WAR TOPICS

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 05, Issue 65, 15 June 1942, Page 6

WAR TOPICS

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DESTROYERS »TURNED SCALE PRICE OF DIVIDED FORCES IN JAVA SEA BATTLE A. D. Divine, Naval correspondent, here gives a frank review of the Battle of the Java Sea, the official account of which was given recently. The correspondent describes it as a tragedy of divided forces, in which the weight of enemy destroyers turned the scale. No useful purpose will be served b3* attempting to minimise the seriousness of the results of the Java Sea battle. The Allied navies have lost by it five cruisers, seven destroyers ami a sloop. We do not know Avhat the strength of the Allied naval force in the Java Sea was before the battle. It seems to have been a tragedy of divided forces. In the first phase of the action, the daylight battle of Fri-daj', February 27, wc had, so far as can be ascertained from the communique,. equality in heavy cruisers, a heavy overlap in light cruisers, and an inferiority of 13 to three in destroj r ers. The destroyers appear to have turned the scale. The action began with a determined torpedo attack by the Japanese llotillas. It had no effect on our line, and one Japanese destroyer was hit by H.M.A.S. Perth. The Japanese followed this with a second destroyer attack. Why wc were r.oi. able to exercise our superior gun power at this stage of the" action is not clear. Presumably heavy use of smoke screens by the Japanese admiral played a considerable part here. Counter Attack While the force took avoiding action after the second torpedo attack Avas launched, 11.M.5. Exeter received her hit. At a single stroke wc lost half the effectiveness of our heavy ships. The Dutch destroyer Kortenaer was sunk at the same time, reducing the destroyer cover of our forcc to three ships. These three —the British destroyers Javelin, Electra and Encounter —■ were thrown in against the enemy flotillas in a counter attack and Electra disappeared in the smoke, presumably hit by an eneni}* torpedo Javelin and Encounter engaged two enemy ships by gunfire before they returned. As Hie A'Ued force drew through the screen the second phase of the action began. Despite the loss of Exeter from the line—she could not keep the speed owing to her damage—Ave seem to have done magnificently in this phase. Within half an hour the action was broken off, the Japanese turning a>vay under smoke cover with one of the Nazi class cruisers burning fiercely. Despite the damage to the Exeter and the less of the destroyers the main action may be accounted a victory to our force.

Then —Tragedy It is believed that one of the Jap-* nncse heavy ships was sunk a second sever!v damaged and three destroyers sunk. T3i tragedy came after. It began when contact with presumably a new enemy force was made near midnight in a sweep down the coast of Java. The two Dutch cruisers were lost by apparently, torpedo attack. Tt is likely that during this attack the cruiser of the Moganui class was hit and set on fire. The loss of the Dutch cruisers reduced our force to the U.S. Hous> ton and H.M.A.S. Perth. Tt was clear that complete naval superiority had been established in the area by the Japanese, and the Avitlulrawal that was ordered was inevitable. The area of the Sunda Sea to the east of Sourabaya from which there are various outlets towards Australia had for some time been under enemy control both by surface craft and by aircraft. The Sunda Strait, the narrow passage between Java and Sumatra, was therefore the only possible Avay of escape. The choice was inevitable; the certainty that the Japanese would patrol it in strength Mas equally inevitable.

!i i ! The Decision Whoever succeeded toi the command after the presumed death of Admiral Doorman brought his ships back to harbour, and from there, I expect, they were instructed by Admiral Hell'rich, the Dutch C.-in-C : . He decided that small units had better chances of escape than a fleet. We cannot at this distance and on inadequate information criticise his decision. But first the Perth, attempting the narrows in the dark of February 28, was intercepted by a Japanese force off St. Nicholas Point. Apparently, though the communique is not clear, the Houston was with her. Nothing has beeen heard of either ship since. On the same night H.M.S. Exeter left Sourabaya with two destroyers. They also have not been heard of since. It is easy to ask why Houston and Perth were not held to cover the withdrawal of Exeter, why the available destroyers were not concentrated to give maximum support. Japanese superiority does not seem ever to have been heavy, and three cruisers together might have had a chance, but though the question is easy there are innumerable factors that must have determined the decisions. Eixctcr was too slow toi fight—she could make half speed only—and Perth was damaged by gunfire. The ships were widely separated; Perth • —and probably the Houston—at Tanjon Priok, with Exeter at the other end of Java. Concentration might well have presented insuperable difficulties. Japan's Losses Japan has not come scathlcss through the fight. With a probable loss of one 8-inch cruiser, certain damage to another, and to a G-dnch gun ship, her navy, already heavily weakened by previous losses, can ill afford even a single heavy ship. Japan has still to meet the main strength of the Allies. This w r as not a suicide force —but a desperate and desperately small band left in an enclosed sea to make a last stand against an enemy who it was known would prove in the long run.superior in weight of numbers and in weight oif mdtal. It made its fight, it inflicted loss on the enemy, it won the first daylight action by all the canons of sea warfare. Then it went under to heavily superior force, craftily and brilliantly handled.