A BUSH FIRE CASE.

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XXXIV, Issue 9426, 23 April 1909, Page 6

A BUSH FIRE CASE.

la the Oourfc of Appeal oa Wednesj day the case of Pryce and another v. Small/was heard. In this case Mr O. P. Skerrett, K. 0., with him Mr H. H. Ostler, appeared for the appellant, -Hubert Pryce, a farmer, of Haloomto, and Mr T. M. Wilford appeared for the respondent, Hugh Gilbert Small, a farmer, of Weber. This was ati appeal on questions of law and fact from the decision of Mr James, S.M., at Danuevirke. Ap-. pellant and respondent were both farmers and occupied adjoining properties in the Dacnevlrke district. In January of last year a bush fire had started on certain property on the other side, bnt adjoining appellant’s land. Appellant had a patch of newly-felled bash on hie land and he was warned that there was danger of the fire setting this alight and burning him cut. He, therefore, on January 18tb set fire to this patch. At the time the wind was blowing from the respondent’s to the appellant’s land. On the night of January 30th the wind changed and blew a gale from the direction of die appellant’s holding towards that of respondent. Early cn January 31st the fire traversed the whole of appellant’s property, entered respondent’s property and did extensive damage, burning his pasture, many of his fences and some foxty or seventy sheep. Respondent brought an action against the appellant in the Magistrate’s Court. The Magistrate fou»d that the firewhich occasioned the damage to respondent was that which had been lighted by appellant’s manager on January 18th, and he gave £IOO damages against appel’ant. The grounds of appeal were stated as follows:—(1) That the fire life by respondent was to protect the properties of appellant and respondent against fires already raging aronnd their respective properties, and was absolutely necessary for that purpose. (3) That the fire lit by appellant had not been proved to have spread to the property of respondent. (3) That, in faot, it did not do so, (4) That if it did so, it did no damage to respondent’s property. His Honor in his reserved judgment said the onus was on Small to give satisfactory evidence that the fire lit on Pryce’s land caused or oontri bated to the injury to plaintiff, and he had failed to do so. Having come to that •onolnsion it was unnecessary to discuss general propositions as to the liability in the case of separate fires combining and doing injury. In such oases the authors of each fire werejnot properly termed “tort-feasors’' although each might in the event of the separate effect of each fire being indistinguishable be liable for the whole damage. There was a great 'deal of nnoontradioted evidence that the action of Pryce’s manager in lighting this fire was a wise and proper precaution, both in his own interests and that orhis neighbour Small to meet the fire that had broken out on the .other side, and that.it did in faot minimise the danger to Small by preventing a bnrnt-ont region between his place and the first fire. The appeal was allowed with £lO 10s costs and disbursements; judgment to be entered in the Lower Court for defendant with costs of that Court.