ILLUSTRIOUS IRISHMEN.

Auckland Examiner, Volume 1, Issue 3, 25 December 1856, Page 2

ILLUSTRIOUS IRISHMEN.

FLOOD. Chapter I. Ireland has given birth to a long line of remarkable men. Its people, so mercurial and imaginative, are wonderfully impressible. They are more suceptible than either the English or the Scotch. No people take a livelier interest in political affairs. Their enthusiasm, like the sea, is boundless, and splendid eloquence has at all times exercised over them a vast influence. But Dugald Stewart justly observed that from the days Jonnnes Scotus, they have been a people by whom logical reasoning was held in high esteem. Conspicuous among their great oiators, and worthy to rank with the greatest orators of any age or nation, were Flood and. Grattan. Between these “ giants of eloquence refreshed by phylosophy” there was long and fierce contention. Their differences may be explained without imputing bad motives to either. The one viewed the many exciting questions of their time through the medium of intellect; the other through the medium of imagination. In 1782 Ireland had to fear not merely the regal but the democratic part of the British legislature; inasmuch as Ireland’s free trade tendencies might,, be supposed as great an object of jealousy to the one as her free political tendencies of the other. Still neither could be resumed without the certainty of convulsions that would have torn the empire asunder. It was clear that the partizans of provincial government had yielded to the champions of national independence. The terms which had been gained by the latter might be considered as one of those immense strides in advance, which is made from time to time by the spirit of the age, and which antiquates all the legal formalities by which it could be constitutionally resisted. As long as human affairs continue to progres, these advances will be made good; and should they retrogade, as legal barriers had not prevented the people from encroaching upon the crown, so they could not hinder the crown from encroaching upon the people. These or similar considerations indisposed many to accede to Flood’s proposition for a renunciation, on the part of England of any assumed right to legislate for Ireland ; but when Lord Mansfield’s adjudication in the King’s Bench in England upon a writ of error scut from Ireland was made known Irish susceptibility was fairly aroused, this indisposition to Flood’s propositions quickly disappeared, and his powerful, lucid, and unanswerable reasoning produced an effect upon the public mind that more than equalled his most sanguine expectations. In an admirable speech delivered on the 11th June, 1782, he said: —

“ The repeal of a declaratory law (unless it contains a renunciation of the principle,) is ouly a repeal of the declaration, and not of the legal principle. The principle remains in full force unless it be renounced. This is universally true, and it is strengthened in this case by this circumstance. Many acts have been made by the British parliament binding Ireland —some of them before the declaratory law of George the First. Now, whilst one of these remains, there is an exercise and a proof of the right,- stronger, by much, than the declaratory

law. A simple repeal, therefore, of the declaratory law, is no vindication of our legislature. But it is argued, that because in your address, you declare that the British parliament had no such right, therefore the repeal joined to this, will be equal to a renunciation by England. But what man in his senses can believe that our renunciation of the British claim can be equal to her own renunciation of it ? Or that, in any controversy, an assertion of a party in his own favour is equal to the admission of his antagonist ? If Britain renounces it no other power on the earth can pretend to maintain it. But if all the rest of the world were to deny her pretension, yet as long as she maintains it, our rights are unvindicatcd, and our constitution is in danger. Will any man say, that if I ask a thing on a particular principle that therefore, if I obtain it at all it must follow that I obtain it on my own principle, ? There is no such inference in law, in logic, or in reason : it would only appear that two parliaments had agreed in one point, that of the bare repeal; bat it never would appear, without an express renunciation, that they agreed in the renunciation also; and we know the fact to be that they do not agree with us in that principle. But, to put this argument to a decisive proof, let us suppose that, after such a simple repeal, at a future day the British parliament should revive the principle, and make a law for us; suppose that Ireland should remonstrate upon this; suppose she should read that paragraph of her address, and quote the British repeal of the declaratory law, and should argue from both that England had for ever renounced her claim, —do you think that England would listen to to such an inference, or that any reasoner in Europe wonld allow the force of your argument ? Would she allow you to piece your address to her act of parliment ? If you questioned her declaratory act, would not she question your declaratory address ? Would she not appeal to the language held by her own members? Would she not appeal to the journals? Would she not appeal to the silence of her law of repeal, and to your acquiescence under that silence? Would she not say that that was, virtually a national relinquishment of any idea of renunciation ; so that the principle remained not only unrenounced, but the equity of it impliedly admitted by Ireland, at a moment when she was the ablest to contest it ?

“ But I shall be asked, (though the repeal of the declaratory law should bs simple and imperfect) whether I think that England will ever revive the claim ? I answer, I cannot be certain that she will, neither can I be certain that she will not; and I ask in return, whether any man will be surety that she will not; and if any man is weak enough to say that he will be so, I will tell him that this nation will not be weak enough to accept of his surety, for no mortal is adequate security in such a case. I add, that England either has or has not a possible notion of such a renewal. If she has not, she will not quarrel about renouncing it; and if she has, the renunciation is absolutely necessary. I add, that if she does not renounce the claim, she may, certainly, revive it; but that if she does renounce it, she cannot certainly revive it. Yes, you will say for she might even repeal an act of renunciation ; — and to argue everything fairly I will admit that in the utmost range of possibility such an outrage is not unimaginable;—but what do I infer?— Not that I should be the more negligent, but that I ought to be the more careful; — that it is my duty to make it impossible if I can; and that if I cannot do so, it is my duty to make it next to impossible. It is absurd to say, because I cannot make a thing physically impracticable, that therefore I should leave it morally easy ; bnt it is good sense to say, that I will make a thing as difficult as I can, though I cannot make it as difficult as I would ; and that if I cannot make a thing impossible, I will make it next to impossible.”