

immediately after the landing. Through his efforts the situation was stabilised in spite of heavy casualties and the left flank of the ANZAC foothold made secure. On the night of the first landing, he noted, there had been talk of re-embarkation; 'Personally', he wrote, 'I see nothing to require it',⁷ and there was no further talk of abandoning Anzac. Of this action Aspinall-Oglander wrote:

[The diary] . . . particularly made me regret something which I wrote about the first few days at Anzac. Naturally, as Official Historian, I was not a free agent, and I could not say exactly what I liked. Many happenings had to be omitted altogether and many (as I thought) fair criticisms were deleted by the official blue pencil. But I was at least allowed to use my own discretion in allotting praise, and it distresses me acutely to find now that, in one particular case, where I went out of my way to eulogise what . . . seemed to be indisputably a piece of extremely fine leadership by a certain officer, I should apparently to have backed the wrong horse! Anyhow, your father's diary now makes me think that, for he definitely states that the other man I praised so highly was in fact a public danger!⁸

The New Zealand Infantry Brigade then went to the Cape Helles front, where they took part in the failed attack on the whole Turkish line. The New Zealanders' objective in the attack was the village of Krithia, but they were brought to a halt, with severe casualties very far short of their goal. Malone describes this battle, and the general situation at Cape Helles.⁹

On his return to Anzac Malone was after a while made commander in succession of two vital posts in the Anzac front line; first at Courtney's Post and then Quinn's. It was at Quinn's where he brought about his most notable success, and earned the praise of the high command. These posts were parts of the line where the Allied grip was most tenuous. When Malone took them over they were a chaotic jumble of trenches and dugouts on the edge of precipitous slopes only a few yards from the Turkish line. The Australians and New Zealanders were in constant danger of being pushed or blown off their perch by the Turks, who were, moreover, able to fire in enfilade upon their trenches from both sides. Malone noted that Courtney's Post was 'a very higgledy-piggledy show. People all over the place',¹⁰ but after eight days in which he had transformed the situation, he was transferred to Quinn's.

His account of what followed is preceded by a typical criticism of Australians. They were responsible in his opinion for the dangerous condition of Courtney's and Quinn's:

In the early stages [when further attacks would have succeeded in pushing the Turks back] The Australians seemingly just sat down and waited and waited and did nothing. That seems to be their character. Dash forward like mad things and then instead of working and making good, sit down and loaf and then get 'scary'.¹¹

Taking over Quinn's he wrote, 'Such a dirty, dilapidated, unorganised post. Still I like work and will revel in straightening things up . . . gave orders that every rifle shot and bomb from the Turks was to be