STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 5, Issue 40, 15 April 1942, Page 4

STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

AN American strategist, writing in the New York Times, has suggested that the defence of Australia should be abandonthat the Allies should concentrate on the defence <>f Burma and India. It is hardly likely that this suggestion will receive a moment's consideration by the High Command of the Allies. On the face of it, it looks stupid and dangerous, but it is unfortunate that it was published, for people attach a good deal of importance to articles appearing in the Press, and this article may have some effect on the movement of the American forces in the Pacific. The whole war strategy in the Pacific received very close and careful consideration in Washington in January, and definite decisions were reached. The Far East was divided into areas, the Anzac Area, and the Indian Area. The former was placed under the control of the United States, while Britain was given control of the other area. And the arrangement seems quite the right thing. What we must all keep in mind is that Japan started the war with superiority of land, sea and air, which gave her complete freedom of movement. She has thus been able to occupy so large a part of the Far East, and extend her operations to as far south as Australia, and as far as Burma. The main effort of the Allies for the present must be to reduce that superiority, and, that can be done by reinforcing. Something, indeed a good deal, has been done in this respect, but a great deal still remains to be accomplished. For example, the troops fighting in Burma, lack air support, and that must be rectified. Now we see Japan with a long line of communications stretching from Burma and the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean to Australia. Japan must protect that line with her navy and her air force. Neither Britain nor the United States could muster a fleet large enough to defeat the Japanese navy, because they must maintain large naval forces in their home waters in the Atlantic. The Mediterranean and other lines of communications must be protected, but it is possible for them to split the Japanese navy by menacing it from both ends with a naval force of moderate strength heavily supported by aeroplanes—and the Pacific strategy seems to be shaping this way. The United States must send warships and aeroplanes to Australia, which is the southern base of attack. With adequate land forces the Allies could clean up the Islands in the Pacific occupied by the Japanese, and particularly Marshall Islands which would furnish a splendid air base for attack on the Japanese mainland. Japan could also be attacked from Alaska. On the Indian side it was reported from Rome, that a British naval squadron of considerable, strength, consisting of two battleships, two aircraft carriers, and other warships had passed Capetown, on the way to the Indian Ocean. This report has not been denied by the British, and therefore it cannot be ruled out. With Japan subject to attack by the British on the one side and the Americans on the other, she would be obliged to split up her forces and she will be unable to say from which side the heaviest attack will come. It must be remembered that every shjip and. every plane that Japan loses is a real loss for she has not the. facilities for rapidly making good such losses. The strategy of the Allies appears to be quite satisfactory and presently we shall see the results.