RUSSIA AWAKENING

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 5, Issue 14, 9 February 1942, Page 6

RUSSIA AWAKENING

SOVIET'S VAST MILITARY MIGHT

NEW FQIIM> OF STRATEGY The tasks set the Soviet anu.v when Hitler attacked may be defined as follows. The nation had to meet an army Hushed with victory over every other military State in Europe —an army which had smashed the "impregnable" Maginot Line, and shattered the Belgium, French, Dutch and British armies in a matter of weeks —an army moreover not only reinforced by the plundered equipment of the defeated armies, but also supported by Finland, Rumania, Hungary, Italy, and the Fascist remnants of Spain, Czechoslovakia, etc. —add tor these a series of brilliant victories in Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, plus the fact that it chose also the day and hour and you have some idea of the magnitude of the jcih so calmly undertaken by the Russians. It should also be appreciated that i,n the Far East the Soviet's have a large, independant and Avell-equipped army to meet Japan. Statements that the Soviet Far Eastern army were sent to the west are ill considered and absurd. It is the one thing the Soviets would not —in fact could not do, while Japan remains a menace. The popular feeling about Russia's success is one of surprise, although why this surprise should exist lias never been quite clear to the writer to whom information on the Soviet army lias been available. It is probable that the average man having neither the time nor the inclination to delve for this information, lias only had recourse to the mass of anti-Soviet propaganda now confined only to Deutchland, Zender and Radio Roma. Be this as it may the writer has in his possession the most recent and authoritative work issued on the Soviet army—the translated work, "The Military Strength ei the Powers." by Ma\ Werner. Although this work deals with all the armies, by far the greater portion concerns the Red arm}', not only because it is the largest and best equipped but becausc in Werner's opinion it is also destined lo play the most important role. Because of.the interest which local l-leane Guards' with horses have -shown in the reports from the Eastern front on the spectacular use by the Russians of Cavalry, it is intended to deal firstly with that arm. It should also be ol geueial interest, as the question of the retention of cavalry, has caused more argument than any other arm. A quotation lrom Russian field service regulations will serve as a warning to our local Guard against over enthusiasm. "Strategic cavalry with its considerable strength in arms and technical equipment (machine guns and aeroplanes) is well able to carry out various tasks in battle (attack, defence, reconnoitring, raids) independently." From the foregoing it is clear that for the purpose c.f a cavalry division the cavalry is supplemented by its armoured equipment rather than that the reverse is true. On the other hand it would appear from further quotations that a cavalry division is itself (with its supplementary equipment) supplementary to motoriscd divisions, lliis is illustrated by the following: "Cavalry must be used in great masses and not in small formations, and cavalry must be equipped with the latest weapons of modern Avarlare, and trained to co-operate in particular with tanks." And Werner has this to say: "At the same time cavalry in the Red Army is trained to cooperate with tanks, and it has its place in the decisive operations ol the powerful moto-mechanised units. It is the task of cavalry to follow up tank attacks, to occupy captured territory and mop up isolated enemy posts. It must never ollei a good mark lo the enemy, ft must be highly mobile and be used against the manpower of tin; enemy whilst the tanks are destroying his fire concentration. In such a ceinbinal ion of arms the operation of pursuit can be carried out rapidlv and with ail energy, and the exploitation of success can be carried out at top speed." It would seem that Home <.iuan: commanders of herse troops wib have some improvising lo do ! n the way of mechanical equipment. Some people think that the .uei'man Military Stafl thought the li.ii.ssians wore gum boots, bean!-, and long shirts—with one or two e>cootie,ns this is not true —il was rea! 1 v we who < bought this. Werner snvs: "The Soviet Commander Krivoshein writes :>> l'o! lows in a book wnich

was translated into German and created a sensation in German mili- I tary circles, which regard it as al pioneering effort in the tactics of 1 modern warfare: "Just as for cav- 1 airy, the pursuit of a defeated enemy is one of the most fruitful tasks of 1 mechanised troops. The great mo- J bility of cavalry is supplemented : by the impetus and manoeuvring : capacity of the tanks, and therefore a mixed formation of cavalry and 1 mechanised troops represents a very effective instrument of pursuit." 1 It is probable that the German military circles mentioned above by i Werner arc at the moment regretting their inability to convince Hit- : ler that Krivosliein knew a thing or tAVO, Although this revolutionary theory of cavalry was quickly appreciated by the Germans there is evidence that our own British High Command would have none of it and were in fact stilt back at the Rattle of Omdurman in 1890 odd. Wintringham" in his book "NewWays of War," quotes the following from a British cavalry training manual, dated 1937-: "It is of the high est importance that all leaders should be trained-: 1. To act quickly and make rapid decisions: with this object officers will be encouraged to hunt and rkle across country." The above sounds funny to us, but in England—well, "Damn it all man who's going to take lessons from low fellows who knew nothing about fox hunting, and are reputed to use their toe nails in lieu of spurs." There is some excuse for our snobocracy, for in 1937 or thereabouts, Ribbentrop, then doing the social rounds in England, was tickling their ribs with mirth provoking stories about the comical things the Russians do Avith their army, and of what the Fuehrer would do Avith Stalin's young Generals, if only he could borrow a few more millions. Our own brilliant General Wavell didn't fall for this stuff, and Max Werner goes out of his Avay to quote Wavcll's trip to the Russian manoeuvres, and ot his comments on the way the Russians used the!tanks. Werner says: "Both Italian and French observers were particularly struck by the youth of the Red Army commanders, and so Avas the British General Wavell Avho avus present at the autumn manoeuvres of the Red Army in While Russia in 193(>." The following extract is of interest as 1 haven't yet seen it in print or in any article on "Wavell. Wa\e!l says: ''The higher officers are younger than in most other armies, including the British Army, that is i favourable factor. The army needs young and physically aeti\'C ofliceis. The above Avas part of "an interview given by Wavell To the Pravda September 11, 1936." Sir Stafford Grippe on his recent return from Moscow gave much prominence to the fact that young generals in the thirties predominate and are. not excluded from the higher command. Incidentally the book by Werner Avas published by an Editorial Board of Avhich Sii Stafford Avas chairman and is evidence of his desire before the war to secure an alliance with the Soviets, in fact it Avas his too ardent pursuit of this object Avhich led to his expulsion from the Labour Party. So you see it Avasn't only the Conservative Parly Avhich Avas guilty of appeasement, All recent news from the Russian front shoAVS that their artillery has played a large part in Avearing the Nazis dotwn and in many places has chopped them to pieces. AVerner gives an amazing array of facts about this artillery, and shows that they have an undoubted superiority both in quality and quantity. Even the heaviest of their pieces arc highly mobile —"the K> m.m. field gun has a range of 13 kilometres, Avliereas the German 77 m.m. held gun has a range of between 10 and 11 kilometres only." "Retreat according to plan" and "strategic retreat," are, as we all know, the favourile phrases of broadcasters, who (God bless them) Avish lo protect our sensitive natures from unpleasant shocks. Nevertheless these phrases do mean something tangible in the strategy of the Soviet army. Compare the presenl ! position en the eastern front with ("Werner's interpretation ol' Uussinr. ■I strategy: -'l/nlike Gennan strategy. | Red strategy refuses to stake all on obtaining a quick decision; .it <s | :■ strategy of many phases, and H I rei'nsis tu expect miracles even from .! j he -most ingenious war plan. On ■the contrary, it reckons Avilh the possibility of long and determined resistance on the part of the enemy. This sums up the essential differ-

cncc between German and Red strategy. Red strategy reckons with the possibility of steadily growing resistance on the part of the enemy; it is a strategy of endurance." Again compare the following extract Avritten by the Soviet military theorist Isserson, with the great battle for Moscow and the counter olfensive, and you will iind that they were brilliant examples of the combining of theory with practise. ''Resistance has a tendency to increase, and it reaches its culminating point at the strategic zenith when the attacker is nearing his object and is compelled to stake everything on his offensive . . • The weakening of an offensive is usually due more to .the increasing strength of the defence than to the exhaustion of the attacker. The genius and the firmness of operative leadership demonstrates itself by forsceing this decisive moment and seizing on it with a new wave of operative efforts and in full possession of all the forces and material required to complete the operation successlully. And Gediakin, a Soviet military writer says the same tiling. "Withdrawing to his own strategic base the enemy has more time to rally and concentrate his forces, and in the upshot he may prove stronger than the first wave of the attacking forces unless the latter have drawn on their reserves."