THE FUTURE WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA

Ashburton Guardian, Volume V, Issue 1412, 20 November 1886, Page 2

THE FUTURE WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA

HOW THE NATIONS ARE PREPARED FOE THE CONFLICT.

A work entitled “ From ViaMila to the Dnieper,” just published in Hanover, U creating considerable aensation on theOontinent. The author—who aigns himself “ Sarmaticu*,” and is said to be a distinguished ( ffioer In the German staff—starts from the time of view that Russian Ohauvlnism is an invading element which threatens Germany in particular, that a war between the two Powers is inevitable sooner or, later, and that in ca 'Sequence toe greatest vigilance Is necessary on the part of the Germans and their allies, the Austria s. The writer begins by describing the difficulties the German array would have to encounter cn Russian soil, and the measures to he taken to overcome them. ie gives a detailed account of the fortifi .t ous *i h which Russia baa strengthened her frontiers during the paet few ye»rs. Hi says Russia, a-cord-iug to cffical ~uusrics, possesses at the present ua >ment about three million of fighting mao. Bat this formidable force, admitting it exists, is ’ encumbered by numerous defects, notaoly want ol mobilisation. He thinks that Germany would be able to concentrate her attacking forces in one-third of the time re* qgired by cinrniv However, in spite of their superior organisation, he confesses hat the Germans would not be certain of victory without the assistance of Austria, The field of battle would probably be confined to Lithuania, on the Lower Niemen, Poland, between the Vistula and the Bug * and Volhyoia, on the Upper Bug The author does not believe that the Russians would abandon Poland and withdraw to the interior, as they did in 1812. This plan cost them so dear then that it would be folly to repeat it now. The ultimate aim of the invaders should not be St. Petersburg, but Moscow. St. Petersburg is an artificial creation ; it is not the real capital of the empire. Moec jw, on the contrary, is the heart of Russia; iu addition the route to it is more favorable than the rout to St. Petersburg. As to the duration of such a war, it is probable a year would not suffice, bat everything would depend on the Beeson and the resistance ffared by the Russians. Germany, however, should not shrink from _ the immensity of the task. Difficulties would not be what they were in 1812* The conditions are do the same. The principal difficulties encountered by Napcleou the First—namely the defective communications between his army and his hasp of operations—bava been considerably decreased *by the railways. The Gasman army, too, is armed and equipped in a manner very different from tnat of la grande stmts. Respecting the tactics of the Russians, he repudiates the idea of their again burning their towns, which wouic. be less to their advantage than to the invaders. The Germane, well provisioned, with the base of their operations secure, could contemplate calmly the burning of Moscow, which would do them no harm. The Russians, on the contrary, would thereby destroy their resources and inflict immense loss on the country. Says “ •'Semartions," conclusion :—“ The Germans have no reason to desire war with hussla, be os use; supposing them victorious, it would entail on them great and lasting evils; pal should it be forced on Germany by tha influence of Panslavlst agitators, we coma take op the glove in toll wd ectlT# OOH* fidraee as to the rewlt.” ; ;