes that are made should' be made speedily. New Zealand is a small country. Its biggest concern at the moment, is production, which in turn depends upon manpower. If reduction in the size of J-Force will release New Zealand men for employment in primary and secondary industry, their availability will be welcome. If there is to be no reduction the Dominion will of course have -to face up to its responsibilities. But whatever course is decided on, it should be decided on quickly. The country as a whole would welcome an end to the uncertainty, vagueness and slight confusion that have already developed around the J-Force and its function.