The Bay of Plenty Beacon Published Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. WED. AUGUST 21, 1946 BEYOND OUR SHORES

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 10, Issue 14, 21 August 1946, Page 4

The Bay of Plenty Beacon Published Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. WED. AUGUST 21, 1946 BEYOND OUR SHORES

THE end of the war has by no means seen .the end of New Zealand’s military commitments beyond her shores. The contribution of a brigade to assist in the occupation of Japan, as part of the British Commonwealth Force, is but a temporary expedient, which has distinct limitations. What defence plans have we in mind for the period following occupation? It is customary during the initial stages of recovery from any great disaster for those in authority to assure their people that the lessons learned at such bitter cost have been well learned and that the knowledge gained is put to practical use. In New Zealand we are now at that stage and while the leaders of victorious peoples are attempting to ensure that there shall be no third World War, and no further outpouring of lives and treasure, the fact remains that, as matters stand, there is still as great a need as ever for the protection of our vital interests. If the aspirations of those who seek to abolish war are realised, and the United Nations organisations can, in fact, maintain peace in the world, there will be occasion for greater rejoicing than the world has yet known. But if the lessons of the past have been unlearned and the nations are once again encouraged to drift into a condition of unpreparedness, thus inviting acts of aggression and another major war, then the prospect ahead is truly dismal. It must take many years for the United Nations Organisation to successfully function, and during that period it will be necessary for Britain and her Dominions to keep their defences well prepared in order to maintain us in a state of reasonable safety until the combined security of the nations is assured. Probably one Of the most important factors requiring study in the Pacific area is the loss of Singapore and the ill-fated campaign in Malaya, where, in the final stages, the situation was, to say the least, confused. After years of preparation the British were apparently in no position to defend the Malayan Peninsula and great -naval base, for, once we had lost command of the sea, the prospects of survival became hopeless. It is not exaggerating to say that, next to Gibraltar, Singapore was regarded as Britain’s most impregnable fortress. Perhaps this line of propaganda was followed in the hope that the Japanese would be deterred and we would gain more time to prepare. If this was the case those responsible must have been sadly disappointed, for all that their deception achieved was the hood-winking of the British people themselves, and the shock when -the truth became known was correspondingly more severe. Without detailed knowledge it is impossible to apportion the blame for what has been rightly called “the most severe reverse ever suffered by British arms.” There is nothing to be gained by seeking scapegoats now. But there is an urgent need for the closest examination of causes before the British Commonwealth Chiefs of'Staff decide the pattern of Imperial defence. If an inquiry would help there should be an inquiry. It cannot be stressed too often that this is very much New Zealand’s business. When the Singapore Base was built New Zealand contributed £1,000,000 towards its cost. At that time we did not aspire to the status of a Pacific Power, but the years have brought a new conception of our responsibilities and we have made categorical demands that they be recognised.ln these circumstances the of our outer bastion, which is Singapore and the islands to the north of Australia, is of vital interest to us. It should be a matter of the liveliest public concern. At the time no one would pretend that public consciousness of New Zealand’s responsibilities matches the stand taken by our Government in international councils. The plain truth is that the people of this country do not want to think about such unpalatable things as occupying Japan, helping Australia garrison Pacific islands, or playing a continuing part on such distant projects as, for example, the defence of Singapore and Malaya. Yet we are all agreed that there must be no repetition of the Singapore tragedy. The question is: Are we prepared to make practical contributions to defences beyond our shores, and, if so, to what extent are we ready to go?