THE WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXVI, Issue 33, 8 February 1905, Page 4

THE WAR.

The results of the last Japanese success in Manchuria appear to be developing slowly. After what seems to have been a desperate struggle, In which the Russians evidently displayed not only as much heroism, out as much tactical skill as their opponents, the armies commanded by Gripenberg and Kuropatkin have been forced backward over the Hun River toward Mukden, According to the Japanese account, General Oku's army was for some time in a position of grave peril, but after its extrication Oyama's troops seem to have carried all before them. The Russian loss was probably heavier than in any other battle but the sanguinary struggle on the Shaho; but eyen this does not express the full magnitude of the disaster. But perhaps the most ominous feature of the situation is the outcry now raised against Kuropatkin in Russia, and the demand, echoed by French and German military experts, for his recall from the seat of war. The position of Kuropatkin has always been extremely unenviable. There is, s-very reason to believe that the jealousy and incompetence of Alexeietf had much to do with the inglorious conduct of the first campaign. At all events we can be sure that Kuropatkin has been hampered at every turn, not only by rivals and enemies on the spot, but by the machinations of the Grand Dukes who aspire to direct the war from the luxurious security of St. Petersburg. At the bidding of courtiers and intriguing adventurers who have the ear of the Czar, Kuropatkin has been compelled to take some of the most decisive steps of the campaign- The Czar ordered him to despatch Stakelberg on his disastrous attempt to relieve Port Arthur. The Czar directed him to encourage his army by advancing against Oyama in the ill-fated marcli that ended a"t the Sha-ho- ]Sow we hear that this last attempt ro drive the Japanese southward was ordained by the Czar so as to distract the attention of the army from the anarchy and revolution now pervading Russia. Throughout Kuropatkin appears to have been the victim of circumstances, and the only just charge that can be brought against him is that he had not the strength of character to refuse to undertake such heavy responsibilities under such impossible conditions. Today his position is far worse than it has been since the successful retreat from Liao-yang. He has probably 300,000 troops, for Colonel Gadke's estimate of 400,000 is a manifest exaggeration; while Oyama, reinforced by Noo-i's veterans from Port Arthur, must* largely outnumber him. The appointment of his nval, Gripenberg, to the Manchurian command has' necessarily paralysed his energies,- and it is no surprise to learn that Kuropatkin has practically refused to act in conjunction with a "colleague S,V? s S + -° rCed ? P °? him » hos «le Court faction, and who has striven from the first to cast the blame for his own failures upon Kuropatkin alone. While the Russian army broken in spirit and reduced in numbers is falling s*owly back toward Mukden, and Oyama is pressing the pursuit, Russia is still seething with the volcanic fire* of revolution. The Czar has displayed no J , of .opacity for grappling with this terrible crisis; and he is still apparently a tool in the hands of his ambitious and unscrupulous uncles and cousins. The Grand Duke Vladmii oir?v la P ermsment Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, and has conspired against Mcholas throughout his reign, the Grand Duke Alexis, High Admira of the navy, the Crand Duke Constanrf , nen L in the arm y> an <* the Grand Duke Serge, Governor of MosiS'^ 4 \ he Grand Dukes Alex- ! d rvT* '• Borh and °y rii - «™ke up a cabal agamst which the limited intellect and the feeble will of the Czar are powerless. Autocrats, readonanes, behevmg tirmly that political progress is an evil, and that their rights and privileges are of paramount importance to the State, they have JhT + e r elVeS caoable °f the subtlest diplomacy or the most un Sat k™™*™ t0 attai » thenends. They are tne virtual rulers of tho country: and this fact alone is enough to explain why Russia is on the o revolution, why Kuropatkin has been all along foredoomed to failure and disgrace, and why the Japanese are "till advancing from victory to victor* to wards the inevitable end F