A GERMAN COMMUNIQUE

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 3, Issue 282, 12 March 1941, Page 3

A GERMAN COMMUNIQUE

HOW IT IS MADE TYPICAL INGREDIENTS "Hier 1 St. Deutsclilandscnder" this is the German Home Radio. A bomber pilot is speaking. He is describing a raid over Britain, and this is what he says; "There was no searchlight activity as Ave circled the aerodrome.' Then Ave dropped our bombs. Several fires started Avith a reddish yellow colour, and Ave heard seA'cn explosions—seven machines destroyed." Typical Result This cock-ami-bull story is soon translated upon arrival in Berlin into the clipped language of a High Command announcement. "Total losses of the enemy ,a|lstevday and last night, therefore, amounted to thirty-three aircraft." (German High Command communique, February 11, 1911). In fact the British lost six machines on the day in question. But this and similar enemy exaggerations are not to be Avondered at if Berlin is prepared to score every hasty assumption as a substantiated result. AD At Sea Claims as to the tonnage of British shipping sunk seem to be made on the same unsubstantial basis. The Nazi bomb—or torpedo-aimer—■ claims as victim the ship whose fate his aeroplane or submarine cannot possibly have Availed to see. The classic case is that of Aircraftsman Francko, Avho'was-award-ed a commission for the first sinking of the Ark Royal, because his comrades had "clearly seen her decks aAvash." On the same scanty type of evidence the German High Command communique of November 8 claimed to haA r e completely destroyed 86,000 tons of shipping being "the whole of the British convoy," Avhich was escorted by the Jcrvis Bay. As is avcll known only four out of the thirty-eight .ships in that convoy were sunk by the raider To take yet another example, the German High Command claimed (February 12) that fourteen out of fifteen ships had been sunk in an Atlantic convo3 r a feAA T days earlier. A German Home wireless commentator (February 15) added the embellishment that "it would have been an easy matter to sink the fifteenth \ r essel as Avell, but the German commander left her to pick up the creAVS of the fourteen other ships." It is already knoAvn at the time of going tc press that ten out of nineteen ships in the convoy in question are safe at their respective destinations and that four more are not yet overdue.

Lastly, Herr Hitler's famous 215000 tons in two days—conveniently reported just in time for his annual speech of February 24—are as far removed from the truth as such enemy assertions invariably prove to be. ' Flying High Light is thrown on the higher mathematics of the Nazi Air Command by an article in "Der Adler," the Nazi flying paper. Writing in the issue of October 29, Hauptmann Schramm, who commands a Press Reporter Company, says that one of the rules governing the recognition of an airman's claim to be credited with a feat Is that: "Victories are not credited to a single pilot, but to his unit. Should more than one unit have taken part in the air battle during which the enemy machine was shot down, all these units are credited with this victory." (For fuller details see article "The Credit of the Luftwaffe," published in Aeroplane," February 7). The rule is evidently open to variation, for German broadcasts often announce that "Sergeant Schmidt has shot down so-and-so many machines." It is easy to register a big score if, as happens, his flight, squadron, wing,, and groups are all credited with the success. The total' is swelled still further whenever other units are engaged in the action, and their flights, squadron?, wings |id groups chalk up the bag as well. Solution to Follow Are the exaggerations, solely the result of . premature conclusions drawn by commander and pilot, or does the cooking staff of the Propaganda Ministry contribute to the total ? This question must remain unanswered until the Nazis fall and German lips are unsealed—until you and I can sit back and read the record of a racket in books called "I Lied for Goebbels,". and "Death of the Swastika."