Sketcher.
STRATEGY IN WAR. *Sl 1 3|jpW the lengih to which deoeptioß ma y witil honour ba carried in MfljK warfare is a question, very difficult to deoide. • History tells us of many artifices which have been successfully practised, but which can be dignified with no better name than that of perfidy. D ffarent exponents of international law have placed very different constructions upon acts which have been always regarded as questionable. Grotius, for instance, who may be tlooked upon as the father of the present system of international law, lays down the definite rule that there is no wrong indecefriaj* an enemy by the use of words or signs which have a meaning confiaed to particular peoples or individuals, while it is dishonourable to use symbols of universal significance for the same purpose. Aosorling to this authority there is nothing reprehensible in the employment of an enemy's uniform or signals against him, for these have no generally established meaning, but merely one attributed to them by a particular body. This theory teaches that the 'franc tireurs' who, in the Franco-Prussian War, disguised themselves in the uniforms of Prussians, and thus succeeded in approaching and killJßjr some of the enemy, acted in a perfectly defensible manner; and so with the many similar instances that c:mld be adduced in which such forms of strategy have been successfully employed. Cimoa, the AtheniaE, for in» Btance, once ciptured some ships belonging to the Persians ; he caused a number of his own men to go board tbem, and to array themselves in the garments of the Persians whom he had Blain. The vessels then were directed to Cyprus, with the result that the inhabitants of the'island came out unarmed, as they thought, to welcome their friends, but only to find themselves confronted by their enemies, who were, of ourse, easily able to defeat them. ;? J
Take another more modern instance ? at the close of the la3t century the •Sybille/ a vessel which Rodney had captured from the French, made captive a French ship that was lying at anchor by approaching her under cover of the Fronch fLvg, and only showing the British colours just before pouring the first broad-, side into the foe. It seemg to luve been* pretty generally recognised in days gone by that it was perfectly fair to use an enemy's colours provided that these uader which the ship really nailed were displayed before the actual commencement of hostilities. In the fourteenth century, for example, the French plundered arid
set fire to Portsmouth, having been allowed to enter the town under the sapposition that they werß English, an idea to which their display of English flags gave rise. Modern notions of right and wrong in warfare do not, however, favour the ideas which Grotius held on this question. In 1874 a Conference met at Brussels with a view to deciding such points, arid it was then settled that the use of an enemy's uniform or flag cjuld not be regarded as a fair act of strategy. Presumably, no one will be found to dispute this decision. It is, of course, absurd to think of returning to the old ideas which precluded the. exarcisebf any guile whatever in war, but
at the same time we do not imagine that anybody will advocate the use of such lsing stratagems as that by which the 'SybiUe' took her priz3„ It is pretty evident that our highest military authorities are of opinion that it is impossible to succeed in war unless deception is practised to a far greater extent than the generally accepted code of morality would allow. Lord Wolseloy ha 3 expressed himself on the matter in the following unmistakeable terms: 'As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood 5 the word 'spy' conveys something aa repulsive as ' slave j * we keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentiments do well for a child's copy-book, but. a man who aits upon them had better sheathe'; his sword for ever.' ' Our only General' would never have found himself at the head of a Eoman army in the days when Some was mistress of the world. Poly bins, Livy, and iElian all agree m stating that the Romans shrank from and despised all forms of strategy. They always mada solemn declarations of war, and endeavoured so to arrange matters that they encountered thair foes in a hand-to-hand conflict, in which sheer bravery, perseverance, and prowess were the only roads to victory. They went so j far as to .appoint a definite date for an ; engagement, and to arrange the ccsne of the conflict beforehand. It was not until the close of the Second Punic War that the Romans adopted strategy in their , military affairs.
In the ancient world the descendants
of Romulus were by no means alone in their aversion to all forms of trickery in war. The Act roans disdained to take advantage of an enemy in any way. They never threw darts nor made use of concealed weapons. Their only mode of fighting was to meet one another in open eo&flicfc at a spot which had been pzes: viously agreed upon between the combatants. The Macedonians, too, seem to have been imbued with the same spirit, for we read that Alexander refused to make a night attack upon Darius, on the ground that he had no desire to win a victory by the adoption of undorhasd I measures.
Bat when oace the Romans cama to look upon devices for deceiving the enemy with favour, tbey showed themselves to be apt pupils in the art of strategy. Poljasnua wrote a book on the subject for the use of the Emperors Verus and. AntoEius, and embodied in it a number; of instances which seemed to him worthy of imitation. The nature of thlse may be gathered from the three following samples. At Notium Paohes, the Athenian general, persuaded the governor to coma out and parley with him, under promise of a safe escort back if they failed to come to any agreement. "When he had the governor in his power and tde vigilance of the defenders was relaxed on account of the parley, he made an assault, obtained possession of the town, murdered all its inmates, and after leading back the governor with a great display of effort, killed him on the walls of the city he had gained by this act of treachery. The Thracianß were worsted in a conflict of some duration with the Boeotians.. They made a treaty for a definite number of days, and, having thus put their opponents cff their guard, attacked them one night while they were engaged in religions obeervances, and succeeded in inflicting a severe defeat upon them. The Locriaas entered into a solemn compact with the Sicilians to the effect that they would keep peace with them so long as they walked upon the earth on which they stood, and.had their heads on their shoulders. Having disarmed suspicion by this agreement, they threw away the heads of garlic which they had tied on to their shoulders, emptied away the earth that they had strewed in their shoes, and falling upon the unsuspecting foe, slaughtered a great number of them.
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Alexandra Herald and Central Otago Gazette, Issue 390, 29 October 1903, Page 7
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1,228Sketcher. Alexandra Herald and Central Otago Gazette, Issue 390, 29 October 1903, Page 7
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