MEDITERRANEAN SCENE

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 3, Issue 273, 19 February 1941, Page 2

MEDITERRANEAN SCENE

ITALY IN TROUBLE MUSSOLINI'S MISCALCULATION HITLER'S ATTITUDE TO HIS ALLY The reports of rioting in Italy may be well foundecL Facing serious setbacks to her armies in Albania, while her armies in Africa arc melting away, "as if by the heat of the sun" and her African Empire is disintegrating rapidly, the external position of Italy is an unhappy one. Nor is the internal situation any better under the impending threat of Nazi domination.

Mussolini's original miscalculation was in June. Then, with most of the Continent passing under Axis control, it seemed, on any normal calculation, impossible that Great Britain should continue the struggle; outnumbered as she was in the air. without an effective army, and thrown by the French defection into naval inferiority in the Mediterranean. Accordingly Mussolini's intervention on June 10 was planned for a time when the fighting would, be virtually over and; Italy, in reward for her "moral solidaritycould take without a struggle a share of the spoils.

But the British people, in their unenviable stupidity, decided to carry on. "Can it be;," asked the Italian press incredulously, "that 47 Englishmen are in fact 47 million Churchills?" In Egypt Ave were, left with small land forces and a strategy planned on the basis of the large French armies in Syria and Tunis. Now both flanks were exposed. On sea, the defection of the French Fleet and its possible surrender to the Axis made it look for a few'black weeks as though the position of our Mediterranean Fleet might prove untenable. Then was the time for Mussolini to strike hard at Egypt and at the Fleet. Italy did not seize the opportunity for the simple reason that her war preparations had been made not for fighting but for victory. Neither in Italy; nor in Libya weire the armed forces on a real war footing. There had been no full mobilisation; for Avhich, says the "Economist," one of the reasons waj a severe shortage of equipment. Coastal defences and anti-aircraft batteries were not fully organised, war output was down, and ten months' inactivity had reduced the comparative standard of skill of Italy's pilots. Nor were her first-line aircraft of first-class quality. Italy Unprepared. There is no threat of actual starvation. Italy's own wheat harvest can probably cover a basic minimum. But there is nothing to replace the formerly imported foodstuffs whose inflow ended in June. Butler, eggs, and\ olive oil, the Italian staples are very scarce and there are four meatless days a week. Prices have risen for food and clothing between 50 and 60 per cent. But wages are stabilised, and in some industries have even been reduced. The psychological preparation in Italy for a prolonged war was even more unsatisfactory. Little fighting nnrl mnfii bntfv blit7kripsrf t»n<l vio-

The psychological preparation in Italy for a prolonged war was even more unsatisfactory. Little fighting and much botty, blitzkrieg and victory were the common themes of politicians and the Press. German Pressure. Hitler's decisive failure in the air battle for Britain put an end to this period of military stalemate. It is likely that, at about the end of August, Hitler began to press Mussolini for more active intervention. But the Italian reply, the advance v • & to Sidi Barrani, was unsatisfactory. Once again, Italy chose the ling of least resistance.

Whether as a consequence of Italy's inactivity or merely as a mani feistation of his new position as master of Europe, Hitler's tone to his ally changed after the defeat of France. Italy's "sphere of influence" in the Balkans, which had traditionally included Hungary, was brutally invaded and Italy was not aslted to do more than "rubber-stamp" the dismemberment of Rumania. Nor did

the Italians fare much better in the West. While the expulsions from Lorraine showed that Germany hatl lot diminished her own claims on France, Italy was not permitted to occupy even a town in Savoy, Corsica or the Riviera. Hitler's fear of stirring up trouble in North Africa <,<nd weakening Laval's position led to a conspiracy of silence over the fate of Tunis and Algeria. It is therefore 'possible to discern a dual purpose on the Italian attack on Greece. On the one hand, it was an attempt to rehabilitate Italy's reputation with her impatient and contemptuous ally by creating that

diversion in the Noav East for which Hitler had been pressing. At the same time the attack on Greece was aimed against Hitler in that it was an Italian, attempt to seize the only remaining part of the Balkans allotted to Italy before the Fuehrer again changed his mind. To this extent, it was an independent line, designed to strengthen Italy's position when the French Empire came, up for redistribution. Unfortunately -for Italy, the war on Greece, like her entry in the West, was launched under a misconception. It was firmly believed that the Greeeks would offer no resistance.

A. MEMORY OF "COBBER" KAIN "Cobber" Ka'sn is the particular hero of "Squadrons Up," Noel Monk's new book about the Air Force in France. He. tells of,his first meeting with "Cobber" in Miay last: "... I turned on the bath while he peeled off his clothes—for the first time in mx days. He was dazed for want of sleep and said hardly a word. "After about 10 minutes I looked into tliq bathroom and 'Cobber's' chin was resting on his massive chest, his eyes were closed, and the water was making little bubbles as he snored a fraction of an inch from the surface. "When the coffee arrived I woke him up and he cried: 'Blow me down! I dreamt I was back in dear old N.Z.'" As a reviewer remarks in the Daily Telegraph: "If that is not literature, I do not know what is."

POCKET SHIP LISTED WITH RAIDERS A Japanese version of survivors' stories from ships sunk by German raiders in the Pacific, says that one raider, known as the Narvik, is a 10,000-ton pocket battleship. Ninety-eight Filipinos who landed at Manila described the raiders as: Manyo Maru, about 10,000 tons, armed with six six-inch guns, two four-inch guns, two torpedo tubes, two seaplanes. Tokio Maru, about 500 tons, 'heavily armed'; served as supply ship. Narvik, about 10,000 tons, low black vessel, armed with four heavy guns, two torpedo tubes, o seaplanes. All vesseils were manned by ibout 300 men wearing the uniform of German marines, and each vessel was described as being able to hold its own against a light cruisci. One commander was observed to be wearing two Iron Crosses.