TERRIFIC FAILURE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 217, 12 September 1940, Page 11

TERRIFIC FAILURE.

INVASION BALLYHOO. FAMOUS DESIGNER SUMS UP. The possibilities of a successful German Invasion of England are discussed here by a noted flyer and airplane designer, Russianborn, who is now an American citizen. He visited Europe a few months ago, and has spent much time studying European military 'planes. (By MAJOR P. DE SEVERSKY.) NEW YORK, July 3. British defences and the nervee of the world have been keyed up for weeks in expectation of a German invasion of England. Several specific dates have been fixed by officially-inspired rumoufor the launching of the attempt. Now Chancellor Hitler's "Last Chance" speech, coupled with demonstrative preparations for the undertaking, ' would seem to make the invasion an imminent possibility. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that there "ill be. no such invasion—unless Germany possesses a huge secret armada of new tv]K:s of fighting aircraft about whi.h the outside world has as yet no inkling. There is a great gulf between the. political logic of the Fuehrer's threats and the tactical realities of the situation. If victory has gone to Hitler's head and he overrides the objections of his strategists in this connection, then Germany is heading for a terrific failure. Indeed, there is room for the suspicion that the deliberate German ballyhoo about the coming onslaught against the British ]«les is a stratagem. It may well be intended primarily to compel Britain to keep its best men and machines at home, in order to permit the Italo-German combine to strike more vigorously in some different direction. The Nazis have again and again shown .themselves past masters in exploiting the principles of surprise in warfare. Middle Sea Easier Target. While British physical and mental attention are concentrated on home defences, the blitzkrieg may be unleashed, let us say, in the Mediterranean— against Malta, the Suez and Gibraltar. General Franco's activities and Count Ciano's visits with Hitler may have more to do with Mideterranean air bases to accommodate German 'planes for such an attack than with the invasion of England. Clearly the hysteria over the invasion is being whipped up consistently and deliberately from German and Italian sources. Now that the fear ie at its apex, and the best of English power diverted to the home arena, it would not surprise me if the death-blow descended on the outposts of the British Empire in the middle sea. There the blitzkrieg has vastly greater chances of swift and overwhelming success, leaving England that much weaker and more vulnerable for a better-prepared invasion in 1941. β-iii. The effective invasion of the liritisa Me is impossible as long as its defenders retain mastery of the skies over the island and over the English Channel. The transporting and landing of large numbers, of troops are unthinkable without the shield of a solid ceiling of air protection. This was demonstrated in positive terms in the Dunkirk evacuation, which was ..possible- only because the British proved in a negative witf in Norway, when overwhelming British, naval superiority wae helpless to prevent the invasion because the Nazis controlled the air over the Skagerrak. By the same token, operations of invading troops in England, if they did land, could not be successfully developed, until the skiea overhead were conquered and cleared. Hitler's Dwindling Chancee. I have inspected or flown every type of bomber and fighter 'plane thus far e.n»a<*ed in the air duel over England, and I have studied carefully all available information on the struggle. Despit© the disparity in numbers, I can see no reason for doubting British de fensive superiority. On the contrary. the results of the German explorative raids to date indicate that, with its present equipment, Germany cannot accomplish the first and indispensable of an invasion—the wresting of control of the air over England. Tha is why previous "zero hours" set for the. promised invasion passed without action, and why the new one, in my opinion, must likewise be postponed. It eeeme obvious to me that summary destruction of British air power—the essential preliminary to an invasion—is altogether unlikely. The only alternative is the tedious process of slowly and laboriously whittling down that defensive air force, which is extremely expensive in men, equipment, and, most important—time. Already Hitler has been obliged to lose a month of valuable "invasion weather." He has only a few more months left before snow, sleet and ice formations on the wings will make air activities sporadic at best. Winter Operations Favour Britain. It has not been generally understood that bad weather, while improving England's defensive position, will not seriously hamper its offensive efforts in the air. Germany has many more flying days in the late fall and in winter than the British Isles. The British warplanes can take off in obscurity at home, strike at enemy objectives in clear weather, and return to the shelter or their shrouded bases. It is at the target end that visibility is important, and German attempts to pierce the fogs would only result in aimless bombing. Blind flying will be open to British airmen, no matter how bad the visibility at home, through radio and ground facilities for take-off and landing; but it will be of no use to the Germans, confronted with banks of fog at the target end of their flights. Thus the advantage of winter operations will be decidedly on the British side. The invasion be undertaken soon or postponed until next spring, and be undertaken with any real hope of success unless British defensive air power is broken down. This the present German equipment cannot achieve. Germany must replace its present Messerschmitts, which are inferior to the British Spitfires and Hurricanes, with pursuits of greater speeds, longer range and more efficient armament. In addition, it must improve Nazi bombing 'planes, the present Junkers and Heinkels being deficient both in armour and in armament for the task of invasion. True, we have heard rumours of a new Fikkei-Wulf pursuit aeroplane similar to our own Bell A'racobra. But as near'y as we can judge, that model has only j.ist been put into production and pW-'unaViy cannot be made available in large enough numbers for the purposta of an immediate invasion. Unless tl.is mode] or some other capable fif meeting the British pursuits on equal terms has ljecii secretly prepared in niu-<s quantities. England's lirst line of defence cannot be pierce , ! ;N.A.N.A.)