THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

Anglo-Maori Warder, Volume 1, Issue 11, 4 July 1848, Page 1

THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

The following is a copy of the letter addressed by the Duke of Wellington to Sir John Burgoyne: "Stratfieldsays, 9th Jan. 1848. "To Major-Gen. Sir John F. Burgoyne, K.C.8., &c. &c. "My dear General,—Some days have elapsed, indeed a fortnight has, since 1 received your note, with a copy of your observations on the possible results of a war with France, under our present system of military preparation. You are aware that I have for years been sensible of the alteration produced in maritime warfare and operations by the application of steam to the propelling of ships at sea. This discovery immediately exposed all parte of the coasts of these ißlandß, which a vessel could approach at all, to be approached, at all times of tide and in all seasons, by vessels so propelled, from all quarters. We are in fact assailable, and at least liable to imult, and to have contributions levied upon us, on all parts of our coast; that is, the , coast of these, including the Channel Islands, which to this time, from the period of the Norman Conquest, have never been successfully invaded. " I have in vain endeavoured to awaken the attention of different administrations to this state of things as' well known to our neighbours (rivals in power, at least, former adversaries and enemies) as it is selvest I hope that your paper may be attended with more success than my representations have been. " I have above, in few words, represented our danger. We have no defence, or hope of defence, excepting in our fleet. We hear a great deal of the spirit of the ' people of England, for which no man entertains higher ; respect than I do. But unorganised, undisciplined, without systematic subordination established and well understood, this spirit, opposed to the fire of musketry and cannon, and to sabres and bayonets of disciplined troops, would only expose those animated by such spirit to confusion and destruction. Let any man only make the attempt to turn to some use this spirit in a case of partial local disturbance; the want of previous systematic organisation and subordination will prevent him even from communicating with more than his own menial servants and dependents, and while mobs are in movement through the country the most powerful will find that he can scarcely move from his own door. " It is perfectly true, that as we stand at present, with our naval arsenals and dockyards not half garrisoned, 5,000 men of all arms could not be put under arms, if required, for any service whatever, without leaving standing without relief all employed on any duty, not excepting even the guards over the pilaces and the person of the Sovereign, i calculate that a declaration of war should probably find our home gar- ■ risons of the strength as follows, particularly considering thafOne of the most common accusations against | this country is, that the practice has been to commence | reprisal at sea simultaneously with adeclaiationof war, the order for the first of which must have been issued before the last can have been published. " We ought to be with garrisons as follows at the moment war is declared ; ! Channel Islands (besides the militia of ! «ach, well organised, trained, and disciplined) 10,000 men Plymouth .:.... 10,000 men Milford Haven 5,000 men Cork 10,000 men Portsmouth 10,000 men Dover 10.030 men Sheemeu, Chatham, and the Thames - 10,000 men " I suppose that one-half of, the whole regalar force of the country would be stationed in Ireland, which half would give the garrison for Cork. The remainder must be supplied from the half of the whole force at home stationed in Great Britain. The whole force employed at home in Great Brita a and Ireland would not afford a sufficient number of men for the mere defence and occupation, on the breaking out of war, of the works constructed for the defence of the dockyards and naval arseails, without leaving a single man disposable. "The measures upon which I have earnestly en* treated different Administrations to decide, which is constitutional, and has been invariably adopted in time of peace for the last eighty years, is to raise, embody, organise, and discipline the militia of the same numbers for each of the three kingdoms united as during the late war. Tbiß would give a mass of organised force amounting to about 150,000 men, which we might immediately set to work to discipline. This alone would enable us to establish the strength of our army. This, with an augmentation of the force of the regular army, which would not cost £400,000, would put the country on its legs in respect to personal force, and I woaldengage for its defence, old as I am. But as we stand now, and if it be true that the exertions of the fleet alone are not sufficient to provide for our defence, we are not safe for a week after the declaration of war. "1 am accustomed to the consideration of these questions, and have examined and reconnoitered, over and over again, the whole coast from the North Foreland, by Dover, Folkstone, Beachy Head, Brighton, Arundel, to Selsey Bill, near Portsmouth; and I say that, excepting immediately under the fire of Dover Castle, there is not a spot on the coast on which infantry might not be thrown on shore, at any time of > tide, with any wind, and in any weather,and from which such body of infantry, so thrown on shore, would not find within the distance of five miles a road into the interior of the country through the cliffs practicable tfor the march of a body of troops;—that in that space of coast (that is, between the North Foreland and Selsey Bill) there are not'less than seven BtnaU hulnars or' .mouths or rivers, each without defence, of which an enemy, having landed his infantry on the coast, might take,possession, and therein land his cavalry and artillery of all calibre, and establish himself and his communication with France. The nearest part of the coast to the metropolis is, undoubtedly, the coast of Sussex, from the east and west side of Beachy Head and to Selsey Bill. There are not less than twelve great roads leadiog from Brighton upon London, and the Fiench army must be much altered indeed, since the

time at which I was better acquainted with it, if there are not'now belonging to it forty chefs d'etat major general capable of sitting down and ordering the march to the coast of 40,000 men, their embarkation, with their hones and artillery, at the several French ports on the coa«t; their disembarkation at named points on the English coast, that of the artillery and cavalry in named ports or mouths of rivers, and the assembly at named points of the several columns; and the march of each of these from stage to stage to London. Let any man examine our mops and road books* consider of the matter, and judge for himself. I know of no mode of resistance, much less of protection from this danger* excepting by an army in the field capable of meeting and contending with its formidable enemy, aided by all the means of fortification which experience in war and science can suggest. I shall be deemed foolhardy in engaging for the defence of the empire with an army composed of such a force of militia. I may be so. I confers it. I should infinitely prefer, and should feel more confidence in, an army of regular troops. But / know that I shall not have these. I may have the others, and if an addition is made to the existing regular army allotted for home defence of a force which will cost £400,000 a yar, there would be a sufficient disciplined force in the field to enable him who should command to defend the country.

" This is of our danger and our resources. I was aware that our magazines and arsenals were very inadequately supplied with ordnance and carriages, arms, stores of all denominations, and ammunition. The deficiency has been occasioned in part by the sale of arms, and of virions descriptions of ordnance stores, since the termination of the late war, in order to dimmish the demand of supply to carry on the peace service of the ordnance, in part by the conflagra'ion of the arsenal which occurred in the Tower some years ago, and by the difficulty under which all Governments in thiß country labour in prevailing upon Parliament, in time of peace, to take into consideration measures necessary for the safely of the country in time of war. The state of th? ordnance, arms, ammunition, &c, in magazines, is in part the question of expense, and perhaps in some decree one of time. I would recommend to have an alphabetical list of the stores examined by a committee, and made out in form, as upon the enclosed half sheet of paper, by ascertaining what there was in 1804, and what there b in store now, of each article, and the difference between the two accounts. I have taken the year 1804 as the standard, as that was the year in which the invasion was threatened. It was previous to the employment of the armies in the Peninsula or North America; in short, as nearly as possible similar to the political circumstances in which we stand at this moment, excepting that we ace now at peace with France—we were then at war, A fourth column would be the estimate of the expense of bringing the magazines to the state in which they were in 1804. With this information before him, the Master General could give the Government accurate information of the wants of ordnance, arms, ammunition, and stores in the magazines of the country.

*' You will see from what I have written that I have contemplated the danger to which you have referred. I have done so for years. I have drawn to it the attention of different administrations at differeut times. Yon will observe, likewise, that X have considered of the measures of prospective security, and of the mode and cost of the attainment, # * * *

" 1 have done more. I have looked at and considered these localities in great detail, and have made op my mind upon the details of their defence. These are questions to which ray mind has not been uuac* , costumed. I have considered and provided for the defence, the successful defence, of the frontiers of many countries. You are confidential head ot the principal defensive part of the country. I will, if you and the Master General of tbe Ordnance choose, converse or otherwise communicate confidently [confidentially ?] with you upon all the details of this suhject; will inform you of all that I know, have seen, and think upon it, and what my notions are of the details of the defensive system to be adopted and eventually carried into execution. 11 1 quite concur in all your views of the danger of oar position, and of the magnitude of the stake at issue. 1 am equally sensible of the certainty of failure if we do not, at an early moment, attend to the measures necessary to be taken for our defence, and of the disgrace—the indelible disgrace of such failure ; putting out of view all the other unfortunate consequences, such as the loss of the political and social position of this country among the nations of Europe, of all its allies, in concert with and in aid of whom it has in our own times contended successfully in arms for its own honour and safety, and the independence and freedom of the world. When did any man hear of allies, of a country unable to defend itself ? Views ol economy of some, aud I admit that the high views of national finance of others, induce them io postpone those measures absolutely necessary for mere defence and safety under existing circumstances, forgetting altogether the common practice of successful armies, in modern times, impoaing upon the conquered enormous pecuniary contributions, as well a$ other valuable and ornamental property* '* Look at the course pursued by France in Italy and Russia 1 at Vienoa repeatedly, at Berlin, at Moscow—the contributions levied, besides the subsistenanoe, maintenance, clothing, and equipment of the army which made the conquest! Look at the conduct of the allied army which invaded France, and had possession of Paris in 18151 Look at tbe account of the pecuniary sacrifices made upon that occasion, under their different heads of contributions, payment tor subsistence, and maintainance of the invading armies, including clothing and other equipments, payments of old repudiated state debts, payments of debts due to individuals in war in the different countries of Europe, r-payment for contribu'ions levied, add moveable and immoveable property sold in the course of the revolutary war. But such an accoout cannot be made out about this country. No 1 but 1 believe that the mean* of some demands would not be wanting. Are there any claims of & fleet at Xqulod, in 1783 ? None lur

debts left unpaid by British subjects in France, wfao escaped from confinement under cover of the invasion, in ISI4-, by the allied armies ? Can any man pretend to limit the amount of the demands on the account of the contributions de guerre ? Then look at the conditions of the treaties of Paris, 181-1, 1815. Franco having been in possession of nearly every capital in Europe, and having levied contributions to each, ami. Germany f and Poland, i* reduced to its territorial limits as they stood in 1792. Do we Buppose that we thonld be allowed to keep—more than the islands composing the United Kingdom, ceding disgracefully the Channel Islands, on which an invader had ever established himself since the period of the Norman Conquest ? ** I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of ago passed in honour. I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures to avert. « Believe me ever yours sincerely, ** Wellington."