

highest test of fair judgment, 'Have you done unto others what you would have them do unto you?' And it is then that the defender of the French Government falls back upon the assertion that after all the Concordat was not a settlement, but was merely an arrangement for governmental voluntary contributions to the Church—contributions that the State may continue or discontinue at will. But argument like that is as bad as its predecessors, for it tries to make us believe that an untruth is the truth. The seizure of the churches at the beginning of the Revolution and the Concordat at the end are not separate items in French history, unrelated to each other.

On the other hand, they are two events closely related, standing to each other in the relation of cause and effect; for without the unlawful seizures the Concordat would never have been brought into existence, and without the Concordat the Church would eventually have found some other way to retrieve the wrong done. Napoleon was not making a contribution. He was righting the wrong. He needed the Church to help govern France, and the Concordat was his token that the Church was not to be despoiled. He needed to show the world that he was not for overturning the well-established institutions of mankind. Justice to the Church that had been robbed was the best evidence of his good faith. In every honest view of history it was a settlement that these parties entered upon in 1801, not a surrender—a settlement that had the intended effect of forestalling the Church from appealing on that day or at some later day, to the conscience of France for the justice that the conscience of France was bound some day to do.

Speaks as a Protestant in the Interest of Protestants.

It is not as a Catholic, therefore, or a Protestant speaking to Catholics, that I chose to raise my voice for whatever my voice is worth against this invasion of the rights of the Church, nor as a Protestant merely interested in seeing that the great sister Church is not despoiled. I speak as a Protestant and in the interests of Protestants; because if such things could be done outside of France, the great Protestant Church to which I belong, secure now in the enjoyment of the property it has created as the human instrument through which it is working out its faith, would be no longer secure. I speak, too, as an American, who, though irrevocably opposed to a Church-controlled State, is as irrevocably opposed to a State-controlled religion. I speak as a man to whom breach of faith is none the less odious because it may emerge from high altitudes. And I speak as a believer who sees in what is transpiring in France an organised movement against belief in God after any faith.

Happily what is transpiring there is not likely to transpire here. Republican America would not tolerate it. Protestant America would put herself against it. Liberty-loving America would overwhelm it or perish, for what France is doing to the Catholics of France, if accepted by the world as a thing rightly done, would be looked back to some day as the first great step toward the extinction not merely of the faith of men in God, but of liberty as individual men.

It is not alone the right of the Catholics of France to hold that which they have created that is on trial to-day. The whole cause of individual property is on trial. Individual liberty of conscience is on trial. And on issues such as these the attitude of America ought not to be in doubt.

The Privy Council

On various occasions in this Colony cases have been taken from our highest court—the Court of Appeal—to the Privy Council, and in view of this fact something about the highest court in the Kingdom will be of interest. It is not a little curious (says an exchange) that, while the inferior courts of law are, in some cases unpleasantly, familiar to the public at large, probably not one man in a thousand has any practical knowledge of the supreme and ultimate court on which the last hope of the persistent litigant depends—the Appeal Court of the House of Lords, which is one of the busiest, and certainly the most important and interesting, of all our tribunals.

The reason, no doubt, is that few litigants are sufficiently resolute or have a long enough purse to carry their grievances from one court to another until they reach the goal of the House of Lords. It is a luxury beyond the reach of the man of average means; for the appellant must, as a preliminary, give as security for costs his own recognizance for £500 and the bond of a surety for a further £200; and he must

brief two counsel, whose fees run to large figures. In addition, he must have a petition prepared praying that the judgment against which he appeals 'may be reviewed before His Majesty the King in his Court of Parliament'; he must lodge with the petition forty printed and bound copies describing in detail his case and that of the respondent; and he must supply ten copies bound in purple cloth for the use of the Lords of Appeal.

The Court which adjudicates on this, the final appeal, consists of the Lord Chancellor, as President, the four Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, each of whom receives a salary of £6000 a year, and any peers who have been or are judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature. Lay peers are entitled to sit as judges, but in practice the Court is confined to the legal lords named, who are certainly among

The Most Learned Lawyers in the Land.

Let us in fancy attend a sitting of this exalted Court, which is open to any member of the public who chooses to attend. The experience will be both novel and interesting, for this tribunal is not only the most picturesque of all, but its procedure is entirely different from that of all the inferior courts.

At half-past ten the Lord Chancellor makes his stately entry into the House of Lords (in which the Court holds its sittings on four days a week during term), heralded by the Serjeant-at-Arms bearing the mace and by the Purse-bearer carrying the richly-embroidered bag which is supposed to, but in fact does not, contain the Great Seal. His lordship proceeds to the Woolsack, on which he takes his seat, with the mace at his back. When the law lords have also taken their seats, on the front benches near the Bar, the court is formally opened with prayer, read by the Chancellor and responded to by his colleagues. This preliminary over, the doors are opened by the yeoman usher; the waiting crowd of counsel, litigants, and the curious public flock into the chamber and take up their position outside the Bar, the lawyers and the parties to the appeal entering a railled-off enclosure appropriated for their use.

Meanwhile the Lord Chancellor has left the Woolsack and has taken his seat at a table nearer the Bar, flanked on each side by his noble colleagues, all of whom, unlike his lordship, are in ordinary lay attire, without either wigs or gowns. Then the first case is opened by one of the counsel, who proceeds to give his arguments in a quiet, conversational fashion, while the judges listen gravely and patiently to him. No witnesses are called, no technical objections and quibbles, such as are common in inferior courts, are heard. It is simply a plain unfolding of his client's case, with a statement of the law on which he relies to support it. No more than two counsel are heard on either side, and when each has exhausted his arguments the Court reserves its judgment until some future day, and the next case is called.

When the day arrives on which the Court, after mature deliberation, is prepared to give its verdict, counsel and litigants again attend, and the Lord Chancellor, leaving the Woolsack, reads his judgment from the clerks' table; the other law lords follow in order of precedence, and, finally, the Lord Chancellor 'puts the question' in the form of his own decision. 'As many as are of that opinion will say "content," and of the contrary opinion "non-content,"' announcing the result as the contents or non-contents are in the majority.

From this verdict there is no further appeal. The law has said its last word on the dispute, and if the appeal is dismissed the appellant has such satisfaction as he can derive from the knowledge that he has done everything that money, pluck, and skill can do to win his case.

The Value of a Trade

The following remarks on the wisdom of boys mastering trades, which appeared in a recent issue of the 'New York Times', are as applicable to New Zealand as to the United States:—

The idea that a trade is an excellent thing for any young man to possess is rapidly gaining weight among the thoughtful people of this country. The idea is a good one, and the more widely it is extended the better it will be for this nation and for its people.

There was a time when it was deemed degrading for the son of a rich man to perform any unnecessary labor. There seemed to be a feeling that, as the father had made all the money that his family could reasonably be expected to require it was the duty of