RENGTH OF ITALY

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 2, Issue 177, 24 June 1940, Page 3

RENGTH OF ITALY

AIR FORCE IMPORTANT

VULNERABILITY TO BLOCKADE EFFECTS OF FASCIST RULE Seeking to gather some of the spoils which lie feels Hitler will not allow him to share without active intervention, Mussolini has launched Italy into the European conflict, Avith a calculation and cold-blood-edness rare even in dictators. Long Preparations. It is not for nothing that Italian military theory has been based on the assumption that a sudden, sharp blow is capable of achieving military success, for the country is condemned to a lack of raw materials and vulnerable to distant blockade in a manner which makes it certain that a long Avar would be bitter and disastrous. Through the Mediterranean, of Avhich the Allies command both ends, come 80 per cent of Italy's vital imports. She lacks completely fourteen vital raAV materials, including cotton, copper, rubber, nickel, manganese and tin. Moreovci, whilst Fascist rule has given Italy a sort of industrial self-sufficiency, the concentration of industry north 6f the valley of the Po constitutes a military AA r eakness of the first order, for it is close to French attack. Mass and Mobility. The Italians have combined theories of mass attack with a Avorship of mobility Avhich they haA r e aIAA r ays planned to link AA'itli large-scale assaults from the air. The Douliet theory of a decision being gained by air power, indeed, is Italian in origin, though of late there has been an indication that this theory has been modified. , Consequently the Italians have usually given their biggest budget to their army. This includes about 525,000 Black Shirt militia and there is equipment available in sufficient quantity to put an army of about 1,200,000 men in the field. Italy is reputed to possess about 20000 guns,, but until 1938 she had little modern heavy artillery and some of the pieces used Avere those taken from the Austrians in the World War. There are 65 millimetre ■ and 75 millimetre field guns and 100 millimetre howitzers., while .the mountain troops pack unassembled 75's. The anti-aircraft artillery is mostly 75 millimetres (3in) or hair that size. Over-rated Tanks. The Italians have been renoAvned for their tanks, but unjustifiably so according to some observers. They had a number of light tanks which scampered around in mediocre fashion iii Ethiopia and met disaster in Spain, mostly 2-men Fiats mount ing tAvo machine guns, and very vuj nerable to anti-tank fire. HoAvever, there have been changes in design in the effort to imr prove these tanks, and much store has been set by flame-throAA'ing tanks, Avhich were used both in Ethiopia and in Spain. Usually these are ligiit Fiats. Tavo years ago new prototypes Avere being developed in the effort to remove tlii> weakness, and Avhat has happened since is shrouded in great mystery. The Ethiopian Avar showed the strength and Aveakness of the Italian military machine. It showed that the Black Shirt militia aaiVs contemptible as a fighting force (the regulars themselves sneered at the political troops). It shoAA T ed that the regular infantry Avas still deficient in training. It sliOAved that the high command, apart from General Badoglio, Avas inefficient an'i riddled with politics. The recent appointment of General de Bono, who has long been a politician and a creature of Mussolini, to an important command, hints that the army is still not free from politics, though Avhen he succeeded to the command in Ethiopia Badoglio sent some of the generals home. The virtues of the Italians as shoAvn # in the African campaign Avere their poAvers j of organisation., supply, and sanitation. The army i? certainly better than it Avas in the World War (it Avould need to be), and it is equally certainly better equipped. In carrying out the Italian offensive the Aviiole of.the air force Avill be i mpor! anl. That air force hat' r/.:o first-line machines in 1937 am! i!aiy sough i to raise the total te (Continued foot previous column)