SUPREME COURT.—In Banco.

Auckland Star, Volume I, Issue 76, 6 April 1870, Page 2

SUPREME COURT.—In Banco.

WEDNESDAY APRIL G

(Before His Honor Sir G. A. Arney, Knight Chief Justice.) His Honor took his seat on the Bench at 11 o'clock. Jl'iEOD V. LACOX. (AVHIT OF PROHIBITION.) His Honor gave judgment in this case to clay, and made the rule absolute for a writ of prohibition. His Honor in giving judgment, recited the various Goldfields Acts from 1858 clown to 1868 inclusive, and observed that they raised questions of gredt difficulty. He also cited and compared the several sections which defined, the jurisdiction of wardens. In the present case the parties who moved for the writ (McLeod and others) did so on the ground that Mr. War.I. en Davy, the Judge of the Wardens Court at Shortland, had no jurirdietion over the Coromandel goldfield. It therefore became a matter of echne moment to ascertain what was the legal position of the Coromandel goldfield, as well as the dates when the several Acts, and the proclamations under them took effect. It appeared that the Coromandel goldfields was first proclaimed by Sir George Grey, and a Warden's Court was constituted a second time under an Act (the Act of 1858), which had been repealed. This and other circumstances connected with the administration of goldfields under these several Acts made it so difficult to determine what was the legal position of persons or localities affected by them. It was said that Mr. Warden Davy, having been appointed Warden for the Hauraki Goldfield, the term being meant to include all the goldfields that might be proclaimed in that district, which, as itincluded Coromandel, therefore the Warden of the Court at Shortland had jurisdiction. It was further contended that, under the provisions of the Act of 1866, the jurisdiction of the Warden had been extended, and would have effect throughout the colony. But the intention of the Legislature appeared, by the construction of the various sections, to be to localise the administration of Wardens to goldfields, and they were to have concurrent juris* diction with the District Judge, but only for the particular district in which his Court was situated. A decision by Mr. Justice Moore appeared to hold that an extension of a Warden extended to cases brought into his own Court from whatever policy. If that judgment had really affirmed what the law was, the Court would be bound by it; but it rather suggested that such may hare been the intention of the Legislature. No decision under which a Warden of one Court wou'd sit in a Court outside his own district had been made. That was not the point in the present case. By the various Acts the powers given to the Governor by Order in Council to proclaim goldfields to constitute Wardens' Courts, to appoint the Wardens thereto, to make regulations, &c., were in each case pretty much the same. It was not until the 16th of May that the Warden's Court for Coromandel was legally constituted. Therefore, having regard to the policy of the legislature towards localising the administration of Wardens, Mr. Davy could rot have acted as Judge of the Court in Shortland in a Court legally constituted in Coromandel to which a Warden had been appointed ; nor could he have acted as a Judge in Coromandel before it was proclaimed a goldfieid; a goldfield if it were outside the limits of the goldfields of which he was appointed Warden. Looking through the whole of these Acts, and after careful consideration how then' language should be construed, I am of opinion this rule must be made absolute.

Mr. Whitaker applied for costs. Mr. Eecs opposed the application, as the Judges had laid down in several cases that costs would not be given upon a writ of propositions where there were no pleadings.

Mr. Whitaker said the question of costs -was entirely within the discretion of the Court. His Honor: rl he rule is made absolute ; nothing is said as to costs. liACON V M'LEOD (APPEAL.)

In this case his Honor said the judgment of the Warden had been given wholly on the facts, and he saw no ground for disturbing the Warden's judgment.

THE QUEEN (ON THE PEOSECUTION OE EOBEBT GBA.HAM AND ALEXANDEE HOGG) ' AGAINST PINEHA AND OTHEES, GEANTEBS OF THE PABAEEKA BLOCK.

The argument in this casa was resumed. Mr. MacOormick was heard in support of the declaration. He admitted that the declaration was imperfect, but the case was whether declaration supported the justice of the plaintiff's case. The Court would not construe the declaration as a special pleader, but would look at it as a whole to see if it contained sufficient upon which to base the judgment of the Court. The declaration had been framed in accordance with precedents. It set forth first the facts, shortly and perhaps imperfectly, but sufficient to enable the Judge to decide. The declaration stated shat the letters patent did operate to the prejndice and inconvenience, and Graham and Hogg must be taken to be connected with the " divers other persons" in respect to whose rights the Crown had been imposed upon. The declaration set out that an imposition was practised, the effect of which was that divers persons were prejudiced and inconvenienced, that amongst these were Graham and Hogg ; and that would be enough to sustain the writ which was set out in the declaration. This was enough to induce the Court to do justice. Taking the declaration as a whole, would the Judge be in a position to give judgment ? In the first place the declaration set out that this grant bore an erroneous date ; the consequence of this wrong date was that several persons were deprived of their estates; that the prosecutors were persons Avho suffered by this error ; that was sufficient foundation for the judgment of the Court. He must contend that there was sufficient title shown. There had been no authority shown that a prosecutor need to have any connection with the letters patent, and that no other person, but anyone interested might proceed under writ of sciori facias. In respect to letters patent for inventions, any person could prosecute under the writ, and he contended that the principle applied to letters patent granted in other matters of prerogative, for the writs of the Sovereign wera placed in the hands of the subject to enforce public right and justice.