The Ashburton Guardian. Magna Est Veritas et Prevalebit. MONDAY, NOVEMBER, 9, 1885. Representative System.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume V, Issue 1320, 9 November 1885, Page 2

The Ashburton Guardian. Magna Est Veritas et Prevalebit. MONDAY, NOVEMBER, 9, 1885. Representative System.

Mr Whitaker has made several attempts during the last seven years to introduce into the electoral laws of this colony some modification of the Hare system of representation adapted to the circumstances of New Zealand. Of course he could never have expected to carry it without an effort on the part of the people themselves —an effort strong enough to bear down the strong sense ot self-preservation which naturally actuates the holders ot office under the present laws, A large body of men will not readily commit suicide, and it was not the nominees of Old Saram who carried the Reform Bill that left that desolate mound unrepresented in the British House of Commons. No good argument has ever been brought against the Hare system cf representation, and the absence of any real and valid objection to it could not be more conclusively shown than by the fact that both in New Zealand and in Australia the men who dread its operation on themselves can say nothing worse against it than that it is (l complicated ” and “ beyond the comprehension of ordinary voters.” What must the opinion of such men be of the electors who send them to Parliament! We must acknowledge that Mr Hare’s book on his system gives a little color to the only objection of its opponents. We think it would have been better if he had simply apd clearly stated his proposals and shown how easily they could be carried out, either with or without adapting them to existing systems. But instead of this his book is full of passages, not only from his own powerful mind, but from the writings and utterances of a number of the deepest thinkers and most profound reasooers on the subject of representation, including Blackstone, Burke, Mill, Buckle, Holland, Grey, Guizot, Gladstone, and other eminent then, so that it requires no

small mental power and application to l master all that he has there provided for i his readers ; but it no more follows that I the elector who would vote under this i system would require to master that 1 book than that the stoker of a steam- 1 ship requires to understand all the principles that have led to the perfection of the machine he supplies with fuel. Under the Hare system the greatest blockhead that ever entered a polling booth could, if he pleased, vote just as he does now, i.e, t for either one of the candidates in his own district, and trouble himself about nothing further. But, if he happen to have intelligence enough to see that none of the candidates in his own district would represent his views so faithfully as a candidate in some other part of the colony instead of voting for a man who would not represent his views he would be allowed to vote for one that would. This is all that an elector need understand about the system, but an ingenious, though very simple arrangement is proposed for him by which he would be preserved from throwing his vote away upon some favorite man who might prove not to want it. The principle would be just the same whether each elector were allowed to vote for any candidate in any part of the colony, or in one-half of the colony, or in onequarter of the colony, but we think the first would be best, although in either case the electors would have a much wider choice of representatives than at present, and a well-known consistent man, who ably and faithfully represents some great principle would have a much better chance of being elected. It would be far more difficult and dangerous for an unprincipled candidate to offer improper inducements to secure his election in such a wide constituency, and very narrow selfish local consideration would be likely to tell as much against a candidate as for him. Let us suppose that it is decided to divide the colony into two electoral districts, and that the division shall be at Cook’s Straits. We will suppose that there are 6o seats to be filled by the southern district, and that there are 120 candidates. When an elector enters a polling booth he has a printed alphabetical list of the 120 candidates presented to him. He erases all the names but, let us say, 20. He can then write numerals against the names heJeaves, in the order of his preference, putting No 1 to the candidate he prefers above all the rest. Let us suppose that 60,000 electors have voted in this way. Then a candidate that has obtained 1,000 first votes is declared elected, and a thousand voting papers headed by his name and with the smallest number of other candidates attached to them, are sealed up and set aside as having done their work and elected their man. But if this candidate is a great favorite with a large party, some thousands of other voters have also put him at the head of their lists, and such votes are not to be wasted. To prevent this his name is struck out from all such papers and No 2 thereon counts as No i, or No 3 counts as No 1 supposing No 2 does not require them, and so on down the list In this way every candidate is elected who receives a thousand votes that were either originally or subsequently made first votes, and no candidate is elected who does not get named in some position on at least a thousand voting papers. This is all simple enough, but the effect of such a change on the elections would be worth ever so great an effort. In the first place tens of thousands of electors who value principle more than party, and some who will not rote at all for the narrow and bad choice that may be offered in their own districts, would come forward and vote for high principled men worthy of their choice. Then the lens of thousands who now only vote for one bad man to keep out a worse would be able to find a good one somewhere and vote for him. Then all the political, sectarian, mercenary, self-seeking, or philanthropic combinations, that now spend their efficient energies chiefly in putting in unprincipled men who will promise anything to secure votes, and keeping out all men of high principle who will boldly expose their selfishness or their sophistry, would certainly be able to send to Parliament the ablest exponents of their particular views that the colony could furnish, and in that way such undoubted curses, as their selfish interests have become at our elections, might even be a blessing, by sending to the House their most able and temperate and judicious representatives.