

sometimes look almost like malignancy, which were perpetrated at the beginning of recruiting in Ireland are beyond belief." (October 28, 1916.)

Mr. Lloyd George found the right word. There was stupidity, but something behind the stupidity. In this crisis the old prejudice against Nationalist Ireland ruled our military administration. The Ulster Division had its badge. The Irish Division was not allowed a badge. The officers of the Ulster Volunteers were given commissions; the officers of the Irish Volunteers were compelled to have further training. The Ulster Division was treated as an Ulster army; the Irish Division as a unit of the British Army. The National University alone of Irish Universities was not allowed an O.T.C. Great difficulties were put in the way of giving commissions to Catholics in the Irish army, though the Ulster army was allowed to exclude officers on account of their religion or their politics. All Redmond's suggestions were refused. He wanted the Tyneside Irish to be trained in Ireland; the War Office insisted on keeping them in Northumberland. The Irishwomen were not even allowed to make colors for the Irish battalions; Mr. Devlin's 4000 recruits were not allowed to march through Belfast; it was only after Lord Roberts's intervention that the Irish army was allowed its full complement of Catholic chaplains.\* In many places the Unionist agent was made recruiting officer. Redmond, with a nation's sympathies in the balance, counted for less than the most obscure English M.P. known only to the Party Whips. One suggestion that he made repeatedly is specially significant in the light of later history. He urged that both the Ulster and the Irish Volunteers should be recognised and given military duties. There were two alternatives. The Volunteers could be used or they could be disarmed. Redmond wanted the first; the second was impracticable as Sir Edward Carson said he would not allow a gun to be taken out of Ulster. The worst course of all was to keep them armed and keep them idle.

The causes of this supreme blunder were two. Ireland was thrown to the War Office as if the problem were a problem of equipment or technical organisation. The War Office is a machine in which feelings count for little and imagination less. No Department was less fitted for this task. But behind the mechanical conservatism of the War Office there was the active ill-will of the Unionist leaders. The man who could have led the Unionist Party with a generous imagination was dead; if Orange intolerance had not been too much for him the Wyndham Act would not have been his only contribution to Irish peace. The man who could least forget the bitter memories of party strife was its leader. The most ardent Orangeman has an Irishman beneath the skin; Mr. Bonar Law is an Orangeman without an Irishman beneath his skin. Redmond's offer touched England, but it did not touch Mr. Bonar Law, who, not allowing strife a moment's respite, went to Belfast in September, with the Germans spreading over Belgium, to redouble his threats. Against these forces Liberal Ministers who, ever since the successful resistance of Ulster, had been doubtful of their authority, were unable to do justice to the generous instincts of the British people. Mr. Asquith went to Dublin to say that England wanted a free gift from a free people. That was precisely what Ireland wanted to give; it was precisely what the British Government refused to let her give. And as it became clear that this was not what England wanted from her, the thermometer in Ireland went steadily down.

It fell much faster in the spring when Sir Edward Carson was given office in the first Coalition (April,

\* "Not one of the brigadiers appointed was generally known in Ireland personally or by his connections. One was an Englishman. Of the officers originally appointed not one in five was a Catholic. No Catholic commanded a battalion, scarcely half a dozen were field officers. The only Catholic field officer appointed to the Division who had been prominently connected with the Volunteers was Lord Fingall, and he had severed his connection with that body."—*John Redmond's Last Years*, by Gwynn, p. 174.

1915). Redmond declined office, and urged that both he and Sir Edward Carson should be left out. Recruiting dropped from 6000 to 3000 a month. The two fiercest adversaries of Home Rule were now Ministers, and Sir Edward Carson was so little changed in temper that he refused to speak at a recruiting meeting with Redmond. Against such obstacles Redmond, intent on an alliance of the two peoples, was fighting a losing battle. He had not misjudged Ireland, but British Ministers had learnt less than this Irishman from the war. It seemed to Ireland, with the War Office and politicians applying the cold sponge to all her zeal, that though Ireland had forgotten her hatred, England had not forgotten her contempt. Steadily and fatally the war became less and less Ireland's war.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL.

In Easter week, 1916, there was a rebellion in Ireland. It took the British Government by surprise; it took Redmond by surprise; it took Ireland by surprise. That fact alone shows what an inconsiderable element it represented in Irish life. It was, in truth, the act of a few men, leading two small forces: a section of the Irish Volunteers, as the Volunteers who broke away at the secession were called,<sup>2</sup> and the Citizen Army, or the Workers' Army, in Dublin, led by Connolly. Judged by numbers, the rebellion was insignificant; it was the quality of its leaders, and, still more, the history of its punishment, that gave it such importance.

The Irish Volunteers had continued a steady propaganda against recruiting, making, naturally, great use of the arguments which the British authorities presented to them. They gained in vigor and popularity with the steady discouragement of the National Volunteers by the War Office. It was not easy for Ministers who had winked at the Ulster rebellion to take active measures against them, unless some association were proved with Germany. Such association was discovered on April 17, when a German ship landed Casement and brought rifles from Germany. On Saturday morning Dublin Castle decided to act, but though a parade of the Irish Volunteers was ordered for Easter Sunday, action was postponed. The Volunteers' parade was cancelled by Professor MacNeill, but some of the Irish Volunteers, acting under Pearse and Macdonagh, with the Citizen Army, acting under Connolly, seized the Post Office, and proclaimed the Irish Republic. Severe fighting was practically limited to Dublin; there were outbreaks in Galway, Drogheda, and Wexford, which the National Volunteers helped to suppress. But in Dublin street fighting lasted from Monday to Saturday: great destruction was done; 106 soldiers and 180 civilians were killed, and 334 soldiers and 614 civilians wounded.

These events excited great indignation for two reasons. In the first place, the rebellion had caused much bloodshed; in the second place, it was concerted with Germany. Germany was to land Casement and arms in Ireland and simultaneously to attack the East Coast of England. To English people, therefore, the act seemed a brutal stab in the back, and they could find no excuse for such conduct. The Home Rule Bill was on the Statute Book. Was not that proof of our goodwill? They did not understand that Irishmen had lost confidence about that Act when they found that the Ministers who had passed it were less powerful than those who had resisted it, and that Ireland was treated in the matter of recruiting in a way in which no Government would have dared to treat Scotland or Wales. They had enough to think about in their own affairs and prospects without trying to think about the affairs and prospects of Ireland.

For the moment this misunderstanding, which was to count later, counted for little, for Ireland and England were at one in their indignation. It has been said, very justly, "There was a rebellion in Ireland;

\* The Volunteers who stuck to Redmond were called National Volunteers.

(Continued on page 18.)

**W. F. SHORT,**

**MONUMENTAL SCULPTOR, POWDERHAM ST., NEW PLYMOUTH**

Every description of Monumental Work undertaken in latest and up-to-date style.