

narrow space of the carriage. . . The light of the lamp falls upon both their faces, and as their eyes meet they stare at each other with a nameless, deadly terror. . . For a moment it seems as if a cry would force itself from their lips, as if their hands would stretch out to clasp each other, as if a passing glow of happiness would lay

itself on both their faces. But a deep and burning blush suffuses her forehead, and a dark cloud passes over his. Their lips are once more closed, their hands press tightly together, and the ray disappears to make room for icy coldness. . . The two passengers sink back into their former seats, silent and dumb, strangers as before.

(To be continued.)

## The Irish Revolution and How It Came About

(By William O'Brien)

CHAPTER XXVII (Continued)

The Sinn Fein attitude during the war has not made matters easier. No British Statesman could coerce Ulster in order to place it forcibly under the control of de Valera and the men who were undoubtedly intriguing with the German to stab Britain in the back at the very moment when Germany was making a special effort to overwhelm her armies in France. I very much regret having to say this for I have always been a consistent supporter of every Home Rule Bill introduced into the House of Commons during the past 30 years. But it is no use ignoring facts. I know you to be a man of supreme courage and therefore prepared to face unpalatable truths.

Ever sincerely,

LOYD GEORGE.

William O'Brien, Esq.

*Private and Confidential.* July 19, 1919.  
Dear Mr. Lloyd George,—

Before you finally make up your mind to the most lamentable decision to which you are tending, there are a few considerations which I would ask you to weigh well.

1. If I was "fundamentally right" in struggling for the conciliation of "Ulster," it is not wise to forget that these efforts were steadily ignored by a Liberal Home Rule Government while Sir E. Carson's men were declaring in the House of Commons that it was still possible to win the consent of Ulster. No concession of any kind was offered, until at the last and under threat of rebellion there was offered the one inadmissible and impossible concession—that of Partition and the whole object of the Home Rule Bill sacrificed.

2. That Partition was offered with the concurrence of the late Irish Party is no argument against the Irish people, who, the moment they got the chance, and mainly on account of their acceptance of Partition, annihilated that Party at the polls.

3. Irish resentment is only exasperated by the allegation that "the Irish Convention failed to agree to a settlement." As you may possibly remember, I pointed out to you at the time, 90 out of 100 members of the Convention were pledged to Partition (which only for the Sinn Fein victories of East Clare and Kilkenny they would certainly have fallen back upon). The Convention represented everybody except the Irish people, as is proved by the fact that not three Nationalist members of the Convention could obtain election by any constituency in the country. On the other hand, you have only to refer to the class of names I suggested for a Conference of ten or twelve known

friends of peace to make sure they would have come to an agreement, and that, on a Referendum, their agreement would have been accepted by as large a majority as it is possible for any country to show upon any contested issue. That way, and that way alone, a settlement still lies.

4. The argument as to Sinn Fein having "stabbed England in the back" is only worthy of Sir E. Carson, whose preparations for his own rebellion were far more responsible for England's troubles with Germany. It must be remembered that the Easter Week Rising was a reaction from the failure of forty years of earnest petitioning for peace on the part of the Irish people, culminating with the proposal of Partition, which is as intolerable to Ireland as a proposal of peace would be to France on condition of the alienation of one-fourth of her territory. If Sinn Fein had stooped to a real policy of treachery, they would have flooded your army with Irish recruits, and by wholesale desertion in battle have imitated the desertions from the Austrian Army of her Bohemian, Croatian, Rumanian, and Italian subjects, to whom you have given liberty as their reward for their rebellions.

5. Nationalists are not pledged to a policy of "putting Ulster in the same position as Munster or Connaught." On the contrary, they are ready with one voice now to concede to Ulster the special terms my friends and myself struggled for all along—terms which would secure her all but half the votes in an Irish Parliament. They would probably accept, further, some such exceptional appeal to the Imperial Parliament for a limited time as we proposed six years ago. Any conceivable danger of oppression would now be met by an appeal to the League of Nations, who will have a jurisdiction in the affairs of minorities much larger than the "Ulster" minorities who have been incorporated in the new States of Poland, Bohemia, Servia, and the Italian Tyrol.

6. If the offer of unqualified Dominion Home Rule for all Ireland were propounded even now on the responsibility of the Government and accepted by an overwhelming majority—even in Ulster itself—on Referendum, it is not conceivable, especially if the verdict of Great Britain were obtained at a General Election, that physical force would be necessary to obtain obedience to the law.

I am too old to be any longer of much account, but it would be a wrong to the two countries to conceal from you my conviction that if the reasonableness of the most in-

fluent leaders of Sinn Fein be now spurned and nothing done, so long as Sir E. Carson bars the way, you will leave many millions of the new generation of Irishmen at home and in America and Australia with no alternative but to place their hopes in England's difficulties either through perilous rivalries with America or in some Socialist revolution at home in some paralysis of English trade. You will not, I hope, complain if I have been free spoken in offering advice of a sort which up to the present has not often turned out to be astray in the affairs of Ireland.

"Sincerely yours,

"WILLIAM O'BRIEN.

"Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.,  
Prime Minister."

"If they are honestly dealt with, all will be well, but God help the Government that will try any further tricks on them!" It was the complete manual of wisdom in the matter, but the manual was placed under the eyes of the blind. Plainly, it was the incorrigible British fault all over again: Mr. Lloyd George read the first hint of good-will on Mr. de Valera's part as a sign that he was a beaten man. As likely as not, he concluded that he had caught Mr. Mr. de Valera and myself in a conspiracy to balk him of the victory already in the hands of the Black-and-Tans. Here was the small smartness which so often marred his imaginative greatness as a statesman. Had he at that time honestly opened negotiations for peace, he would have avoided most of the difficulties which were later to imperil everything when the Irish Republic had to be dealt with as an accomplished fact. The Dail had not yet been formally called together: its members had not yet sworn the solemn oath of allegiance to the Irish Republic which it thenceforth became the principal difficulty of delicate minds to recall. It seems certain that Mr. de Valera's scruples about arranging the terms of an "external association" with the Empire would never have assumed their subsequent seriousness, and that the vast bulk of the nation would have welcomed peace in ecstasy. Nevertheless, in the very letter in which he acknowledges that I was "fundamentally right" (and consequently he himself fundamentally wrong) in the advice I had for years been tendering, the Prime Minister once more rejects my counsels, will talk of nothing except the old bitterness of Easter Week, and the failure of his own precious specific of "The Irish Convention," and obviously dismisses the subject with the comfortable feeling that his own policy of the Black Hand was winning.

### CHAPTER XXVIII.—THE BLACK AND-TANS.

Forced by England's deliberate plan from its quiet administration of Corporations and Co. Councils, its Arbitration Courts and peaceful picketing of the Royal Irish Constabulary, to fight for its life, Sinn Fein at last stood on its guard and fought. Since young David took up his sling to tackle Goliath never seemed there so unequal a match. Between regulars, policemen, and naval ratings, England disposed of an army of 100,000 of the best equipped troops in the

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