THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 2, Issue 165, 27 May 1940, Page 7

THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

BELIEFS OF GERMAN STRATEi GIST ENCIRCLING STRATEGY Whether Germany, in her attack on Belgium and Holland, is tryijng the famous Sclilieffen Plan again, extended to allow for an effort fto provide aira nd sea bases in Holland, is perhaps not yet entirely clear, but it looks very much as though she is. It was in pursuance of this Sclilieffen Plan, in a modified form, that the Germans invaded Belgium in 1914. The idea was an encircling movement on the Allied flnnk, all along the line of the Franco-Belgian, frontier. This avoided attacking ths more heavily fortified Ftench posts on the German frontier and aimed at surrounding the French and British armies by an ultimate advance of the far wing of the Germans) down from Belgium towards Paris and the coast. The 1914 generals changed the plan, advanced on Paris from the front instead of the" rear, and failed at the Battle of the Marne. Count Alfred von Sclilieffen, the originator of the plan, was dead a year before it was tried out, but his influence was still great in the German Army. He was appointed Chief of Staff of the army in 1891, and held the post lor 15 years, exercising an extraordinary effect oh the development of the German General Staff and the whole army. Disciple of Clausewitz. Like the elder Moltke, Sclilieffen was a disciple of the noted strategist Clausewitz, whose ideas owed much to Napoleon. Their doctrine was that enemy forces should be not merely defeated, but destroyed, and thus to them it appeared neces-* sary that not only the front but the flanks and, if possible, the rear, should be attacked, so that the enemy should be forced to give battle on a reversed front. Schlieffen, in the early years of this century, saw Germany surrounded on all sides by enemies, who, together, were far more powerful than herself. It seemed to him that the only salvation lay in opposing one of the enemies with a superior force, inflicting a decisive defeat and then turning upon the other enemy, against whom defensive positions had till then been maintained. To achieve such aims rapidly decisive blows were necessary, and Schlieffen's writings were designed to prove such blows possible and to show how troops could be handled for that purpose.