The Bay of Plenty Beacon Published Wednesdays and Fridays. WEDNESDAY, MAY 1st, 1940. PACIFIC STRATEGY

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 2, Issue 154, 1 May 1940, Page 4

The Bay of Plenty Beacon Published Wednesdays and Fridays. WEDNESDAY, MAY Ist, 1940. PACIFIC STRATEGY

IN view of the concern shown in America, and reflected in Australia and New Zealand, that Japan might take advantof the present European situation and seize the Dutch EastIndies, the strategical situation in the Pacific warrants review. Actually there are four strategical schemes to take into account—that of Japan, the British Empire scheme based on Singapore; the United States scheme, whose base is at present Hawaii, but might be altered to give more striking power if the present political trend continues; and lastly the 'defensive measures taken by the Dutch themselves. The last-mentioned scheme would be likely to play an important part in any invasion by Japan, though it would have to be left to either the United States or Great Britain to take decisive action. As in the Dutch East Indies there is a defence force numbering some 200,000 men, and as the Dutch have with the. comparatively small resources at their command developed a mosquito fleet, for which these waters are excellent lurking grounds, the occupation of Java and the other islands of the group overnight seems unlikely. Whether or not the Dutch, with their recently expanded defence precautions, are justified in the confidence in their torpedo-boat chasers and their submarine fleet cannot be answered at present, but it it certain that the boats, with the intensive knowledge of their commanders of these littleknown coasts, have a very high nuisance value. Japan s trouble is that she 'does not know if America would intervene, or what strength Great Britain could, at a pinch, allocate to these waters. Any midway posts she might attempt to use are believed to be not sufficiently developed to serve as safe: bases for large warships, and the Singapore naval base <is ideally situated for forays upon any Japanese convoys. That means that any ships that Great Britain could spare would be particularly effective—the British theory of naval strategy in the Pacific is that no enemy can attack involving long lines of communication against'the East Indies—or regions further south—as long as an undefeated- British battle fleet can use Singapore, deemed practically impregnable, as a repair base. At present however, the exceptionally strong base at Honolulu must probably be looked upon as the real centre of any operations the American line through Honolulu to Wake Island and Guajn has not yet been enirely consolidated, and it seems that, like Japan, America would be hampered as things stand by exceptionally long lines of communications-. So far as can be known at present, the Japanese and United States navies compare as follows: Battleships, U.S.A. 15, Japan 10; cruisers, U.S.A. 35, Japan 39; destroyers, U.S.A. 215, Japan 112; submarines, U.S.A. 87, Japan 59; whilst "the Japanese fleet is reported to be singularly weak in minesweepers, Of which it would have great need in Dutch waters. But whether the Uuited States would agree to guarantee the security of % Dutch East Indies in the event of aggression remains to be seen*